How disinformation shut down US special operators

A U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS TEAM could not operate in combat for a month because of disinformation.

It was March 26, 2006, and American Green Berets and their Iraqi partners had just fought insurgents from the Mahdi Army, a brutal death squad in Iraq.

After a brief gun battle, they cleared the target compound and tallied the score: A dozen or so enemy dead, a similar number of detainees to interrogate, a weapons cache found and destroyed, and one hostage rescued. Mission complete.

The special operators had finished a typical no-knock raid and were headed home. But they weren’t prepared for what came next: After leaving, someone went to the compound, removed the weapons, and rearranged the insurgents’ bodies to make it seem like they were murdered during prayer.

“They then took pictures, uploaded them to the web, and issued a press release explaining that U.S. soldiers had entered a mosque and killed men peacefully at prayer,” the Government Accountability Office said in a new report to Congress demonstrating how disinformation can threaten national security and have real-world impact.

“Literally they had their story, their propaganda, out on the wires before the assault force was back at the compound…” Col. Kenneth Tovo, the group commander, recalled to an Army War College researcher in 2009. “That’s how brilliant [this was. It] really surprised us that first time.”

Back then, photos of empty bullet casings on a blood-stained floor the insurgents claimed as a mosque appeared on the AP wire. The story was picked up in American and Arab news media, outraging Iraqis and fueling violent protests and suicide bombings in the ensuing days.

“As a result of this disinformation activity, this special operations unit was not allowed to conduct any military operations for 30 days while the Army conducted an internal investigation,” the GAO wrote.

In other words, a team of elite soldiers was bested on the battlefield not by bullets but by information. “…essentially neutralized for a month by those same forces using a cell phone camera,” the War College researcher concluded.

Fortunately, U.S. soldiers had helmet cameras documenting the raid, which showed the insurgent propaganda was bogus. But the incident convinced at least one Army officer to never again go out without considering visual documentation of a mission.

I HAD NEVER HEARD this story before reading the report. But it sounded familiar, having personally felt the power of flawed ...