Evidence Is Seemings

Here, I explain for the umpteenth time why I think justification comes from seemings.* I was invited to contribute to a debate on whether “evidence is seemings”, defending the affirmative.

[ *Based on: “Evidence Is Seemings” and “Four Challenges for Phenomenal Conservatism,” pp. 127-34 and 142-5 in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd ed. (Wiley, 2024). ]

1. A Theory of Justification

I was asked to talk about whether “evidence” consists of seemings. Some epistemologists use “evidence” to mean whatever confers epistemic justification for belief, so let’s just talk about that.

I think that all justification for belief derives from appearances, or seemings (mental states one has whereby something seems to one to be the case). These include sensory experiences, memory experiences, and intuitions, perhaps among other things. It’s rational, I claim, to presume that things are the way they seem, unless and until you acquire reason (which would itself have to come from other seemings) for doubting that. I call this principle Phenomenal Conservatism (PC).

2. Examples

Usually, the best way to assess a theory of X is to think of examples of things that we pretheoretically consider examples of X, and see how well the theory does explaining them.

Most beliefs derive (directly or indirectly) from observation by the 5 senses. Observation is a matter of having sensory appearances (things look a certain way, sound a certain way, etc.) that are caused in the right way by the objects they represent. PC explains why we (justifiedly) believe what we seemingly observe, until we get reasons for doubting it.

Or consider a priori beliefs, such as the belief [If a=b and b=c, then a=c]. When you think about this proposition, it just seems obvious. That is a type of appearance (sc., an “intuition”). PC can explain a priori knowledge as resting on these sorts of intuitions.

Memory beliefs are similar. You don’t start by assuming that memory is untrustworthy until proven trustworthy. You start by assuming that what you seem to remember is what happened, unless and until you have grounds for doubt.

Regarding self-knowledge (knowledge of your own mental states), note that the appearance need not be a separate state. Maybe conscious mental states are identical with their own appearances. E.g., if you’re in pain, the “appearance of being in pain” just is the pain.

In brief, Phenomenal Conservatism does a good job of explaining the beliefs that