Foreign Agents Registration Act

Based on Wikipedia: Foreign Agents Registration Act

In 1938, Nazi propaganda was flooding American shores. Radio broadcasts, pamphlets, and carefully cultivated American sympathizers were spreading fascist ideology across the United States. Congress, alarmed by this invisible invasion, passed a law that would mostly gather dust for the next eighty years—until it suddenly became one of the most consequential statutes in American politics.

That law is the Foreign Agents Registration Act, known by its acronym FARA (pronounced like "pharaoh"). And here's the thing that surprises most people: it doesn't actually ban anything.

What FARA Actually Does

FARA operates on a simple premise. You're perfectly welcome to lobby the American government on behalf of Saudi Arabia, or China, or France, or any other foreign power. The First Amendment protects your right to petition the government, and the courts have consistently ruled that this right doesn't disappear just because you're being paid by foreigners.

But you have to tell people about it.

If you're working as a "foreign agent"—meaning you're advocating, lobbying, or doing public relations work for a foreign government, foreign political party, or foreign person—you must register with the Department of Justice and disclose your relationship, your activities, and how much you're being paid. The government then makes this information publicly available. That's it. Sunlight as the disinfectant.

The logic is straightforward: Americans deserve to know when the voices trying to influence their opinions and their government are speaking on behalf of foreign interests. You can listen to that voice or ignore it, but you should know who's pulling the strings.

A Law Born from Nazi Fears

The story begins in the 1930s, when Adolf Hitler's regime was investing heavily in shaping American public opinion. German agents were financing American fascist movements, distributing propaganda through front organizations, and cultivating sympathetic journalists and politicians. The House of Representatives created a Special Committee on Un-American Activities—the original version of what would later become the infamous McCarthy-era committee—specifically to investigate Nazi influence operations.

The committee's findings were alarming enough that Congress acted quickly. FARA passed in 1938, requiring anyone engaged in propaganda on behalf of foreign governments to register and disclose their activities. The State Department initially oversaw enforcement, complained that it lacked resources, and by 1942 the responsibility had shifted to the Justice Department, where it remains today.

During World War Two, the law had teeth. Twenty-three criminal cases were prosecuted. But once the war ended, enforcement collapsed. Between 1945 and 1955, exactly two indictments. Then nine more scattered across the next seven years. The law was becoming a dead letter.

The 1966 Transformation

Congress substantially rewrote FARA in 1966, and the changes matter for understanding how the law works today.

The original law cast a wide net, capturing anyone acting "for or on behalf of" foreign interests—language vague enough to snare almost anyone with foreign connections. The 1966 amendments narrowed this dramatically. Now, the government had to prove that someone was acting "at the order, request, or under the direction or control" of a foreign principal. That's a much higher bar.

The amendments also shifted the law's focus from propaganda to political lobbying. The framers in 1938 had been worried about Nazi pamphlets and radio broadcasts. By 1966, the concern was sophisticated influence campaigns targeting Congress, the White House, and federal agencies.

This higher burden of proof had a predictable consequence: prosecutions became extraordinarily rare. From 1966 until 2015—nearly fifty years—there were only seven criminal prosecutions under FARA. None resulted in a conviction.

But the amendments also added a civil enforcement mechanism. The Justice Department could now warn individuals and organizations that they appeared to be violating the law, giving them a chance to register voluntarily rather than face criminal charges. Most people, when confronted with such a warning, chose to comply. The law shifted from a criminal statute to something more like a regulatory regime.

What Being a "Foreign Agent" Actually Means

The term "foreign agent" sounds sinister, conjuring images of spies meeting in shadowy parking garages. In reality, most registered foreign agents are thoroughly boring: lawyers, public relations consultants, lobbyists, and tourism boards.

Consider some actual registered foreign agents: the Japan National Tourism Organization, which promotes travel to Japan; the Netherlands Board of Tourism and Conventions; Invest Northern Ireland, which encourages American businesses to set up operations in Northern Ireland. These aren't exactly cloak-and-dagger operations.

But the same law also covers genuinely significant influence operations. When the ruling party of India wants to shape American policy toward the subcontinent, when Middle Eastern governments want to influence American politicians, when authoritarian regimes want to improve their image among American voters—these activities, if done through hired American advocates, should trigger FARA registration.

The exemptions are important too. News organizations aren't covered, as long as they're not owned by the foreign government itself—a distinction that becomes crucial when we talk about state media. Religious organizations, academic institutions, and scientific organizations get a pass. And perhaps most significantly, the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 created an alternative registration system. If you register as a lobbyist under that law and comply with its requirements, you may be exempt from FARA, even if your client is foreign.

The Law Wakes Up

For decades, FARA was a backwater. The Justice Department's FARA Unit was understaffed, its database was literally described as "in disrepair" in 2004, and nobody much cared about enforcement. In 2007, the department finally launched an online database, revealing that approximately 1,700 lobbyists were representing more than 100 countries—many of whom probably should have been registered but weren't.

Then came 2016.

The investigation into Russian interference in the presidential election brought FARA into the spotlight. Suddenly, prosecutors were using this dusty Depression-era statute to pursue major political figures. Paul Manafort, who had served as Donald Trump's campaign chairman, was charged with failing to register as a foreign agent for his work on behalf of Ukrainian political interests. Michael Flynn, who briefly served as Trump's National Security Advisor, pleaded guilty to lying about his foreign contacts. Other Trump-connected figures faced similar scrutiny.

The statistics tell the story. Since 2016, registrations have increased by thirty percent. As of late 2022, over 500 active foreign agents were registered with the FARA Unit—and that number keeps climbing. Foreign Affairs magazine, not known for hyperbole, declared that "FARA is no longer a forgotten and oft-ignored piece of New Deal-era reforms. Eight decades after being enacted, FARA is finally worth the paper it was written on."

State Media and the Registration Question

Some of the most contentious FARA cases involve state-controlled media organizations.

In November 2017, RT America—the American arm of the Russian government-funded television network formerly known as Russia Today—was required to register as a foreign agent. This was significant: RT had long maintained that it was simply a news organization with editorial independence, despite being funded by the Russian state. The forced registration essentially labeled it as an arm of the Russian government for legal purposes.

The following year, the Justice Department ordered the Chinese state-run Xinhua News Agency and China Global Television Network (CGTN) to register as well. These organizations had been operating in the United States for years, producing news content that American audiences consumed without any clear indication that they were produced by and for the Chinese government.

The question of when a news organization crosses the line from "foreign-funded" to "foreign agent" remains genuinely difficult. The BBC is funded by the British government but operates with editorial independence; nobody seriously argues it should register under FARA. But RT and CGTN? Their editorial decisions are far more closely aligned with their governments' foreign policy objectives. The law now requires them to disclose that connection.

Notable Cases Through History

The law's enforcement history reads like a tour through decades of American foreign policy concerns.

In 1951, the government went after the Peace Information Center, a peace organization led by W.E.B. Du Bois, the pioneering Black intellectual and civil rights activist. The charge? That the organization was spreading propaganda as an agent of foreign governments. The trial judge dismissed the case for lack of evidence, but the prosecution itself illustrated how the law could be weaponized against domestic political movements.

The 1970s brought Koreagate. Park Tong-Sun, a South Korean businessman, was charged with attempting to bribe members of Congress on behalf of the South Korean government without registering as a foreign agent. The case ended in a plea bargain but revealed how foreign governments could attempt to covertly influence American politicians.

The Irish cases of the 1980s raised questions about political movements versus foreign governments. The Irish Northern Aid Committee was already registered under FARA, but the government sought to force it to register more specifically as an agent of the Irish Republican Army. The committee denied any relationship with the IRA and claimed selective prosecution. They lost—sort of. The court ruled they had to register with the IRA as their foreign principal, but allowed them to include a written disclaimer objecting to the ruling.

The Cuban Five case at the turn of the century involved actual intelligence officers—five Cuban spies who had infiltrated the United States to gather information on the U.S. Southern Command and monitor Cuban-American exile groups. They were convicted under FARA alongside various conspiracy charges.

More recently, in September 2024, Linda Sun, a former high-ranking New York State official, was arrested and charged with acting as an undisclosed agent of China. The case illustrated how foreign influence operations might target not just the federal government but state-level officials as well.

The Problem of Enforcement

FARA's critics point to a fundamental problem: the law depends almost entirely on voluntary compliance, and the penalties for non-compliance have historically been negligible.

Think about the incentive structure. If you're lobbying for a foreign government and you don't register, the worst that typically happened—at least until recently—was that the Justice Department might send you a letter suggesting you register. If you complied, that was usually the end of it. No fine, no prosecution, just a polite reminder. Given the stigma associated with being labeled a "foreign agent," many lobbyists rationally calculated that the benefits of non-registration outweighed the minimal risks of being caught.

The recent uptick in enforcement has changed this calculus somewhat. When Paul Manafort faced the real possibility of prison time for FARA violations, other lobbyists suddenly found their registration forms. But critics argue that enforcement remains selective and often politically motivated, targeting certain foreign relationships while ignoring others.

There's also the question of what happens to the disclosed information. The FARA database is technically public, but it's not exactly user-friendly. Journalists and researchers dig through it occasionally, but the average citizen has no idea it exists. If transparency is the goal, the transparency isn't reaching most people.

Baby FARA: The States Get Involved

Recently, several states have begun creating their own versions of FARA, sometimes called "baby FARA" laws. The logic is straightforward: foreign governments don't just try to influence Washington. They also target state capitals, where regulations are often looser and scrutiny is minimal.

A state legislator in a swing state might be a more attractive target than a federal congressman. State pension funds control enormous investments that foreign entities might want to influence. State attorneys general make decisions about investigations and enforcement that could affect foreign companies and governments. Yet until recently, there was little systematic transparency around foreign influence at the state level.

These state-level initiatives remain controversial. Critics argue they could chill legitimate international business relationships or academic exchanges. Supporters counter that the same transparency principles that justify federal FARA apply equally to state government.

George Washington's Warning

In his farewell address of 1796, George Washington issued a warning that could have been written yesterday:

Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens) the jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly awake, since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government.

Washington understood something that remains true: foreign powers will always try to shape American politics to serve their interests. They'll use money, propaganda, and "tools and dupes"—his phrase—to influence both the government and public opinion.

The question is what to do about it. Banning foreign advocacy would run headlong into the First Amendment. Criminalizing foreign influence would require defining it in ways that could capture legitimate speech and association. The approach America has chosen—disclosure, transparency, letting sunlight serve as disinfectant—reflects a distinctly American faith that an informed citizenry can evaluate arguments on their merits, even when those arguments are being made by paid advocates for foreign powers.

Whether that faith is justified remains an open question. FARA exists because we believe that knowing who's paying for an argument helps us evaluate that argument. But in an age of social media, sophisticated influence operations, and declining trust in institutions, the disclosure model may be reaching its limits.

The Ongoing Tension

FARA sits at the intersection of several fundamental American values that sometimes conflict.

Free speech: Americans can advocate for any cause, including foreign causes, and this right is constitutionally protected.

Transparency: Americans deserve to know when advocacy is paid for by foreign interests.

National security: Foreign influence operations can undermine American democracy and serve hostile interests.

Equal treatment: The law should apply consistently, regardless of which foreign power is involved or which American political faction benefits.

The law has never perfectly balanced these values. It was born from fear of Nazi propaganda, retooled during the Cold War, largely ignored for decades, and suddenly revived in an era of renewed great power competition. Its enforcement has been sporadic and arguably selective. Its disclosure requirements depend on voluntary compliance that often doesn't happen.

Yet the basic insight behind FARA remains sound. Foreign governments will try to influence American politics. Some of that influence will operate through hired American advocates. Those advocates should have to disclose who's paying them. Whatever FARA's flaws—and they are many—the alternative of no disclosure at all would be worse.

The law that Congress passed to counter Nazi propaganda in 1938 has become one of the primary tools for understanding who's trying to shape American politics in 2025. It's an imperfect tool, inconsistently applied, poorly understood by the public, and perpetually controversial. But as foreign influence operations grow more sophisticated and American politics grows more polarized, FARA may be more important than ever.