Wikipedia Deep Dive

Al-Qassam Brigades

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In the summer of 1991, a new kind of fighting force emerged from the Palestinian territories. It was named after a man who had been dead for over half a century—a Syrian-born Muslim preacher named Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, who had fought against British and French colonial rule and died in a shootout with British police in 1935, exhorting his followers to "fight until the last bullet." His final words became a founding myth. The organization that now bears his name would become the largest and most capable militant group in the Gaza Strip.

The Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades—often shortened to Al-Qassam Brigades or simply EQB—serve as the military wing of Hamas, the Palestinian Islamist movement that has governed Gaza since 2007. But that phrase "military wing" deserves some unpacking, because the relationship between Hamas and its armed fighters is more complicated than it might first appear.

A Structure Designed for Deniability

Think of it this way: in 1997, political scientists compared Hamas and the Brigades to the relationship between Sinn Féin and the Irish Republican Army during the Troubles in Northern Ireland. A senior Hamas official was quoted saying that the Brigades "have their own leaders who do not take their orders from us and do not tell us of their plans in advance."

This wasn't just an organizational quirk. It was strategic.

The separation allowed Hamas political leaders to maintain what's called "plausible deniability"—the ability to claim they weren't directly responsible for specific attacks. This made Hamas eligible to participate in peace negotiations, just as Gerry Adams of Sinn Féin had done despite his party's connections to the IRA. Whether you view this as clever politics or cynical maneuvering depends largely on your perspective.

The Brigades take secrecy seriously at every level. Fighters' identities typically remain unknown until they die. Even during combat operations against Israeli forces, all militants wear distinctive black hoods with green headbands—the organizational colors. The group operates through independent cells, with even senior members often unaware of what other cells are doing. This compartmentalization serves a practical purpose: when Israeli forces kill Brigade members, the organization can regenerate because no single person holds all the operational knowledge.

The Man Who Survived Seven Assassination Attempts

For over three decades, the Brigades were led by Mohammed Deif, a figure so elusive that only a handful of photographs of him exist. Deif survived at least seven Israeli assassination attempts—strikes that killed family members and left him with serious injuries, including the loss of an eye and a leg. Each failed attempt only added to his almost mythical status among supporters.

His luck ran out on July 13, 2024.

The Israeli military finally killed Deif in an airstrike, ending one of the longest manhunts in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. His deputy, Marwan Issa, had already been killed four months earlier in March. The organization's leadership has since passed through several hands in rapid succession—a pattern that reflects the extraordinary pressures the group has faced during recent conflicts.

From Homemade Rockets to a Conventional Military Structure

The Brigades didn't start as the organized force they later became. In the early years, they were essentially a loose militia. The transformation came in 2004, ironically triggered by Israeli actions.

When Israel assassinated Hamas leaders Ahmed Yassin and Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi that year, decision-making power shifted to leaders living in exile in Damascus, Syria. This opened the door to greater influence—and crucially, greater funding—from Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah, the Lebanese militant group backed by Tehran.

The Brigades restructured along conventional military lines. Gaza was divided into six or seven regional divisions, each headed by a division commander responsible for a defined territory. Below them came regiment commanders, then company commanders responsible for individual neighborhoods. The organization developed a formal hierarchy: squads, companies, battalions, brigades—the same structure you'd find in any professional army.

Today, five main brigades divide Gaza geographically, comprising roughly thirty battalions in total. The North Brigade covers the northern governorate with seven battalions including an elite unit. The Gaza Brigade handles the main population center. The Central Brigade, Khan Younis Brigade, and Rafah Brigade cover the rest of the Strip. Each battalion is associated with a major settlement or refugee camp—names like Jabalia, Shati, Nusairat that appear regularly in news reports about the conflict.

The Arsenal: From Garage Projects to Guided Missiles

The military evolution of the Brigades can be traced through their weapons.

In the early days, they had rifles. Then came the Qassam rocket—a crude, homemade projectile that became so associated with the group that it shares their name. On August 3, 2004, they launched their first Yasin missile, a homebrew anti-tank rocket-propelled grenade. They developed other improvised weapons: rocket launchers with names like al-Bana and Batar.

But the arsenal grew far beyond garage projects.

An Associated Press investigation found that the majority of the Brigades' weapons come from China, Iran, Russia, North Korea, and former Warsaw Pact countries. The investigation couldn't determine whether Hamas obtains these weapons directly from those governments or through arms trafficking networks. China and North Korea officially deny arming the group, though American, Israeli, and South Korean intelligence suggests North Korea has done exactly that. A Hamas official claimed the group received permission from Russia to copy its weapons designs. Iran is believed to smuggle weapons into Gaza through the extensive tunnel networks that run beneath the territory.

The current inventory is formidable. Beyond the light automatic weapons, grenades, and homemade rockets, the Brigades possess sophisticated anti-tank guided missiles: the Russian-made Kornet-E and Konkurs-M, the North Korean Bulsae-2, the Soviet-era Malyutka, and even European-designed MILAN missiles. They have shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles including the SA-7B and SA-18 Igla, and reportedly some SA-24 Igla-S systems obtained from Libya during the chaos following Muammar Gaddafi's fall.

In 2014, they launched their first reconnaissance drone, the Ababeel-1—a sign that the conflict had entered a new technological era.

Tunnel Warfare: Going Underground

Perhaps no aspect of the Brigades' military strategy has attracted more attention than their tunnels.

After the 2004 restructuring, tunnel warfare became a primary means of combating the Israel Defense Forces, known as the IDF. The tunnel network serves multiple purposes: smuggling weapons and supplies, moving fighters undetected, launching surprise attacks, and holding hostages. The system is extensive enough that Israeli forces have spent months trying to locate and destroy it, often with limited success.

The tunnels represent an asymmetric response to Israeli military dominance. Israel controls the skies with advanced aircraft and drones. It monitors the surface with satellites and surveillance systems. But underground, the technological advantage narrows considerably. The Brigades can move through passages that Israeli forces can't easily detect or penetrate without significant risk.

Who Fights for the Brigades?

According to a spokesman for the Brigades known as Abu Obaida—speaking publicly during the conflict in 2023—eighty-five percent of their recruits are orphans whose parents were killed by the Israeli military, seeking revenge. This statistic, if accurate, speaks to the self-perpetuating nature of the conflict: violence creates orphans who grow up to become fighters who create more orphans.

Recruitment reportedly draws heavily from unemployed young people, including minors under eighteen. Some 50,000 young Gazans under eighteen have reportedly registered for security training. This makes sense when you consider that Gaza has one of the highest unemployment rates in the world—around forty-five percent of the population is jobless. In an economy with virtually no opportunities, militant organizations offer something: purpose, community, income, and the chance to strike back against a perceived oppressor.

Estimates of the Brigades' total strength vary widely. Israeli intelligence in 2011 suggested a core cadre of several hundred who receive formal military training, including sessions in Iran and Syria. Beyond this core, an estimated 30,000 operatives of "varying degrees of skill and professionalism" could reinforce the Brigades in emergencies. Other estimates range from 30,000 to 50,000. An October 2023 assessment put the figure at 40,000 fighters with specializations in areas including cyber security and naval warfare.

The Cost of War

The Brigades have paid heavily for their operations.

During Operation Summer Rains in 2006—an Israeli military response to the capture of soldier Gilad Shalit—the Brigades acknowledged losing 192 fighters. That operation marked the first time in over eighteen months that the Brigades had actively engaged Israeli soldiers in sustained combat. Shalit himself would remain a prisoner for five years before being released in 2011 in exchange for over a thousand Palestinian prisoners.

The toll from recent conflicts has been far higher. According to the Institute for the Study of War, by September 2024 the Israeli invasion of Gaza had dismantled multiple battalions. The Brigades were fighting in a disorganized manner through small, decentralized cells rather than as coordinated units.

But the same analysts noted something else: these cells are capable of merging to rebuild battalions, or regenerating destroyed units through recruitment when Israeli forces withdraw from areas. The organizational structure that makes the Brigades vulnerable to disruption also makes them remarkably resilient.

The Legal Status: Terrorist Organization or Liberation Movement?

The Al-Qassam Brigades are explicitly designated as a terrorist organization by the European Union, Australia, New Zealand, Egypt, and the United Kingdom. The United States and Canada have designated Hamas—the parent organization—as a terrorist group, which effectively covers the Brigades as well. Mohammed Deif was personally classified as a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" under American law.

The distinction matters because it affects how governments can interact with or fund the organization, and whether its members can be prosecuted under anti-terrorism laws. It also shapes public perception, framing the group either as terrorists or as fighters in a national liberation struggle, depending on who's speaking.

The international community, particularly the United Nations, considers several Brigade tactics to be violations of international humanitarian law. Using civilians as human shields—placing military assets near or among civilian populations—violates the Geneva Conventions. So do indiscriminate attacks on civilian populations, whether by rockets or suicide bombers.

The Brigades' stated aims, according to their own materials, focus on resistance to Israeli occupation and the establishment of Palestinian sovereignty. Critics argue that their methods—particularly attacks on Israeli civilians—undermine any legitimate political goals. Supporters counter that an occupied people have the right to resist by any means available.

The Origins: A Preacher, a Police Shootout, and a Founding Myth

To understand the Brigades, you need to understand the man they're named for.

Izz ad-Din al-Qassam was born in Syria around 1882. He became a Muslim preacher, a scholar educated at Cairo's Al-Azhar University—one of the oldest and most prestigious centers of Islamic learning in the world. But he was also a fighter. He joined the resistance against French and Italian colonial forces in Syria and Libya, then moved to Palestine in the 1920s.

In 1930, al-Qassam organized what he called the Black Hand, a militant group opposed to both Zionism—the movement to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine—and British and French rule in the region. The British Mandate authorities viewed him as a dangerous agitator.

On November 20, 1935, British police cornered al-Qassam and a small group of followers near Jenin. In the shootout that followed, he was killed. But his final exhortation—to embrace martyrdom and fight until the last bullet—transformed him into something more powerful than he'd been in life: a symbol.

Palestinian nationalists elevated al-Qassam to the status of a founding martyr. When Hamas needed a name for its military wing in 1991, they reached back to this figure from sixty years earlier, claiming his legacy and his willingness to die for the cause.

The Road to 1991

The Brigades didn't spring fully formed from nothing. Their roots trace back to 1984, when Hamas co-founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and several colleagues began preparing for armed resistance to Israeli control. They focused on acquiring weapons, but Israeli authorities arrested them and confiscated their arsenals.

In 1986, Salah Shehada—one of those early organizers—formed a network of resistance cells called al-Mujahidun al-Filastiniun, meaning "Palestinian fighters." This network targeted Israeli troops and Palestinians suspected of collaborating with Israel. Their most notorious operation came in 1989: the kidnapping and killing of two Israeli soldiers, Avi Sasportas and Ilan Saadon.

Hamas was officially established on December 14, 1987, just days after the First Palestinian Intifada—the first major uprising against Israeli occupation—began. The organization created various armed networks. Then, in the summer of 1991, these coalesced into the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. Their first act was the assassination of the rabbi of Kfar Darom, an Israeli settlement in Gaza.

The timing was significant. The early 1990s saw the beginning of the Oslo peace process—negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization that would produce the Oslo Accords in 1993. Hamas opposed these negotiations, viewing them as a betrayal of Palestinian rights. The Brigades emerged, in part, to sabotage the peace process through violence.

The Intelligence Operation

Beyond their combat role, the Brigades maintain their own intelligence division. This isn't unusual for large militant organizations—Hezbollah, for instance, runs extensive intelligence operations—but it underscores the Brigades' evolution from a loose militia into something approximating a state military.

There have also been reports of the Brigades pursuing unconventional capabilities. In 2000, CIA Director George Tenet testified that Hamas had sought the ability to conduct attacks using toxic chemicals. Reports emerged of operatives planning attacks incorporating chemical agents. In one documented case, a December 2001 suicide bombing in Jerusalem's Ben-Yehuda Street used nails and bolts that had been soaked in rat poison—an attempt to maximize casualties beyond the blast itself.

A Fragile Ceasefire and Its Collapse

In June 2008, Egypt brokered a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel. For several months, rocket attacks from Gaza dropped to near zero—just two rockets in September and October combined.

Then, on November 4, Israeli forces crossed into Gaza and killed six Hamas fighters. The ceasefire shattered. Rocket attacks surged to 190 in November alone. Each side blamed the other for breaking the truce first.

This pattern—fragile ceasefires collapsing into renewed violence—has repeated throughout the conflict's history. Each cycle tends to strengthen the arguments of hardliners on both sides who claim that negotiation is futile and only force matters.

The Takeover of Gaza

One of the most significant moments in the Brigades' history came in June 2007, when Hamas seized complete control of the Gaza Strip.

The background: After Hamas won Palestinian legislative elections in 2006, tensions with the rival Fatah movement—which controlled the Palestinian Authority and was led by President Mahmoud Abbas—escalated toward civil war. In 2005, Hamas had created the Executive Force, a 3,000-strong paramilitary police unit composed of Brigade members.

By January 2007, Abbas outlawed the Executive Force and ordered its 6,000 members absorbed into PA security forces under his command. Hamas refused. Instead, they announced plans to double the force to 12,000.

The standoff ended in five days of fighting that June. The Brigades and Executive Force routed Fatah's forces in Gaza. Hamas took complete control of the territory. The Palestinian territories split: Hamas governing Gaza, Fatah governing the West Bank. That division persists today.

The Current War and Its Consequences

The conflict that began in October 2023 has been the most devastating in the Brigades' history.

Israeli forces have conducted extensive ground operations throughout Gaza, systematically targeting the Brigade structure. Multiple battalions have been dismantled. The leadership has been decimated—Deif killed, Issa killed, and a rapid succession of commanders since.

Yet the Brigades continue fighting. The same cellular structure that makes them vulnerable to disruption also enables regeneration. When Israeli forces withdraw from an area, surviving fighters can recruit new members, reorganize, and resume operations. The question is whether Israel can sustain pressure long enough to prevent this regeneration, and at what cost.

For the civilian population of Gaza, the cost has already been catastrophic. The war has created the conditions—displacement, destruction, loss of family members—that have historically driven recruitment to organizations like the Brigades. Whether this cycle can ever be broken remains one of the defining questions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

What Comes Next

The Al-Qassam Brigades have proven remarkably durable over three decades. They've survived assassination campaigns that killed their founders. They've rebuilt after military operations that dismantled their structure. They've evolved from a ragtag militia into an organized force with sophisticated weapons and formal military hierarchy.

But they've never faced pressure like this.

The current conflict has degraded their capabilities more severely than any previous Israeli operation. Their leadership has been hollowed out. Their tunnel networks—the foundation of their military strategy—are being systematically destroyed. The civilian population that provides their base of recruitment is scattered and traumatized.

History suggests they'll regenerate in some form. The conditions that drive recruitment—occupation, unemployment, desire for revenge—remain as potent as ever. But what form that regeneration takes, and how long it takes, remains to be seen.

What's certain is that the story of the Al-Qassam Brigades is inseparable from the story of Gaza itself: a densely populated territory under blockade, caught between competing visions of liberation and security, where violence has become both cause and consequence of an unending conflict.