Crumbs concerning existential "proofs"

The following isn’t intended to be revolutionary or majorly corrective for the vast majority of philosophically trained minds in our current postmodernity. It is merely a note on the problem of “arguments for the existence of God” that leads me to say that they are, especially in their classical forms, useless at best and misleadingly comparative at worst. It is an honest attempt to frame an overly philosophical approach to proofs (both apologetically and polemically) as lacking the real “bite” with which we can apply them to anything outside of the proofs themselves—or, in short, they seem to neither give us the objective proof sufficient to believe in a God (but, even then, this phrase could only ever mean “mere acknowledgement”) nor clear the slate in demonstrating the non-existence of this divine object. Even if we could demonstrate such a thing, the proof would merely leave us at the first step of the journey with no obvious movement from mere disbelief.

With that in mind, we draw from the writings of Johannes Climacus in order to dismiss the problem of “objective” and “serious” philosophical theology.

In their most basic form, an argument for the existence of God is intended to, by way of propositions, logical movement, and a little bit of philosophical sleight of hand, show that the statement “God exists” is both a) meaningful, in the sense that it communicates a statement about the world which can be either true or false and b) true. Various kinds of arguments have been offered since antiquity towards various ends, e.g., the very first formulations were wielded in defence of pagan thought, and there are also “ecumenical” grounds for inter-faith dialogue today found in our faithful commonality, especially amongst Christians, Jews, and Muslims. You, my reader, are no doubt at least aware of some of these approaches, such as cosmological and teleological arguments.

As with all good teaching, let us first erect a strawman to quickly dispose of. Here is a standard formulation of a teleological argument that a young student might be expected to interact with:

1. Some things in nature (or nature itself, the cosmos) are design-like (exhibit a cognition-resonating, intention-shaped character R)

2. Design-like properties (R) are not producible by (unguided) natural means—i.e., any phenomenon exhibiting such Rs must be a product of intentional design.

3. Therefore, some things in nature (or nature itself, the cosmos) are products

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