Briefing: Takaichi Sanae and China–Japan Relations

1. Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s 7 November comment that a Taiwan conflict could threaten Japan’s “survival” triggered a huge, ongoing wave of commentary in China.

2. Analysts stress continuity: her rhetoric fits a long trend of Japanese remilitarisation and “historical revisionism” driven by right-wing forces.

3. Specific motives are debated, from factional politics and right-wing populism to personal conviction.

4. Official messaging argues that her comments undermine: 1) China–Japan bilateral relations as captured by the “four political documents”; 2) the regional security order; and 3) the post-1945 international order.

5. Commentary combines confidence that a declining Japan cannot match China’s industrial weight with a pessimistic view that, although off-ramps exist, Tokyo is unlikely to change course; only a few voices are more sanguine.

6. Many argue the US will resist being dragged into a Japan-led Taiwan conflict, but analysis is split between “Japan as America’s attack dog” and “Japan pulling a reluctant US into the Pacific”.

7. Most Chinese analysts judge Beijing’s response as appropriate, with some arguing it should go further; Japanese militarism is widely portrayed as responding only to strength.

8. Fringe nationalist commentary spells out alarming “policy options”, including a revision of China’s nuclear doctrine to allow a first strike against Japan.

9. The broader policy menu focuses on rules-based “legal diplomacy”, calibrated economic pressure, and a more visible PLA presence; the goal is to convince Japanese elites that an anti-China line is structurally untenable.

10. A notable recurring proposal is to “play the Ryukyu card” by supporting Okinawa-based indigenous and anti-base claims as structural leverage over Japan.

Chinese commentary on Sino–Japanese relations has surged since Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae linked a Taiwan conflict to a “situation threatening Japan’s survival” on 7 November.

Although Beijing’s off-ramp is tied to a retraction, Chinese writers place this episode within a broader indictment of Takaichi’s policy choices. Her apparent readiness to loosen Japan’s “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” is treated with particular alarm.

Several authors tie her language back to the 1930s, arguing that invoking an impending “existential crisis” (存亡危机) to justify external aggression is a habitual trick of Japanese militarism. Across the spectrum — from People’s Daily’s “Zhong Sheng” editorials to think-tank scholars and fringe commentators — Takaichi’s remarks are framed as evidence of a dangerous shift towards Japanese remilitarisation and “historical revisionism” (历史修正主义) ...