Deinstitutionalisation
Based on Wikipedia: Deinstitutionalisation
The Great Emptying
In 1955, American psychiatric hospitals held over half a million patients. By 2000, that number had dropped to around fifty thousand. Where did everyone go?
This mass exodus—one of the largest social experiments in modern history—was called deinstitutionalisation. It promised freedom, dignity, and community care for people who had spent years, sometimes decades, locked away in sprawling asylum complexes. What it delivered was far more complicated: liberation for many, abandonment for some, and a complete reshaping of how societies deal with mental illness and developmental disabilities.
The story of deinstitutionalisation is not a simple tale of progress or failure. It's a story about good intentions colliding with economic pressures, about revolutionary drugs and revolutionary ideas, and about what happens when we try to undo a century of policy in just a few decades.
Before the Emptying: The Rise of the Asylum
To understand why the hospitals emptied, you first need to understand why they filled up in the first place.
The nineteenth century saw an explosion in asylum construction across Western industrialised countries. This wasn't cruelty masquerading as medicine—at least not initially. These new institutions were designed as a rebuke to the dungeons and prisons where mentally ill people had previously been confined. The idea, known as "moral treatment," held that patients needed comfortable, therapeutic environments where they could recover.
The reality turned out differently.
As admissions climbed year after year, the idealistic asylums became warehouses. Overcrowding became the norm. Funding was slashed during economic downturns and wars. The therapeutic environments devolved into places notorious for poor living conditions, lack of hygiene, neglect, and outright abuse. Patients starved to death. The very institutions designed to heal became instruments of suffering.
By the early twentieth century, reformers began floating the idea of community-based care as an alternative. A few experimental programs launched in the 1920s and 1930s. But the asylum population kept growing, reaching its peak in the 1950s.
The Shadow of Eugenics
There's a darker thread running through this history that must be confronted directly.
The eugenics movement—the pseudoscientific belief that humanity could be "improved" through selective breeding—reached its peak influence between the two World Wars. One of its stated aims was to prevent people with disabilities from reproducing. Isolate them, the thinking went, and the "defects" would die out.
Charles Darwin's own son lobbied the British government to arrest people deemed "unfit" and either segregate them in colonies or sterilise them. In the United States, tens of thousands of institutionalised people were forcibly sterilised under eugenics laws that the Supreme Court upheld.
But Germany went further.
In 1920, a German legal scholar and a psychiatrist co-authored an essay with a title that still chills: "Permitting the Destruction of Life Unworthy of Life." It argued that some lives simply weren't worth living—and that the state should be permitted to end them.
This essay became a blueprint.
In 1939, the Nazi regime launched a program called Aktion T4. Psychiatric institutions for children and adults with disabilities were systematically transformed into killing centers. Midwives were compelled to report all babies born with disabilities. Parents were coerced into placing their children in institutions. Visits were discouraged or outright forbidden.
More than five thousand children were murdered in this network of institutions. Then came the adults—over two hundred thousand disabled people killed. The medical personnel and administrators who developed these first mass extermination techniques were later transferred, along with their killing technology, to set up and manage the death camps of Treblinka and Sobibor during the Holocaust.
The Nazi crimes against institutionalised people became one of the most powerful arguments for dismantling the institutional model entirely. If asylums could become killing centers, perhaps the very concept of locking people away was fundamentally dangerous.
The Chemical Revolution
Ideas alone don't empty hospitals. You need something practical that makes a different approach possible.
That something arrived in the 1950s with the discovery of chlorpromazine, the first antipsychotic medication. For the first time in history, doctors had a tool that could actually manage psychotic episodes—the terrifying breaks from reality that had made confinement seem necessary.
Chlorpromazine didn't cure schizophrenia or bipolar disorder. But it could calm the most acute symptoms. Patients who might have spent their lives in locked wards could now, potentially, live outside hospital walls.
The effect was dramatic. Suddenly, discharging patients seemed medically responsible rather than reckless. The drugs didn't work perfectly, and they came with serious side effects, but they opened a door that had been locked for generations.
The Intellectual Assault
While chemists were developing new drugs, sociologists and psychiatrists were developing new ideas that would prove equally explosive.
In 1961, sociologist Erving Goffman published a book called "Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates." Based on fieldwork he conducted while working undercover in a psychiatric hospital, the book introduced a concept that would reshape thinking about institutions: the "total institution."
A total institution, Goffman argued, is a place where every aspect of life—sleeping, eating, working, socialising—happens in the same location under the same authority. Prisons are total institutions. So are monasteries. And so are psychiatric hospitals.
Goffman's insight was that total institutions don't just house people—they fundamentally change them. The daily rituals and rules serve to "institutionalise" both the patients and the staff, creating a self-reinforcing system where everyone learns their place. The institution shapes behavior in ways that have nothing to do with treatment and everything to do with maintaining order.
In other words: the hospital itself might be making patients sicker.
Italian psychiatrist Franco Basaglia pushed this critique even further. He described psychiatric hospitals as "oppressive, locked and total institutions" where "prison-like, punitive rules" created a process that damaged everyone involved—patients, doctors, and nurses alike. Basaglia didn't just write about reform; he led it. He became the architect of Italy's psychiatric reform laws, which would eventually close the country's psychiatric hospitals entirely.
Some critics went further still. In 1970, Goffman joined forces with psychiatrist Thomas Szasz to found the American Association for the Abolition of Involuntary Mental Hospitalisation. Their goal was radical: eliminate all involuntary psychiatric treatment. They provided legal help to patients fighting commitment and published a journal called, pointedly, "The Abolitionist."
Scandal as Accelerant
Abstract arguments about total institutions might have remained academic curiosities. But a series of scandals in the 1960s and 1970s brought the horrors of institutional care into American living rooms.
In 1972, a young television reporter named Geraldo Rivera smuggled cameras into Willowbrook State School on Staten Island, a facility for children with developmental disabilities. What he filmed was medieval: naked children lying in their own waste, crowding in dark rooms, receiving almost no education or treatment. The exposé shocked the nation and led to a landmark consent decree requiring improved conditions.
Similar scandals erupted elsewhere. In the United Kingdom, revelations about abuse at Ely Hospital in Cardiff sparked public outrage and government inquiries. Each scandal added momentum to the idea that these institutions were beyond reform—they needed to be closed.
Following the Money
Idealism and scandal created the will for deinstitutionalisation. But there was a third factor that made governments eager to act: money.
Psychiatric hospitals are expensive to run. They require large buildings, twenty-four-hour staffing, food services, laundry, maintenance—all the infrastructure of a small city. Community-based care, supporters argued, could deliver better outcomes at lower cost.
This argument was partly true and partly wishful thinking. Properly funded community mental health services—with supportive housing, specialized treatment teams, and crisis intervention—can indeed match or beat institutional care in cost-effectiveness. But the key phrase is "properly funded."
What often happened in practice was that hospitals closed and the money simply disappeared. The savings went to other budget priorities rather than following patients into the community. The result was not community care but no care—patients discharged into a world that had no place for them.
What Deinstitutionalisation Actually Did
Deinstitutionalisation operated through two mechanisms, and understanding both is essential to grasping why outcomes varied so dramatically.
The first mechanism was straightforward: reduce the hospital population. Release patients. Shorten stays. Make it harder to admit people in the first place. Reduce readmissions. The numbers had to come down.
The second mechanism was more subtle: reform psychiatric care itself to avoid creating dependency. The old institutions had fostered learned helplessness—patients became so accustomed to having every decision made for them that they lost the ability to function independently. New approaches aimed to build skills, autonomy, and hope.
Where both mechanisms worked together—where patients were discharged into genuine support systems designed to foster independence—deinstitutionalisation succeeded brilliantly. People who had spent decades in hospitals discovered they could hold jobs, maintain apartments, form relationships, and live meaningful lives.
Where only the first mechanism operated—where patients were simply released without support—the results were catastrophic.
The Alternatives That Emerged
When deinstitutionalisation worked, it wasn't because patients were abandoned to fend for themselves. It was because new forms of care emerged to replace the hospital.
Group homes and halfway houses provided transitional living for people who needed structure but not lockdown. Supported housing programs paired apartments with regular visits from case managers. Community mental health centers offered outpatient treatment, therapy, and medication management.
Some innovations proved particularly effective. Assertive Community Treatment, known as ACT, sends multidisciplinary teams directly to patients rather than waiting for patients to come to clinics. These teams—typically including a psychiatrist, nurses, social workers, and vocational specialists—provide comprehensive care wherever the patient happens to be: in their apartment, at a coffee shop, on the street.
Early intervention teams focus specifically on young people experiencing their first psychotic episodes, aiming to prevent the years of deterioration that often preceded hospital admission. The theory is that catching mental illness early, before it becomes chronic, produces far better long-term outcomes.
These community services have become so widespread that we often forget they emerged from deinstitutionalisation. Foster care for adults with disabilities, supported employment programs, community residences, peer support specialists—all of these grew from the effort to create alternatives to institutionalisation.
The Costs of Getting It Wrong
But not everyone landed in supportive housing or community programs. Some landed on the street.
The relationship between deinstitutionalisation and homelessness is genuinely complicated. Critics have pointed to the timing: as psychiatric hospitals emptied in the 1970s and 1980s, homeless populations grew. Many homeless people clearly struggle with mental illness. The connection seems obvious.
But researchers caution against assuming causation. The same decades that saw deinstitutionalisation also saw the destruction of low-income housing in American cities, cuts to disability benefits, and the collapse of manufacturing jobs that had provided stable employment for people without college degrees. Blaming homelessness entirely on deinstitutionalisation, some scholars argue, is an oversimplification that ignores these other forces.
What's harder to dispute is that many people with serious mental illness ended up in jail or prison. This phenomenon, sometimes called "transinstitutionalisation," represents not the end of institutionalisation but its migration to a different system. The penal system has become, in some ways, the largest provider of mental health "care" in America—though calling what happens in prisons care stretches the meaning of the word.
The Reinstitutionalisation Critique
Some mental health scholars have identified a subtler problem than homelessness or incarceration. They argue that deinstitutionalisation, even when it "succeeded," often just created a different kind of institutionalisation.
Consider a person discharged from a psychiatric hospital into a group home. They attend a day program at a community mental health center. Their social circle consists almost entirely of other mental health service users. They interact with staff constantly but rarely with anyone outside the mental health system.
Is this person living in the community? Technically, yes—they're not behind locked doors. But they're still living within a "psychiatric community" that's socially isolated from the broader public. The physical walls came down, but invisible walls may have replaced them.
Researchers Walid Fakhoury and Stefan Priebe coined the term "reinstitutionalisation" to describe this phenomenon. The goal of deinstitutionalisation was integration—people with mental illness participating fully in society. But what often emerged was a parallel society of mental health service users, connected to "normal" society only through their interactions with paid professionals.
The View From Different Sides
Opinions on deinstitutionalisation split sharply depending on who you ask.
Disability rights advocates generally celebrate it as a civil rights victory. People who had been imprisoned for no crime—their only offense being born with a developmental disability or developing a mental illness—won their freedom. The alternative to deinstitutionalisation wasn't some imagined perfect hospital; it was the actual hospitals that existed, with their overcrowding, abuse, and dehumanisation.
Some psychiatrists and mental health professionals, however, argue that deinstitutionalisation went too far. E. Fuller Torrey, perhaps the most prominent critic, has argued that closing hospitals was fundamentally misguided. In his view, some people with serious mental illness lack the insight to seek treatment voluntarily—a symptom of their disease called anosognosia. Without the ability to compel treatment through hospitalisation, these individuals end up cycling through emergency rooms, jails, and homelessness, suffering more than they would have in a well-run institution.
Torrey's critics counter that the problem isn't deinstitutionalisation itself but the failure to adequately fund community alternatives. "Well-run institution" is doing a lot of work in his argument, they note—most institutions historically were not well-run, and there's little reason to think rebuilt institutions would be different.
The Pharmaceutical Aftermath
Deinstitutionalisation had an unexpected effect on the pharmaceutical industry: it made psychiatric drugs enormously profitable.
In the era of long-term hospitalisation, drug costs were just one line item in massive institutional budgets. But when patients moved into the community, medications became the primary intervention. Insurance would pay for pills far more readily than for the intensive community services that might have helped people need fewer pills.
Prescriptions for psychiatric medications soared. In most developed countries, more than ten percent of the population now takes some form of psychiatric medication. In the United Kingdom, the figure exceeds fifteen percent. Some researchers argue this explosion reflects genuine unmet need being addressed. Others argue it reflects economic incentives pushing doctors toward diagnosis and medication.
The comparison is telling: before deinstitutionalisation, if you diagnosed someone with a serious mental illness, the logical consequence was expensive hospitalisation. After deinstitutionalisation, diagnosis leads to outpatient prescriptions—far cheaper for insurers and far more profitable for pharmaceutical companies. Did this shift change diagnostic patterns? Some researchers believe it did, arguing that conditions like Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder would not have been diagnosed nearly as frequently if the treatment were institutionalisation rather than medication.
Violence and Fear
One question haunted deinstitutionalisation from the beginning: would releasing psychiatric patients into the community endanger the public?
The public perception, amplified by media coverage of rare but horrifying crimes, is that people with mental illness are dangerous. This belief fueled opposition to deinstitutionalisation and continues to drive calls for easier involuntary commitment.
The research tells a more complicated story.
A major 1998 study published in Archives of General Psychiatry compared discharged psychiatric patients to their neighbors in economically deprived, high-crime areas. The finding was striking: patients without substance abuse problems were no more likely to commit violent crimes than their non-patient neighbors. The key variable wasn't mental illness—it was substance abuse. Patients who also abused drugs or alcohol did show elevated rates of violence, but so did non-patients who abused substances.
Here's the crucial detail: institutionalised patients were actually more likely to abuse substances than non-institutionalised people in the same neighborhoods. The perception that mental patients are dangerous was being inflated by substance abuse problems that the institutions themselves may have been failing to address—or even fostering.
What the public rarely hears is the other side of the violence statistics. People with mental illness are far more likely to be victims of violence than perpetrators. In one study of people using community mental health services in an American inner city, over a quarter had been victims of at least one violent crime in the past year—a rate eleven times higher than the already-high inner-city average. This held true across every category of crime: rape, assault, theft, property crime. The vulnerability cuts both ways.
Where We Are Now
Deinstitutionalisation is not a completed project but an ongoing one, still generating debates and still producing mixed results.
In many Western countries, the large psychiatric hospitals of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are gone—converted to condominiums, demolished, or standing empty as ruins. The populations they once held now live scattered across communities, some thriving in supported housing, some struggling on the streets, some cycling through emergency rooms and jails.
The research consensus, such as it exists, holds that deinstitutionalisation was net positive for most patients. People are generally better off in community settings than in institutions, especially the institutions that actually existed as opposed to idealized versions. But this consensus comes with enormous caveats about the need for adequate community services—services that are often underfunded or unavailable.
Some scholars worry about a new kind of institutionalisation emerging: the forensic psychiatric facility, the prison mental health unit, the locked nursing home. The institutional impulse—the desire to contain and control people deemed difficult or dangerous—hasn't disappeared. It may have just found new expressions.
The Lesson That Won't Stay Learned
Perhaps the most important lesson of deinstitutionalisation is how easily good intentions can go wrong when they align with budget-cutting.
The reformers who fought to empty the hospitals genuinely believed in patient freedom and community integration. They weren't wrong about the horrors of institutional care. But their vision required replacing hospitals with something better, not just closing hospitals and hoping for the best.
Politicians found in deinstitutionalisation a rare opportunity: a reform that civil libertarians supported and that also saved money. The temptation to capture the savings while skimping on the community alternatives proved irresistible. Hospital budgets disappeared. Community mental health funding never materialised at the promised levels.
This pattern—reformers and cost-cutters forming an unstable alliance, with cost-cutters ultimately dominating—has repeated in other policy areas. It's a dynamic worth understanding because it will certainly happen again.
The emptying of the asylums changed how society deals with mental illness more profoundly than any other single policy shift in the past century. Whether that change was good or bad depends enormously on where you look, when you look, and whom you ask. What's certain is that we're still living with the consequences—and still arguing about what they mean.