Independent agencies of the United States federal government

Based on Wikipedia: Independent agencies of the United States federal government

The Federal Reserve can raise interest rates and crash the stock market. The Federal Trade Commission can block mergers worth billions of dollars. The Securities and Exchange Commission can charge executives with fraud and send them to prison. These agencies wield enormous power over American life—and yet the president of the United States, the most powerful person in the world, often cannot fire the people who run them.

This is not a bug. It's a feature.

The Strange Island of Independence

Picture the federal government as a vast organizational chart. At the top sits the president. Below him are the Cabinet departments—State, Treasury, Defense, and so on—each headed by a secretary who serves entirely at the president's pleasure. The president can fire the Secretary of State on a whim, for any reason or no reason at all. These departments form the traditional executive branch, responsive to presidential direction and removable at presidential discretion.

But scattered across this chart are dozens of curious entities that don't fit this pattern. They're called independent agencies, and they occupy a constitutional twilight zone. They're part of the executive branch, sort of. They answer to the president, kind of. They can be directed by White House policy, maybe.

The ambiguity is deliberate.

When Congress creates an independent agency, it typically does something clever: it limits the president's ability to remove the agency's leaders. Instead of serving "at the pleasure of the president," commissioners of independent agencies can usually only be fired "for cause"—meaning incompetence, neglect of duty, or actual wrongdoing. Simply disagreeing with the president's policies doesn't count.

Why Would Anyone Design a Government This Way?

The answer lies in a fundamental tension within American democracy. We want our government to be accountable to elected officials, but we also want certain decisions made by experts free from political pressure.

Consider the Federal Reserve. When the Fed decides whether to raise or lower interest rates, that decision affects every mortgage, every car loan, every business investment in America. It's an enormously consequential choice. If the president could fire the Fed chair whenever interest rate decisions proved politically inconvenient, every monetary policy decision would become a political calculation. Should we raise rates to fight inflation, even though it might cause a recession right before the election? A Fed chair worried about keeping their job might make different choices than one focused purely on economic fundamentals.

Or consider the Federal Trade Commission, which decides whether corporate mergers violate antitrust law. If a president could fire FTC commissioners for blocking a merger by a major campaign donor, the entire enforcement system would become corrupt. The threat alone would be enough to influence decisions.

Independence, in this context, means insulation from short-term political pressure. It doesn't mean the agencies operate without oversight—Congress still controls their budgets and can rewrite their governing statutes. But it does mean that day-to-day decisions are made by appointed experts rather than elected politicians.

The Architecture of Independence

Independent agencies share several distinctive features that reinforce their autonomy from presidential control.

First, most are run by commissions or boards rather than single directors. The Federal Communications Commission has five commissioners. The Securities and Exchange Commission has five. The National Labor Relations Board has five members. This collegial structure means no single person controls the agency, and decisions require consensus or at least majority agreement.

Second, commissioners serve fixed terms that are staggered and usually longer than a presidential term. FCC commissioners serve five-year terms, for example, with one term expiring each year. This means a new president typically inherits commissioners appointed by their predecessor and cannot immediately reshape the agency. It might take two or three years before a president can appoint enough commissioners to constitute a majority.

Third, many independent agencies have statutory requirements for bipartisan composition. The FCC, for instance, cannot have more than three commissioners from the same political party. Even a president with a Senate majority cannot simply pack the commission with ideological allies.

These structural features work together. A president facing an independent agency finds commissioners they didn't appoint, serving terms they can't shorten, protected by removal restrictions they can't circumvent, and balanced by members of the opposing party they can't exclude.

The Supreme Court Draws a Line (Sort Of)

The constitutional status of independent agencies has always been contested. The Constitution vests "the executive Power" in the president and requires that the president "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." How can the president fulfill this duty if they can't control the officials executing the laws?

The Supreme Court addressed this question in 1935 in a case called Humphrey's Executor v. United States. President Franklin Roosevelt had fired William Humphrey from the Federal Trade Commission because Humphrey's policy views conflicted with Roosevelt's. The question was whether the president had the constitutional authority to do this.

The Court said no. It drew a distinction between officials who perform purely executive functions—carrying out the president's policies—and officials who perform "quasi-legislative" or "quasi-judicial" functions, like writing regulations or adjudicating disputes. The president's removal power, the Court held, extends fully to the former but can be limited by Congress for the latter.

This distinction created constitutional space for independent agencies. If an agency writes rules (quasi-legislative) or decides cases (quasi-judicial), Congress can protect its leaders from at-will presidential removal. The president can still remove them, but only for the causes specified by statute.

For ninety years, Humphrey's Executor stood as settled law. Presidents grumbled about independent agencies but accepted their legitimacy.

Then came 2025.

The Ground Shifts

In early 2025, the Supreme Court issued an unsigned emergency order in a case called Wilcox v. Trump. The case involved Gwynne Wilcox, a member of the National Labor Relations Board—one of those classic independent agencies protected by for-cause removal restrictions. The administration had attempted to remove her, and she sued.

A district court issued an injunction blocking her removal. The full D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that injunction. Under normal circumstances, the case would have proceeded through the courts while Wilcox remained in her position.

But the Supreme Court intervened with an emergency stay, allowing her removal to proceed while the case continued. The practical effect was to let the president remove an independent agency official despite the statutory protections Congress had enacted.

The order was unsigned and unexplained, as emergency stays often are. But its implications were profound. If presidents can remove independent agency officials despite for-cause protections, even temporarily during litigation, the entire architecture of agency independence may be crumbling.

The case remains ongoing, and the final resolution is uncertain. But the emergency order signaled that at least some Supreme Court justices may be ready to reconsider the constitutional foundations of independent agencies.

The Agencies You Actually Encounter

Independent agencies touch American life in countless ways, often invisibly.

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, known as the CFPB (pronounced by spelling out the letters: C-F-P-B), oversees everything from credit card companies to payday lenders to debt collectors. If you've ever received a disclosure form explaining your mortgage terms, the CFPB probably wrote the rules requiring it. If you've ever complained about a financial company and gotten a response, the CFPB may have facilitated it.

The Federal Communications Commission, or FCC, determines how the radio spectrum is allocated—which means it shapes everything from your cell phone coverage to your Wi-Fi speeds to what you hear on the radio. Every time you connect to the internet, you're using infrastructure governed by FCC regulations.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, known as the FDIC (F-D-I-C), guarantees your bank deposits up to $250,000. This guarantee, created during the Great Depression, is why bank runs no longer spiral into economic catastrophes. When you deposit money in a checking account, you're trusting the FDIC to make you whole if the bank fails.

The Securities and Exchange Commission, the SEC, regulates stock markets and public companies. Every time a company goes public, the SEC reviews its disclosures. Every quarterly earnings report follows SEC requirements. The SEC's enforcement actions against fraud help maintain confidence in financial markets.

The Federal Trade Commission, the FTC, enforces antitrust law and consumer protection. When the FTC blocks a merger, it's deciding that less competition would harm consumers. When it brings an enforcement action against deceptive advertising, it's defining the boundaries of corporate honesty.

The Ones That Don't Quite Fit

Not every agency called "independent" has the same protections. The terminology is confusing because "independent agency" can mean two different things.

In a broad sense, it means any agency that isn't part of a Cabinet department. The Environmental Protection Agency, or EPA, is independent in this sense—it's not housed within another department. But the EPA administrator serves at the pleasure of the president and can be fired at will. The EPA is structurally independent but not functionally independent in the way the Federal Reserve is.

In the narrower sense, "independent agency" means an agency whose leaders have for-cause removal protection. The Federal Reserve, the FTC, the SEC, the FCC—these are independent in the meaningful constitutional sense.

The distinction matters enormously. When a president wants to change policy at the EPA, they can simply fire the administrator and appoint someone new. When a president wants to change policy at the Federal Reserve, they have to wait for terms to expire and hope the Senate confirms their nominees.

The Central Bank That Runs on Independence

No independent agency matters more to the economy than the Federal Reserve System, commonly called "the Fed." The Fed is America's central bank, and its decisions ripple through every corner of economic life.

When the Fed raises interest rates, borrowing becomes more expensive. Mortgages cost more. Business loans cost more. Economic activity tends to slow down, which can reduce inflation but also reduce employment. When the Fed lowers interest rates, the opposite happens: borrowing gets cheaper, economic activity tends to increase, but inflation may rise.

These are extraordinarily consequential decisions, and they're made by the Federal Open Market Committee—a group of Fed officials who are deliberately insulated from political pressure. The Fed chair serves a four-year term and can only be removed for cause. The other governors serve fourteen-year terms, longer than almost any other government appointment.

This extreme independence reflects a lesson learned from history. In countries where central banks answer directly to politicians, there's a constant temptation to keep interest rates low before elections, juicing the economy in the short term even if it causes inflation later. An independent central bank can make the unpopular decisions—raising rates to fight inflation, for instance—that elected politicians might avoid.

The Fed's independence has been tested repeatedly. Presidents from both parties have criticized Fed decisions. But until recently, the basic principle that the Fed should operate free from day-to-day political interference has held.

The Agencies That Keep Things Safe

Several independent agencies focus specifically on safety and investigation.

The National Transportation Safety Board, or NTSB (N-T-S-B), investigates transportation accidents—plane crashes, train derailments, major car accidents, pipeline explosions. The NTSB doesn't regulate anything; it just investigates and makes recommendations. But its reports carry enormous weight. When the NTSB determines what caused a crash, airlines, railroads, and regulators typically act on those findings.

The Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, usually called the CSB, does similar work for industrial and chemical accidents. When a refinery explodes or a chemical plant leaks, the CSB investigates. Its reports have led to significant safety improvements across American industry.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or NRC, oversees everything nuclear in the civilian sector—power plants, medical equipment, research reactors, radioactive materials. The NRC licenses nuclear facilities, sets safety standards, and can shut down operations that don't comply. Given the potential consequences of nuclear accidents, the NRC's independence from political pressure on licensing decisions seems particularly valuable.

The Consumer Product Safety Commission, the CPSC, tests and evaluates consumer products for safety hazards. When you see a product recall notice—lead paint in children's toys, fire hazards in appliances, choking dangers in small parts—the CPSC is usually behind it.

The Ones You Might Not Expect

Some independent agencies seem surprising inclusions in this category.

The Central Intelligence Agency, the CIA, is technically an independent agency. It doesn't sit within a Cabinet department—though it does report to the Director of National Intelligence, who is also an independent agency head. The CIA's independence is less about removal protections (the CIA director serves at the president's pleasure) and more about operational autonomy in intelligence gathering.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration—NASA—is an independent agency. There's no Department of Space; NASA answers directly to the president rather than through a Cabinet secretary. NASA's independence reflects both its unique technical mission and the historical circumstances of its creation during the space race.

The General Services Administration, or GSA, handles the mundane but essential work of government logistics—buying supplies, managing buildings, maintaining the vehicle fleet. It's independent in the organizational sense but not in the protected-from-removal sense. The GSA administrator can be fired at will.

Amtrak, the national passenger railroad, is technically an independent agency organized as a government corporation. It operates trains rather than writing regulations, making it quite different from the classic independent regulatory agencies.

The Constitutional Controversy That Won't Go Away

The existence of independent agencies has always troubled some legal scholars. Their argument goes like this: The Constitution vests all executive power in the president. Executing the laws is inherently an executive function. Therefore, any official exercising executive power must be subject to presidential direction and removal. Agencies insulated from presidential control are unconstitutional.

This argument has gained significant support among conservative legal thinkers and, increasingly, among Supreme Court justices. The "unitary executive theory," as it's called, holds that the Constitution requires a clear chain of command from the president through every executive official.

Defenders of independent agencies respond that Congress has broad power to structure the executive branch, including the power to create offices with various tenure protections. They note that independent agencies have existed since the late 1800s, that Congress has created them repeatedly with presidential acquiescence, and that the practical benefits of insulating certain decisions from political pressure are substantial.

This debate, once confined to law reviews and academic conferences, has moved to the center of constitutional law. Recent Supreme Court decisions have expressed skepticism about agency independence. The Wilcox case may bring the question to a head.

What Happens If Independence Falls?

Imagine a world where the president can fire the Federal Reserve chair for raising interest rates. Or remove SEC commissioners for bringing enforcement actions against a political ally. Or dismiss FTC commissioners for blocking a merger the president supports.

Defenders of the current system warn that such a world would see regulatory decisions become nakedly political. Enforcement would be selective, favoring friends and punishing enemies. Markets would lose confidence in regulatory consistency. Long-term planning would become impossible when agencies might reverse course with every new administration—or even within an administration, as political winds shift.

Critics of independent agencies counter that democratic accountability is more important than expert insulation. If the public disagrees with how the Fed manages monetary policy or how the FTC enforces antitrust law, they should be able to elect a president who will change course. Independent agencies, in this view, represent an unaccountable "fourth branch" of government that the Constitution never authorized.

Both sides have a point. The tension between accountability and expertise, between democratic responsiveness and institutional stability, doesn't have an easy resolution. The American system has tried to balance these values through the creative compromise of independent agencies—genuinely part of the executive branch, but not entirely under presidential control.

Whether that compromise survives the current constitutional moment remains to be seen.

The Reality on the Ground

Despite all the constitutional drama, the practical reality is often messier than the legal categories suggest.

Presidents have always found ways to influence independent agencies. They appoint the commissioners, after all. They designate who serves as chair. They can pressure agencies through public statements, private conversations, and the appointment of like-minded officials over time. The removal restrictions matter, but they're not an impenetrable shield.

Moreover, commissioner turnover is higher than the staggered-term structure might suggest. People resign. People get appointed to other positions. People simply leave. Most presidents end up with the opportunity to appoint a majority of commissioners on most independent agencies within their first term.

And sometimes independent agencies prove more aligned with presidential preferences than the president's own Cabinet appointees. The agencies attract people who care deeply about their substantive areas—securities regulation, telecommunications policy, labor law—and those people sometimes share the policy views of the president who appointed them more consistently than Cabinet members facing different political pressures.

Independence, in practice, is a matter of degree. Some agencies are more independent than others. Some moments see more presidential deference than others. The formal legal protections establish a baseline, but the actual relationship between presidents and agencies depends on personalities, politics, and the specific issues at stake.

The Broader Lesson

Independent agencies represent one answer to a question every democratic society must face: how do you make good decisions in a complex world while remaining accountable to the people?

You could give all power to elected officials, ensuring maximum accountability but potentially sacrificing expertise and consistency. You could give all power to unelected experts, ensuring technical competence but potentially sacrificing democratic legitimacy. Or you could create institutions that try to combine both—appointed by elected officials but insulated from their day-to-day control, accountable ultimately to Congress but protected from presidential whim.

The American system chose the third option, at least for certain regulatory functions. Whether that choice was wise, whether it was constitutional, and whether it will survive—these remain open questions, more open now than at any time in nearly a century.

The answers will shape not just abstract legal doctrine but the concrete reality of how America is governed: who decides interest rates, who approves mergers, who protects consumers, who regulates the airwaves. These are not small questions. They affect every American, every day, in ways both visible and invisible.

The independent agencies sit at the heart of the modern administrative state—powerful, contested, and perpetually uncertain of their own constitutional foundations.