Houthis
Based on Wikipedia: Houthis
A Rebel Movement That Humiliated Superpowers
In 2009, something remarkable happened in the mountains of northern Yemen. A ragtag militia of tribal fighters, armed with little more than small arms and determination, fought the Saudi Arabian military to a standstill. The Saudis had spent tens of billions of dollars building one of the world's most advanced armed forces. The Houthis had summer camps and slogans. The Houthis won.
That humiliating defeat for Saudi Arabia marked a turning point. What had begun as a theological study group in the early 1990s had transformed into one of the most consequential armed movements of the twenty-first century. Today, the Houthis control much of Yemen, fire missiles at Israel, and have effectively shut down one of the world's most important shipping lanes.
How did a movement that started teaching religion to teenagers in a remote Yemeni province become a force capable of reshaping global trade routes?
The Believing Youth
The story begins in 1992, in Saada Governorate—a mountainous region in Yemen's far north, bordering Saudi Arabia. There, members of the al-Houthi family founded an organization called "the Believing Youth." It sounds almost quaint: summer camps and after-school clubs for young people, teaching them about their religious heritage.
But this was no ordinary youth group.
The Believing Youth aimed to revive Zaydism, a branch of Shia Islam that is almost unique to Yemen. For a thousand years, Zaydi-led governments had ruled this ancient land. That ended in 1962. By the 1990s, Zaydis—about a quarter of Yemen's population—felt increasingly marginalized, their religious traditions fading, their political influence shrinking.
The summer camps were a response to this decline. By 1995, between fifteen and twenty thousand students had attended them. The curriculum mixed traditional Zaydi teachings with lectures from two Lebanese figures who would profoundly shape the movement's direction: Mohammed Hussein Fadhlallah, an influential Shia scholar, and Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hezbollah.
Hezbollah—the "Party of God"—had demonstrated something powerful. It had shown that a relatively small, religiously motivated militia could challenge mighty adversaries. Israel had invaded Lebanon in 1982; by 2000, Hezbollah had forced them to withdraw. For young Yemenis watching from Saada, this was an electrifying example of what was possible.
A Slogan That Changed Everything
In 2003, the United States invaded Iraq. For Hussein al-Houthi, the movement's charismatic leader, this was a galvanizing moment. Under his influence, the Believing Youth's followers adopted a new slogan that would become infamous:
God is great. Death to America. Death to Israel. Curse upon the Jews. Victory to Islam.
The slogan was directly modeled on Hezbollah's rhetoric. It marked a decisive shift from a theological revival movement to something explicitly political, even revolutionary.
Hussein al-Houthi began leading his followers in chanting these words at the Al Saleh Mosque in Sanaa, Yemen's capital, after Friday prayers. The Yemeni government, led by President Ali Abdullah Saleh, grew alarmed. If today these young men were shouting "Death to America," security officials reasoned, tomorrow they might be shouting "Death to the President."
In 2004, authorities arrested 800 followers in Sanaa. President Saleh invited Hussein to meet with him—an offer that might have been a trap. Hussein declined. On June 18th, Saleh sent government forces to arrest him.
Hussein responded by declaring war.
The Six Wars of Saada
The insurgency that began in 2004 would drag on through six separate rounds of fighting until 2010. Hussein al-Houthi himself did not survive the first round; he was killed on September 10th, 2004, less than three months after the fighting began. But his death transformed him into a martyr, and his brother Abdul-Malik took command.
These were brutal years. The Yemeni army and air force pounded the mountainous Saada region. The Saudis, alarmed by a Shia militia operating on their southern border, joined the campaign. Yet the Houthis, fighting on home terrain with fierce determination, held on.
More than that—they expanded. The very tactics meant to crush them instead fueled their growth. Government airstrikes killed civilians, creating new grievances and new recruits. The marginalization that had originally driven the Believing Youth became more acute, not less. Each round of fighting ended with the Houthis controlling more territory than before.
By the time a ceasefire was finally reached in 2010, the Houthis had evolved from a religious study group into a battle-hardened military organization. They had beaten Yemen's army. They had beaten Saudi Arabia's army. They had learned that armed resistance worked.
Revolution and Opportunity
Then came 2011, and everything changed again.
The Arab Spring swept across the Middle East and North Africa, toppling dictators who had seemed immovable. In Yemen, massive protests filled the streets, demanding an end to President Saleh's thirty-three-year rule. The Houthis joined the revolution, marching alongside liberals, socialists, and other opposition groups.
Saleh eventually fell. A transitional government took power, and the international community organized a National Dialogue Conference to chart Yemen's future. The Houthis participated—but they were playing a longer game.
They rejected the conference's final agreement, which proposed dividing Yemen into federal regions. The Houthis objected that this would leave their strongholds in some of the poorest areas, cut off from oil revenues and the sea. When their representative at the conference was assassinated, any remaining goodwill evaporated.
While other political parties descended into chaos during the transitional period, the Houthis remained disciplined, organized, and expansionist. By late 2011, they controlled two entire governorates—Saada and Al Jawf—and were closing in on a third. By 2012, they had reached the Red Sea coast and were erecting barricades north of Sanaa itself.
An Unlikely Alliance
What happened next was one of the strangest twists in modern Middle Eastern politics. The Houthis made peace with their oldest enemy.
Ali Abdullah Saleh—the same president who had launched six wars against them, who had ordered the killing of Hussein al-Houthi—now saw an opportunity. Removed from power but not from influence, Saleh still commanded the loyalty of much of Yemen's military. He reached out to the movement that had once been his mortal foe.
By late 2014, the alliance was formalized. With Saleh's military connections opening doors, the Houthis swept into Sanaa in September. By January 2015, they had seized the presidential palace. The internationally recognized president, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, fled to Saudi Arabia.
On February 6th, 2015, the Houthis officially dissolved Yemen's parliament and declared their Revolutionary Committee to be the country's governing authority.
A religious study group from the remote mountains of Saada now controlled the capital of an Arab nation.
The Saudi Intervention
Saudi Arabia could not accept this. A Shia militia aligned with Iran, their great regional rival, now controlled the country on their southern border. On March 27th, 2015, a coalition of Arab states—led by Saudi Arabia and including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Sudan—launched airstrikes against Houthi positions.
The United States quietly supported the intervention, helping plan airstrikes and providing logistical and intelligence assistance. The U.S. Navy joined a Saudi-led naval blockade of Houthi-controlled territory.
What followed was one of the worst humanitarian catastrophes of the century. The blockade, combined with the destruction of infrastructure, triggered a famine. Cholera outbreaks killed thousands. Millions faced starvation. The United Nations would eventually call it the world's worst humanitarian crisis.
Yet the Houthis did not break. They dug in, adapting to the siege. They acquired increasingly sophisticated weapons—drones and missiles capable of striking deep into Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In January 2022, Houthi drones hit industrial targets in the UAE, setting fuel trucks ablaze and killing three workers. It was a message: the war's front lines now extended across borders.
The Alliance Collapses
The partnership with Saleh had always been uneasy—a marriage of pure convenience between parties that had spent years trying to kill each other. In late 2017, it finally fell apart.
According to Houthi officials, they had detected secret communications between Saleh and the UAE three months before events came to a head. Saleh, they claimed, had been negotiating with the enemy coalition through encrypted messages, with Jordan and even Russia involved as intermediaries.
On December 2nd, 2017, Saleh appeared on television to announce the split. He called on his supporters to take back the country and expressed openness to dialogue with the Saudi-led coalition.
Two days later, he was dead.
Houthi fighters assaulted Saleh's house in Sanaa and killed him. The alliance was over. The Houthis now stood alone—but they also stood unchallenged within the territory they controlled.
What Do the Houthis Actually Believe?
This is where things get complicated. Scholars who study the movement often throw up their hands at trying to define a coherent Houthi ideology.
According to Bernard Haykel, an American historian who has studied the group extensively, Hussein al-Houthi drew on such a variety of religious traditions and political philosophies that it's nearly impossible to fit the movement into any existing category. The Houthis' stated positions are often vague, self-contradictory, or seem designed more for propaganda than precision.
Still, two core religious tenets stand out. The first is what the movement calls the "Quranic Way"—the belief that the Quran contains everything Muslims need to build a just society, and that it should not be subject to interpretation or scholarly elaboration. Just read it and follow it.
The second is more politically charged: the belief that the Prophet Muhammad's descendants—the Ahl al-Bayt—have a divine right to rule. This traces to a fundamentalist strain within Zaydism called Jaroudism. It implies that legitimate political authority belongs only to those with prophetic lineage.
Hussein al-Houthi himself proposed a concept he called "Guiding Eminence"—a descendant of the Prophet who would serve as "a universal leader for the world." He never spelled out what powers this figure would have or how they would be chosen. The vagueness may have been intentional.
Zaydi Revival or Something More?
Zaydism is fascinating in its own right. Unlike mainstream Shia Islam, which holds that leadership should pass through specific designated successors of the Prophet, Zaydis believe any descendant of the Prophet who is learned and capable can claim the imamate—the position of religious and political leader. This made Zaydi politics historically more fluid and contested than in other Shia traditions.
The Houthis insist they are not trying to restore the old Zaydi imamate that governed Yemen for a millennium. This is probably smart politics—most Yemenis, even Zaydis, have no nostalgia for those days. But some analysts suspect the movement's true goals remain hidden, and that a restored imamate might emerge if conditions allow.
Meanwhile, the movement has proven surprisingly flexible in its recruitment. While its leadership is overwhelmingly Zaydi, the Houthis have recruited Sunnis as well, appealing to themes that cross sectarian lines: opposition to corruption, resistance to foreign interference, defense of Yemen against outside powers. Several predominantly Sunni areas have joined the Houthi cause.
But there are limits. In territory they control, the Houthis have closed Sunni mosques and reserved leadership positions almost exclusively for Zaydis. When they killed Saleh—a Sunni—they lost significant support among Sunni tribes who had tentatively allied with them.
Populism and Pragmatism
Beyond religion, the Houthis have positioned themselves as champions of ordinary Yemenis against a corrupt elite. Their messaging emphasizes economic development, an end to political marginalization, fair fuel prices, government accountability, job opportunities, and resistance to Western influence.
These are powerful themes in a country where corruption was rampant, where the government's revenues rarely benefited ordinary citizens, and where the United States was widely seen as propping up an illegitimate regime.
The movement has also been opportunistic in its alliances. At various times, the Houthis have partnered with countries and actors they later declared enemies. Saleh is the most dramatic example, but there are others. Survival has often taken precedence over ideological purity.
As the years have passed and the movement has grown, incorporating more fighters from different backgrounds, the original vision has diluted somewhat. Tribal feuds and local interests have crept in. The movement today is less a monolithic ideological force than a coalition held together by shared enemies and the momentum of war.
The Iranian Connection
No discussion of the Houthis is complete without addressing their relationship with Iran. The Saudis and their allies describe the Houthis as Iranian proxies, an extension of Tehran's "Axis of Resistance" that includes Hezbollah in Lebanon, various Shia militias in Iraq, and the Assad regime in Syria.
There is truth to this. Iran has provided the Houthis with weapons, training, and political support. The ideological influence of Hezbollah is unmistakable—from the movement's slogan to its media strategy to its military tactics. The Houthis are certainly part of an Iranian-aligned constellation of forces across the Middle East.
But the relationship is more complicated than simple proxy control. The Houthis have their own agenda, rooted in specifically Yemeni grievances and led by Yemenis. They are not puppets who jump when Tehran pulls strings. The movement predates significant Iranian involvement; it grew from local conditions and fought local wars before Iran took much interest.
Many Yemenis—including many Zaydis—resent the suggestion that the Houthis are Iranian puppets. They see this as propaganda meant to delegitimize a movement with genuine local roots. Some Zaydis who oppose the Houthis nevertheless bristle at the claim that they are controlled by Tehran.
The truth is probably somewhere in between. The Houthis benefit enormously from Iranian support and share many of Iran's strategic objectives. But they are not simply an Iranian franchise; they are an indigenous movement that has found a powerful patron.
The Red Sea Crisis
In October 2023, Hamas fighters broke through the barrier separating Gaza from Israel, killing approximately 1,200 people and taking more than 200 hostages. Israel responded with a devastating military campaign in Gaza that has killed tens of thousands of Palestinians.
The Houthis saw an opportunity—and perhaps a moral obligation.
On October 31st, 2023, Houthi forces launched ballistic missiles at Israel. Israeli officials claimed they were intercepted by the Arrow missile defense system in what they called the first combat to occur in space—an engagement at the edge of the atmosphere.
But the missile strikes on Israel were only the beginning. The Houthis then began attacking commercial shipping in the Red Sea, targeting vessels they claimed had connections to Israel. They demanded a ceasefire in Gaza and an end to Israel's blockade.
The Red Sea is one of the world's most critical waterways. Roughly twelve percent of global trade passes through it, including cargo ships traveling between Asia and Europe through the Suez Canal. Houthi attacks forced many shipping companies to reroute their vessels around the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa—adding weeks to journeys and billions of dollars to costs.
In January 2024, the United States and United Kingdom conducted airstrikes against Houthi targets in Yemen, attempting to degrade the movement's ability to threaten shipping. The strikes have not stopped the attacks.
A movement that began with summer camps in the Yemeni mountains now has the power to disrupt global commerce.
Terror Designation and Humanitarian Consequences
In January 2021, in the final days of the Trump administration, the United States designated the Houthis a terrorist organization. Humanitarian groups immediately warned that this would choke off aid to millions of starving Yemenis, since organizations would fear prosecution for any transactions that might benefit the Houthis.
When Joe Biden took office a month later, he reversed the designation, prioritizing humanitarian access over political pressure. But following the Red Sea attacks, there have been renewed calls to redesignate the group.
The designation debate captures a genuine dilemma. The Houthis have committed serious human rights abuses—recruiting child soldiers, targeting civilians, restricting humanitarian access, and discriminating against religious minorities. International human rights organizations have documented these violations extensively.
But Yemen also faces one of the world's worst humanitarian crises, with millions dependent on international aid. Any measures that restrict that aid have deadly consequences.
What Comes Next?
The Houthis control approximately a third of Yemen's territory but a majority of its population, including the capital and most major cities. The internationally recognized government, backed by Saudi Arabia, controls much of the south and east. Neither side has the strength to defeat the other.
Peace talks have sputtered on and off for years. The Saudis, exhausted by a war that has cost them billions and damaged their international reputation, have explored compromises. But fundamental questions remain unresolved: What role would the Houthis play in any future government? What happens to their weapons? Who governs the territories each side currently holds?
Meanwhile, the Houthis continue to grow in sophistication and ambition. Their Red Sea campaign has demonstrated that they can project power far beyond Yemen's borders. Their alliance with Iran gives them access to advanced weapons and strategic coordination with like-minded movements across the region.
The Believing Youth of 1992 could never have imagined this trajectory—from after-school religious classes to attacks on global shipping lanes. But perhaps Hussein al-Houthi, chanting his defiant slogan in the mosques of Sanaa, would not have been surprised at all.
He understood something about the power of conviction, about how a small group of true believers, given the right circumstances, can reshape the world. Whether that reshaping leads toward justice or toward more suffering remains, as it always has, unclear.