Geopolitical Disorder in 2026 and Implications for Beijing and Moscow

Bilateral ties between the People’s Republic of China and Russia will likely be marked more by continuity than change in 2026, but both Beijing and Moscow will seek to capitalize on profound geopolitical disruptions that seem very likely to occur this year.

As in 2025, some assumptions about China-Russia relations seem safe to hold. In a continuation of trends seen since the Prigozhin mutiny, Beijing will continue to de-personalize and institutionalize China-Russia relations, in order to hedge against Russian domestic political uncertainty. Accordingly, bilateral political and military ties will likely remain robust no matter who sits atop the power vertical. Finally, PRC-Russian defense industrial base cooperation will remain in place for at least the duration of the war – although Beijing may have obtained Russia’s most valuable technology already, either through voluntary transfer or other means.

On the other hand, developments in Russian domestic politics could inject uncertainty into bilateral ties. A cease fire in Ukraine could, in fact, irritate ties between Beijing and Moscow, if post-war Russia experiences domestic political economy convulsions. If the war winds down, the Russian economy will need to reorient from military to civilian production, which will create winners – and losers. Putin’s ability to buy off losers will be constrained, moreover, by dwindling national wealth reserves and low oil prices, assuming there are no major global oil production outages. Finally, an unsatisfactory political outcome in Ukraine could roil elite and domestic perceptions of Putin, especially if paired with discontent from returning veterans. Still, the Russian economy is faring better than many anticipated and is not yet on the verge of crisis. Putin is an adept manager of Russian domestic politics and will likely continue to rule throughout 2026, but outside analysts, including in China, may pay growing attention to potential succession plans.

Bilateral economic ties will remain robust, although additional frictions will likely emerge as commercial relations become even more tilted in Beijing’s favor. As Russian firms return from a wartime economy they will increasingly compete with Chinese firms, raising questions about how much Chinese economic and technological influence Moscow will tolerate. Indeed, Chinese vehicles trade with Russia will be something to watch closely (and will be a subject of an upcoming analysis), as Moscow began imposing restrictions in 2024. Russia will also have to determine what role Chinese-owned Douyin (Tiktok in the West) and other Chinese technology companies will play in 2026.

Finally, ...