Democratic Realism, Inclusiveness, and Subjugation

Very short summary: This essay explores a neglected aspect of the debate between deliberative democrats and democratic realists regarding the possibility and relevance of more inclusive democratic institutions. I reformulate the debate in terms of the subjugation costs due to a lack of inclusiveness. Hélène Landemore’s open democracy argues that demands for more inclusiveness justify non-electoral democratic mechanisms. Reasoning in terms of subjugation costs makes it possible to evaluate this argument. I argue that subjugation costs depend on the stakes of politics. From this perspective, a polycentric (rather than open) democracy could lower the stakes of politics – thus making demands for inclusiveness less pressing, but also making inclusiveness less costly to implement.

There have been a few significant paradigmatic innovations in the theory of democracy over the last couple of decades. One is the so-called “epistemic turn” in deliberative democracy, which acknowledges that the justification of political institutions largely depends on their epistemic properties for tracking the truth.[1] The other is the emergence of the “realist” account of democracy, which urges us to reconsider our normative expectations about what a democratic regime can and should achieve, especially in light of what we know about voters’ competences.[2]

The interaction between these two innovations can lead to unexpected outcomes. In particular, democratic realists can easily raise skepticism about democratic mechanisms’ ability to produce good outcomes or to uncover the truth. It is then only a small step to the more radical conclusion that some undemocratic regimes are epistemically superior to democracy.[3] [3] Epistemic democrats have countered by arguing that “diversity trumps ability,” meaning collective decisions made by a diverse electorate through democratic mechanisms tend to track the truth better than a more competent but less diverse committee of experts.[4] Also, screening for competence can inadvertently (or, for the most cynical, purposively) introduce social biases in the electorate, as socioeconomic and demographic characteristics are likely to be correlated with competence, however the latter is defined.[5]

I must admit that I’ve never been much impressed by the deliberative democrats’ epistemic counterargument, as I’ve already explained on this newsletter. More generally, the epistemic aspect of the debate between deliberative democrats and realists is not the most interesting. More relevant is that this confrontation prompts a reconsideration of the nature of democracy and its normative justification. Realists point out that an appropriate account of voters’ behavior disqualifies any “populist” ...