No Need for Explanation
Deep Dives
Explore related topics with these Wikipedia articles, rewritten for enjoyable reading:
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Banach–Tarski paradox
13 min read
The article directly discusses the Banach-Tarski Theorem as a key example in its argument against Phenomenal Explanationism. Understanding this mathematical paradox about decomposing spheres would give readers deeper appreciation of why necessary truths pose problems for PE.
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Abductive reasoning
1 min read
Phenomenal Explanationism is built on the concept that beliefs are justified when they're part of the best explanation for appearances. Understanding abductive reasoning and inference to the best explanation provides essential background for evaluating the debate between PC and PE.
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Justification (epistemology)
13 min read
The entire article centers on competing theories of epistemic justification - what makes a belief justified. This Wikipedia article would provide readers with the broader philosophical context for understanding the PC vs PE debate, including concepts like defeaters and bootstrapping.
Here, I explain why Phenomenal Conservatism is better than Phenomenal Explanationism.*
[ *Based on: “No Need for Explanation,” Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (2024), https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-024-00187-2. ]
1. Background
Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) holds that if it seems to you that P, and you have no reason to doubt P, then you thereby have some justification for believing P. I’ve defended this in earlier papers and posts (1, 2, 3, 4, 5).
Phenomenal Explanationism (PE) holds that a seeming that P provides justification for P when and only when the truth of P is part of or implied by the best explanation for one’s having that seeming. (See Kevin McCain & Luca Moretti, Appearance and Explanation, 2021.)
Someone invited me to write a paper about this.
2. Replies to Objections to PC
Here, I respond to objections to PC raised by McCain and Moretti (M&M).
2.1. Explaining defeat
M&M objected that PC doesn’t explain how defeat works, i.e., how additional information can defeat the justification that an appearance would normally provide for believing P.
I think PC can easily explain this. Justified beliefs are, basically, beliefs that make sense to adopt if you want to have true beliefs and to avoid false ones. If P seems true to you and you have no reason to doubt it, then it makes sense, from your own point of view, to adopt the belief that P.
But also, if you then acquire some evidence of ~P, or you just acquire evidence that your appearance that P isn’t a reliable indicator of the truth in this case, then it no longer makes sense, from the standpoint of the goal of having true beliefs and avoiding false ones, to believe P.
2.2. Reflective awareness
Maybe this case poses a problem for PC: imagine that S is taken, blindfolded, into a room. In advance, S knows that one of the room’s walls will be green, while another will be white but illuminated by green light such that it will look exactly like a green wall. Upon removing the blindfold, S sees a wall in front of her that looks green. What should she believe?
It seems that S should have a 50% credence that the wall in front of her is actually green, and a 50% credence that it is instead white but illuminated by green light. How would a phenomenal
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