Moral Motivation

Here, I discuss how David Hume is wrong about moral motivation. Reason sometimes produces moral judgments, which can motivate and justify actions, independent of desires.*

[ *Based on: Ethical Intuitionism, ch. 7. ]

This part of my book was unjustly ignored. :( It deserves attention since it refutes the leading theory of action and the most common argument against moral realism. It also helps us understand free will and weakness of will.

1. The Humean Argument Against Moral Realism

Maybe the most popular argument in all of the ethics literature is the Humean argument against moral realism:

1. The Humean Theory of Reasons: All reasons for action derive from desires. I.e., you have reason to do A (only) insofar as A would raise the chances of your getting something you already want.

2. Beliefs about objective facts do not entail the presence of any desires.

3. Moral attitudes (the attitudes expressed by moral claims) entail reasons for action. E.g., if you sincerely say “x is wrong,” then you must have some motivation to avoid x.

4. Conclusion: Moral attitudes are not beliefs about objective facts.

   (Maybe they are expressions of emotion or desire, or reports of emotions or desires, or something like that.)

Many philosophers think this is a great argument. It is generally used to support subjectivism or non-cognitivism, especially the latter.

Note: “Reasons for action” can be understood in 2 ways:

• a. Motivating reasons: The sorts of things that tend to cause actions; they explain, psychologically, why a person in fact does what they do.

• b. Normative reasons: The sorts of things that tend to make an action rational. They explain why a person (rationally) should do a given thing.

The Humean argument can be understood using either sense of “reason.” There is also an argument that the two kinds of reason are closely connected. Roughly: To say you should do A (or that it would be rational to do A) implies that you can do A of your own free will. But you cannot do A of your own free will unless you have some motivation for doing A. Therefore, you have a normative reason for A only if you have a motivating reason for A.

2. A Non-Humean View of Reasons

Here are four kinds of motivations that we have:

1. Appetites: These are simple, instinctive desires, whose satisfaction normally gives sensory pleasure. (Think of hunger, thirst, lust.) [Aside: