Eastern Theater Command
Based on Wikipedia: Eastern Theater Command
The Military Command Built for One Mission
If you want to understand what China's military is actually preparing for, look at a map of the Eastern Theater Command. Its headquarters sits in Nanjing, a city that has served as China's capital multiple times throughout history. But the real story isn't in Nanjing. It's in the waters and airspace between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan—a stretch of ocean roughly one hundred miles wide that represents one of the most dangerous flashpoints in modern geopolitics.
The Eastern Theater Command exists primarily for Taiwan.
That's not speculation or Western analysis. It's built into the command's very structure. Three of its ground force divisions include amphibious brigades—specialized units trained to assault beaches and establish footholds on defended coastlines. Its rocket force base in Huangshan has been called the "premier conventional base opposite Taiwan." Its naval fleet patrols the Taiwan Strait daily. Everything about this organization whispers—and sometimes shouts—a single purpose.
What Is a Theater Command, Exactly?
To understand the Eastern Theater Command, you first need to understand what China did to its military in 2016. It was the most significant restructuring since the Communist revolution.
Before 2016, China's military was organized into seven military regions—geographic areas that operated somewhat independently, each controlled by ground force generals who accumulated enormous political power. The system was a holdover from the civil war era, when regional commanders needed autonomy to fight the Nationalists. But by the twenty-first century, this structure had become a liability. The regions couldn't coordinate effectively. The ground forces dominated everything, treating the navy and air force as supporting players. And the regional commanders had become power centers unto themselves, creating corruption networks that rivaled small governments.
Xi Jinping tore it all down.
In its place, he created five theater commands—not seven military regions, but five joint warfighting organizations. The difference is more than semantic. A military region was essentially a ground force kingdom with some planes and ships attached. A theater command is designed from the ground up to coordinate all services: army, navy, air force, and rocket force. Each theater has a joint headquarters where officers from every service work side by side, planning operations that combine tanks with aircraft carriers with missile batteries.
The Eastern Theater Command encompasses the provinces of Anhui, Fujian, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Zhejiang, plus the megacity of Shanghai and the entire East China Sea. But geography is almost beside the point. This command exists to project power across the Taiwan Strait and, if ordered, to bring Taiwan under Beijing's control by force.
The Inauguration That Signaled Everything
On February 1, 2016, something remarkable happened in the Bayi Building in Beijing. All five new theater commands held their inaugural meetings simultaneously. Xi Jinping personally awarded military flags to each command's leadership and issued their official instructions. The symbolism was unmistakable: these weren't bureaucratic reorganizations but the creation of warfighting headquarters that answered directly to him.
The Bayi Building itself carries meaning. "Bayi" means "August First"—the date in 1927 when Communist forces launched the Nanchang Uprising, traditionally considered the founding of the People's Liberation Army. By hosting this ceremony in that building, Xi was connecting his military reforms to the revolutionary origins of Chinese Communist power.
Fan Changlong, then Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and a member of the Communist Party's Politburo, read the orders aloud. Xu Qiliang, the other Vice Chairman, presided over the proceedings. Both men were among the most powerful military figures in China. Their presence underscored that this wasn't theater—it was a fundamental redistribution of military authority.
Exercises That Aren't Really Exercises
Since its creation, the Eastern Theater Command has conducted a series of increasingly aggressive military exercises around Taiwan. Each one has been larger than the last. Each has pushed further into what Taiwan considers its defensive perimeter. And each has been triggered by some perceived slight from Taiwan or the United States.
In August 2022, when United States Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, the Eastern Theater Command responded with what Chinese media called "unprecedented" exercises. For the first time, Chinese missiles flew over Taiwan itself—not around it, but directly over Taipei. Chinese naval vessels crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait, an unofficial boundary that both sides had respected for decades. Fighter jets flooded into Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone, forcing Taiwanese pilots to scramble in response.
The exercises weren't spontaneous. They were clearly pre-planned, waiting for a triggering event. The speed with which China mobilized ground, naval, and air forces—plus launched ballistic missiles from multiple locations—revealed years of preparation.
In April 2023, after Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen met with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California, the Eastern Theater Command launched another round of exercises. These simulated a blockade of Taiwan, with Chinese vessels practicing how to cut off the island's access to international shipping lanes.
Then came 2024. When Lai Ching-te took office as Taiwan's new president and stated that Taiwan and China "are not subordinate to each other," Beijing launched exercises codenamed "Joint Sword-2024A." Six months later came "Joint Sword-2024B." In April 2025, "Strait Thunder-2025A." And in December 2025, the most ominously named exercise yet: "Justice Mission 2025."
That last name is worth pausing on. Previous exercises had operational codenames—"Joint Sword," "Strait Thunder." But "Justice Mission" implies moral authority. It suggests that any future action against Taiwan wouldn't be aggression but righteous correction. The propaganda value is baked into the name itself.
Anatomy of a Modern Chinese Fighting Force
The Eastern Theater Command is not a single military force but a collection of specialized components, each designed for a specific type of warfare. Understanding these pieces reveals how China would actually fight a war over Taiwan.
The Ground Forces: Three Armies Waiting
The ground component consists of three Group Armies—the 71st, 72nd, and 73rd. In American terms, a Group Army is roughly equivalent to a corps, commanding roughly fifty thousand to one hundred thousand soldiers. But the comparison is imprecise because Chinese Group Armies are designed differently.
Each Group Army commands twelve brigades: six combined-arms brigades and six support brigades. The combined-arms brigades are the fighting units, mixing tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery into single organizations that can operate independently. The support brigades handle everything else—aviation (attack helicopters), additional artillery, air defense, special operations, and logistics.
This structure emerged from China's 2017 military reforms. The old system organized forces by type: tank divisions, infantry divisions, artillery regiments. The new system creates self-contained fighting packages. A Group Army commander can task-organize forces for specific missions, detaching a combined-arms brigade reinforced with attack helicopters and special operations troops for one operation while another brigade with additional artillery handles a different objective.
The 73rd Group Army is the most interesting of the three. It's headquartered in Xiamen, Fujian Province—directly across the strait from Taiwan, closer to Taipei than to Shanghai. Unlike the other two Group Armies, the 73rd never deployed to the Korean War in the 1950s. Instead, it stayed in Fujian Province, preparing for a potential invasion of Taiwan that never came.
In 1958, the 73rd's predecessor, the 31st Corps, participated in the artillery bombardment of Taiwan's Kinmen and Matsu Islands during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. For forty-four days, Chinese artillery pounded the islands, firing nearly half a million shells. The bombardment failed to dislodge the Taiwanese defenders, but it established a pattern that continues today: the 73rd Group Army exists for Taiwan operations.
Today, the 73rd includes two amphibious combined-arms brigades—the 14th and 91st. These units train specifically for beach assaults. Chinese state media regularly features footage of the 73rd conducting amphibious landing drills on Fujian's beaches, rehearsing the techniques they would need to cross the strait and establish a foothold on Taiwan's shores.
The Air Force: Fighters and One Remaining Division
The Eastern Theater Command Air Force has undergone its own transformation. Like the ground forces, China's air force used to organize around divisions and regiments—a structure inherited from the Soviet Union. Most of those divisions have been disbanded, their regiments converted into independent brigades that can be assigned wherever needed.
But one division remains: the 10th Bomber Division, commanding the 28th, 29th, and 30th Bomber Regiments. This is significant. Bombers are offensive weapons, designed to strike targets far beyond the front lines. Keeping this unit intact as a division—rather than breaking it into brigades—suggests China views strategic bombing as a distinct mission requiring dedicated command and control.
The fighter brigades tell their own story. Nine fighter brigades gives the Eastern Theater Command a substantial air-to-air and air-to-ground capability. In a Taiwan conflict, these aircraft would seek to establish air superiority over the strait, allowing ground forces to cross without being destroyed by Taiwanese aircraft.
Perhaps most intriguing is the unit listed simply as "unidentified drone attack brigade." Its very existence on the order of battle—acknowledged but not detailed—signals that China has operationalized drone warfare in ways it prefers not to advertise.
The Navy: Guardians of the East China Sea
The East Sea Fleet is one of three major fleets in China's navy. Its area of responsibility covers the waters most critical to any Taiwan operation: the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, and the approaches to the disputed Senkaku Islands (which China calls the Diaoyu Islands).
The fleet operates from multiple naval bases—Shanghai, Xiangshan, Zhoushan, and Fujian—giving it the ability to surge forces from different directions. In a conflict, ships could sortie from all four bases simultaneously, complicating any defensive response.
The fleet includes its own coastal defense brigades, responsible for protecting the mainland's shoreline, and a pontoon bridge brigade capable of rapidly constructing floating bridges. This last capability is often overlooked but could prove crucial. If Chinese forces established a beachhead on Taiwan, pontoon bridges could rapidly link supply ships offshore to the beach, accelerating the flow of reinforcements and equipment.
The Rocket Force: Missiles Aimed at Taiwan
Base 61 of the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force may be the most consequential unit in the entire Eastern Theater Command. Headquartered in Huangshan, Anhui Province—far enough inland to be protected from immediate attack but close enough to range every target on Taiwan—Base 61 controls China's missile forces in the eastern theater.
The unit's history stretches back to 1965, when Unit 121 was established to build missile silos. Over the decades, it evolved from construction unit to operational missile base, accumulating a diverse arsenal. By 2016, when the Rocket Force took command, Base 61 controlled eight brigades armed with DF-21, DF-15C, DF-15A, DF-11A, CJ-10A, and DF-21C missiles.
These designations require translation. The DF prefix stands for "Dongfeng," meaning "East Wind"—a name chosen for revolutionary symbolism in 1960. The DF-11 and DF-15 are short-range ballistic missiles, capable of striking Taiwan in minutes. The DF-21 is a medium-range ballistic missile with both conventional and nuclear variants; the conventional version can carry specialized warheads designed to destroy ships, earning it the nickname "carrier killer." The CJ-10 is a land-attack cruise missile, similar in concept to the American Tomahawk, capable of striking targets with precision from hundreds of miles away.
In any Taiwan scenario, Base 61's missiles would likely fire first. Before ships sailed or aircraft launched, ballistic and cruise missiles would arc toward Taiwan's air defenses, command centers, and military bases, attempting to blind and paralyze the island's defenses before the main assault began.
The History Embedded in These Units
Military organizations carry their histories with them, and the Eastern Theater Command's subordinate units are no exception. Their lineages reveal how deeply the Taiwan question is embedded in China's military culture.
The 71st Group Army traces its origins to the 12th Corps, formed in February 1949 during the final phase of the Chinese Civil War. That corps fought in the Korean War, participating in the brutal Shangganling Campaign—known in the West as the Battle of Triangle Hill—where Chinese forces faced two United Nations divisions in some of the war's bloodiest fighting.
More controversially, the 12th Corps played a role in the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. When the 38th Army's commander, Xu Qinxian, refused orders to mobilize against the student protesters—an act of defiance that landed him in prison—units from the 12th Corps were among those airlifted to Beijing to enforce martial law. The Central Military Commission mobilized at least fourteen of the army's twenty-four Group Armies for the crackdown, a larger force than had been deployed for China's border wars with Vietnam, India, or the Soviet Union.
The 72nd Group Army's lineage extends even further, to the 2nd Red Army formed in 1930 in Hunan Province. This unit participated in the Long March—the legendary 1934-1935 retreat that became central to Communist mythology. Mao Zedong himself marched with the 1st Red Army, but the 2nd Red Army's parallel journey established its revolutionary credentials.
These histories matter because they shape institutional identity. Officers in the 73rd Group Army know their predecessors shelled Kinmen in 1958. Officers in the 71st know their unit helped suppress the Tiananmen protests. These aren't just historical footnotes but lived legacies that influence how these organizations see themselves and their missions.
Command and Control: The Party's Eyes and Ears
Unlike Western militaries, where political oversight comes from civilian officials outside the military chain of command, the People's Liberation Army builds political control into its very structure. Every Eastern Theater Command headquarters includes two parallel departments: the General Staff Department for military operations and the Political Works Department for Communist Party oversight.
The Political Works Department isn't a ceremonial office. It maintains six bureaus covering organization, cadres (officer management), military-civilian relations, publicity, and liaison with party organizations. Political commissars serve at every level of command, holding ranks equivalent to the military commanders they shadow. Major decisions require both the commander's and the commissar's approval.
This dual-command system has historical roots. During the Chinese Civil War, the Communist Party distrusted military commanders—some of whom had defected from Nationalist forces—and installed commissars to ensure loyalty. The system survived because it serves the party's interests: no military commander can act independently without party oversight.
For the Eastern Theater Command, this means any major operation—including action against Taiwan—would require approval not just from military leadership but from party officials embedded within the command structure itself. The decision to launch a cross-strait assault would ripple through both chains simultaneously.
What This All Means
The Eastern Theater Command represents the most concentrated expression of China's military power aimed at a single objective. Its ground forces train for amphibious assault. Its air force practices establishing air superiority over the strait. Its navy patrols the waters that any invasion fleet would cross. Its rocket force maintains missiles targeted at every military installation on Taiwan.
This doesn't mean war is inevitable. Military preparations are not the same as political decisions. China maintains powerful forces opposite Taiwan for the same reason the United States maintains forces in South Korea: to deter, to signal resolve, and to be ready if deterrence fails.
But the Eastern Theater Command's structure reveals something important about how Beijing thinks. Taiwan isn't just another foreign policy issue to be managed. It's serious enough to warrant a dedicated theater command, three Group Armies, multiple air brigades, an entire naval fleet, and a missile base—all positioned and trained for a single contingency.
The exercises of recent years—Joint Sword, Strait Thunder, Justice Mission—aren't mere saber-rattling. They're rehearsals. Each one tests coordination between services, identifies weaknesses, and refines tactics. Each pushes slightly further than the last, normalizing what once would have been considered provocative.
Whether this culminates in conflict or remains deterrence theater, only time will tell. But the Eastern Theater Command exists because China has decided it must be ready for the former while hoping for the latter. Its very existence is the clearest signal of Beijing's intentions—and its capabilities—regarding the island across the strait.