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A Version of Direct Realism

By Michael Huemer · Fake Nous · · 10 min read

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Here, I explain the sense in which sensory perception provides direct awareness of the external world.*

[ *Based on: Skepticism & the Veil of Perception, ch. 4. ]

Background: In the theory of perception, there are traditionally four views:

  1. Direct realism: In perception, we are directly aware of the external world. Also, we have non-inferential knowledge about the external world.

  2. Indirect realism (sometimes called “representationalism”, but this could be misleading): In perception, we are directly aware only of something in our own minds, and we are indirectly aware of the external world. Also, we have (only) inferential knowledge about the external world.

  3. Idealism: In perception, we are directly aware of our own minds (or “ideas” in the mind), and there is no external world.

  4. Skepticism: Nobody knows whether there is an external world.

Most philosophers who endorsed any of these have endorsed (2), though the issue is not often discussed today. Most psychologists would also endorse (2), though perhaps without knowing what it means. Let’s start by understanding what (1) and (2) mean.

1. Awareness

Here, I am interested in “awareness” as a relationship between a conscious being and an object of which the being is aware. There are different kinds of awareness: E.g., perception (perceptual awareness) is direct awareness of external objects, events, or other phenomena. Knowledge is awareness of facts. Memory is awareness of past events or previously-learned facts. Concepts are states of awareness of abstract objects (universals). At least some intuitions constitute awareness of necessary truths.

Since my thesis is phrased in terms of awareness, I should say something about what awareness is. For S to be aware of x, three things must happen:

(i) S must have an assertive mental representation.

Comment: This is a type of mental state that represents its content as actual (such as perceptual experiences or beliefs, and unlike mere imaginings or desires).

(ii) x must (exist and) at least roughly satisfy the content of that representation, at least in some important respects. And

(iii) It must be non-accidental (not merely a matter of chance) that the content of the representation is satisfied.

2. Direct vs. Indirect Awareness

The distinction between direct and indirect awareness is a generalization of the distinction between non-inferential and inferential knowledge.

You are “indirectly aware” of x when your awareness of x is based on your awareness of something else. You are directly aware of x

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