We need to talk about Kyrgyzstan

Western countries need to strongly consider placing significant restrictions on trade with Bishkek. I elaborate on this argument in The Telegraph’s Ukraine: The Latest podcast, where I discussed some analysis conducted in a recent article on Sino-Russian trade for The Atlantic Council.

I’ve included my high-level talking points for the podcast below but suggest consulting the Atlantic Council or Lowy Institute articles on Central Asia/Kyrgyzstan for more in-depth analysis/data visualizations, or the Telegraph podcast if you’re more of an auditory learner. Thanks for reading - Joe

Five broad points:

1.       Chinese exports to Russia, whether shipped directly or via cutouts, are critical for the Kremlin’s war effort. These direct and indirect exports to Russia have surged since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022.

2.       Chinese firms are not unconditionally committed to Russia. They have been cautious about violating Western sanctions and have scaled back ties with Russia twice due to sanctions fears, first at the beginning on the full-scale invasion and again in early 2024.

3.       Sanctions are something like a game of whack-a-mole and lead only to temporary disruptions. But they’re still important, as they can disrupt the Kremlin’s war machine for weeks or even months.

4.       With Ukraine likely facing its darkest winter of the war, Kyiv needs all the help it can get. Western policymakers should look closely at further disrupting the Kremlin’s indirect imports from China. Accordingly, Western countries should also consider applying tougher sanctions to Kyrgyzstan, which has been a huge violator of sanctions. This approach is not without risks but would disrupt the Russian war machine for several weeks or even months.

5.       There are at least two ways to slow indirect China-to-Russia trade. First, Western countries should consider blanket bans on exports to Kyrgyzstan. Second, many Western firms with operations in China are notionally exporting to Kyrgyzstan, but with the understanding that these goods will ultimately arrive in Russia. The status quo allows them to trade with Russia with a fig leaf of deniability. By placing Russia-like sanctions on Kyrgyzstan, Washington and Brussels can significantly disrupt China-to-Russia trade via the indirect route.

The role of Chinese exports to Russia in shaping the conflict

Russia very likely could have lost the war already without access to Chinese imports. According to estimates from Alex Isakov and Gerard DiPippo of Bloomberg Intelligence, China’s share of all Russian imports jumped from 25 percent before ...