China’s Policy and Intellectual Debates | Sinification: January 2026

Sinification is a terrific resource for understanding how domestic and international affairs are being debated by the Chinese establishment, and for getting a better sense of where China may be heading. Sinification’s team track, translate, and analyze key debates shaping thought and policy in China, adding the context needed to understand why they matter. I’m very pleased to be able to share this year’s first edition with Sinocism readers.

In 2026, Sinocism and Sinification will cooperate on monthly editions for Sinocism’s subscribers, highlighting the internal discussions and policy thinking that matter in a system that remains so stubbornly opaque. More on Sinification, including weekly subscription options, is available here. — Bill

International Relations

A noteworthy development in January’s foreign relations discourse is the emergence of more assertive calls to recalibrate China’s diplomatic posture, against a backdrop of overwhelmingly cautious reactions to the Maduro operation. The position taken by the hawkish Jin Canrong is particularly striking: moving beyond his earlier restraint on Venezuela, he warns that China will struggle to compete with the United States for influence among small or middle powers through economic engagement alone, absent credible security guarantees.

Jin’s proposal is unusual. While many other commentators similarly interpret declining cohesion among Western states as an opportunity for China to assume greater global responsibility, what such responsibility would entail remains vague in their formulations. Enthusiasm for engaging US allies is muted, and Europe-focused commentaries are often openly scornful of the continent’s continued dependence on the illusory “paradise” of security guarantees from an unpredictable—and potentially coercive—partner. Only Feng Yujun and the liberal scholar Xu Jilin depart from this prevailing mood, with Xu offering an affirmative reading of Mark Carney’s Davos “middle powers declaration” as signalling the rise of a strategically significant “second world”.

Most scholars argue that China is better served by attracting partners through a posture of defending globalism, rather than mirroring any Monroeist drift towards spheres of influence, and they generally reject any direct analogy between Venezuela and Taiwan. One notable outlier is the tub-thumping scholar Zhang Weiwei, who suggests that Trump’s Monroeism creates an opening for China to “act decisively” on Taiwan should an opportune moment arise—an argument the retired scholar Xiao Gongqin explicitly cautions against as a dangerous misreading of the strategic environment. A recent Qiushi analysis of the US National Security document by Ni Feng of CASS offers an authoritative framing closer to Xiao’s position, ...