It Seems There's No Escaping It: Putin Must Pay
Deep Dives
Explore related topics with these Wikipedia articles, rewritten for enjoyable reading:
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Munich Agreement
11 min read
The article explicitly compares early Russia-Ukraine negotiations to the 1938 Munich Agreement, calling it 'a disastrous capitulation to Hitler.' Understanding this historical appeasement policy and its consequences provides essential context for evaluating current diplomatic approaches to Putin.
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SWIFT
10 min read
The article mentions throwing Russian banks out of the SWIFT system as economic pressure. Understanding how this global financial messaging network works and why exclusion from it is a powerful sanction helps readers grasp the economic leverage being discussed.
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War in Donbas
13 min read
Ponomarenko describes Donbas as his home region that he may never see again. Understanding the eight-year conflict that preceded the 2022 invasion, including Russian-backed separatism and the Minsk agreements, provides crucial context for why this territory is central to negotiations.
Peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, facilitated by a US administration that is openly seeking to profit from the endgame somehow, grind on incoherently amid persistent battlefield violence and growing unease among Ukraine’s European allies. Kyiv seeks binding international security guarantees and a ceasefire that maintains current frontlines, which it hints it might accept in practice (if not formally recognize), while Moscow is doubling down on demands. Putin has reiterated that the war would end only “once Ukrainian troops withdraw from the territories they occupy,” referring to lands recognized internationally (and in the 1990s by Russia) as Ukrainian. It’s none too promising.
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The weekend’s Miami talks leading to more talks followed Geneva talks that significantly (and weirdly) altered an earlier 28-point framework largely written by Moscow after fake talks (which we compared on these pages to the 1938 Munich Agreement remembered as a disastrous capitulation to Hitler) — yielding a second 19-point framework somewhat palatable to Ukraine (but not to Russia). Meanwhile Russia launched nearly 1,400 attack drones, 1,100 guided aerial bombs, and 66 missiles last week alone. Ukraine has responded with long-range drone strikes on Russian oil facilities and Black Sea shipping. Again, unpromising.
Against this backdrop, I joined a debate on the I24 station with Fred Fleitz, a thinktanky Trump advocate, and Illia Ponomarenko, a Ukrainian journalist who staunchly defends his country’s staunch stand. Something interesting happened: We agreed on little that came before, but concluded anyway that more pressure on Russia would be needed: That Putin must feel the cost of his aggression at a level that threatens the regime, which like all vile dictatorships will fall one day.
I said the 28-point plan was a total non-starter — while the 19-point plan is a no-go with Putin even though that too contains painful concessions by Ukraine. “It reminds me a little bit of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict … one side’s maximum will give does not meet the other’s minimal demand.” Ponomarenko pressed the risk of appeasement: “Who told anybody that by disarming Ukraine … will not be used by Russia to resume war in an even better position?” He betrayed some paranoia there, and I answered: “Everyone said that. There’s no disputing it” — which is why the second plan no longer places limits ...
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