China's militarily-sensitive exports to Russia are evolving

Chinese direct exports to Russia are rising – and shifting. Past changes in PRC exports of military-relevant goods have aligned with key developments in the war, such as trench-digging equipment exports coinciding with Russia's construction of the Surovikin Line. Recent data indicates that China is dramatically increasing shipments of electric components, circuit boards, and modules to Russia, potentially signaling shifts in Russia’s defense industrial posture, battlefield tactics, or both. With China supplying the bulk of Russia’s direct and indirect imports, trade data may offer valuable insights into Russia’s defense industry priorities and the evolving nature of the conflict.

Chinese exports to Russia of High-Priority Goods are rising again

Beijing has been openly but not explicitly supplying Moscow with critical defense industrial base support throughout its invasion of Ukraine. Parenthetically, you can read a short history of post-February 2022 bilateral trade here, or a prior explainer about Beijing’s role in fortifying the Russian front lines.

Chinese direct exports to Russia reached $11.25 billion September 2024, an all-time high. Rising Chinese exports were partially attributable to an anticipated increase in Russian import duties of Chinese autos, as SWP’s Janis Kluge noted.

Source: PRC GACC, Author’s Calculations

But the uptick in Chinese exports to Russia is not only due to a one-off event. After a brief retreat this summer in the face of stronger U.S. and allied sanctions, Chinese firms are once again directly engaging with Russian counterparts in militarily-sensitive trade, according to PRC trade data.  

The U.S., EU, UK, and Japan have imposed export controls and other measures against militarily-sensitive items. The “Common High Priority List,” or CHPL, consists of 50 items that are most relevant for Russia’s war effort. The CHPL is divided into four tiers, per the U.S. Department of Commerce:

·         Tier 1: Items of the highest concern due to their critical role in the production of advanced Russian precision-guided weapons systems, Russia’s lack of domestic production, and limited global manufacturers.

·         Tier 2: Additional electronics items for which Russia may have some domestic production capability but a preference to source from the United States and its partners and allies.

·         Tier 3.A: Further electronic components used in Russian weapons systems, with a broader range of suppliers.

·         Tier 3.B: Mechanical and other components utilized in Russian weapons systems.

·         Tier 4.A: Manufacturing, production and quality testing equipment