Political Violence and the Exceptionalism of Public Reason

Very short summary: In this essay, I defend the central importance of the idea of public reason in liberal social and political morality. It is incompatible with political violence in all circumstances. The idea of public reason is however a late discovery of humanity and is fragile. It can quickly unravel as soon as some members of the population suspect others to be unwilling to meet its demand.

A recurrent theme discussed in this newsletter is the idea of public reason. It's not only because it refers to a research program – public reason liberalism – with which I identify and that largely informs my recent academic work. The idea of public reason also has a particular echo in our politically disturbed times where a lot of things that we have been taking for granted regarding the organization of our society and how to live together are suddenly struck with uncertainty.

The idea of public reason is complex and resists any simple characterization. At the most general level, it expresses the requirement that moral and political rules should be justifiable or acceptable to all persons over whom those rules are assumed to have authority.[1] In one of the very first attempts to make the idea explicit, John Rawls presented it as an encapsulation of our democratic political culture.[2] It expresses at the same time a commitment to certain democratic practices, a way to “do politics,” and a more substantive assessment of values, principles, and beliefs that are acceptable and can legitimately be introduced in the democratic collective deliberation.

As a way to do politics, the idea of public reason expresses at once the willingness to listen to others' arguments, a restraint from bringing views and demands that we know others cannot accept, general sincerity in the search for a consensus or at least a compromise, and – of course – the rejection of any form of violence to coerce others into submitting to one's views. As Rawls put it, in this sense, the idea of public reason entails a "duty of civility" for all citizens, or at least for political actors who, in one way or another, are making rules that will have authority over everyone. In particular, public officials who don't follow this duty, for instance by continually appealing to religious reasons that disregard the religious beliefs of a part of the population, or by threatening to ...