India–Russia relations

Based on Wikipedia: India–Russia relations

In the summer of 2022, pollsters asked Indians a simple question: which country do you trust most? The answer surprised many Western observers. Forty-three percent named Russia—nearly twice as many as those who named the United States. This wasn't an anomaly or a blip. It was the culmination of a relationship stretching back centuries, one that has shaped geopolitics in ways that most people outside these two nations barely understand.

The partnership between India and Russia is one of the most consequential and least discussed alliances of our time.

Ancient Trade Routes and Traveling Merchants

Long before diplomats exchanged credentials or generals negotiated arms deals, merchants blazed the trail. Archaeological discoveries at Pazyryk—a series of ancient burial mounds in Siberia's Altai Mountains—reveal that nomadic peoples were trading with India as early as the fourth century before the common era. Textiles, spices, and precious goods moved along routes that would later become legendary.

In 1468, a Russian traveler named Afanasy Nikitin set out on an extraordinary journey. He crossed Persia, wandered through the Indian subcontinent, and passed through the Ottoman Empire before returning home nearly four years later. His account, sometimes called A Journey Beyond Three Seas, became one of the earliest Russian records of India—though Nikitin himself returned disappointed, unable to afford the goods he had hoped to trade.

By the eighteenth century, Indian merchants had become regular visitors to Russian cities. Astrakhan, Moscow, and Saint Petersburg all hosted traders from the Mughal Empire. This commerce received an official blessing in 1696 when Peter the Great—the reforming czar who dragged Russia into the modern era—wrote to the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb requesting formal trade relations.

The Russian government treated these Indian merchants remarkably well. A trader named Anbu-Ram Mulin received a personal grant from the czar allowing his company to resolve property disputes in Astrakhan. Indian merchants there paid just twelve rubles annually to rent shop space in what became known as the Indian Trading Compound. They were exempted from taxes and duties—privileges they had never enjoyed in other Eastern countries. Perhaps most importantly for a community far from home, they were granted religious freedom.

By 1724, goods exported by Indian merchants from Astrakhan into Russia's interior cities exceeded 104,000 rubles—nearly a quarter of all trade passing through that strategic port city.

Then Britain arrived, and everything changed.

The Great Game and Its Shadows

The British occupation of India effectively severed independent Indian trade with Russia. But the relationship between these two vast territories didn't disappear—it simply transformed into something more dangerous.

In 1801, Czar Paul hatched one of history's more audacious military schemes. He ordered plans for an invasion of British India using 22,000 Cossacks. The grand strategy called for Russia to ally with Napoleonic France; together, a French corps of 35,000 men would join 25,000 Russian infantry and 10,000 mounted Cossacks in an assault on Britain's most valuable colonial possession.

The plan never came to fruition. Some Cossacks had already approached Orenburg—a staging point for the eastward march—when Czar Paul was assassinated. His successor, Alexander the First, immediately cancelled the operation. But the episode illustrated a crucial geopolitical reality: Russia and Britain were now rivals for influence in South Asia, a competition that would become known as the Great Game.

Independence and the Soviet Embrace

India established official diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in April 1947—months before it declared independence from Britain. This timing was deliberate. As the colonial era ended, India's leaders were already looking for counterweights to Western influence.

The relationship deepened quickly. In 1951, the Soviet Union exercised its veto power at the United Nations Security Council to support India in the Kashmir dispute—the first of many times Moscow would shield New Delhi from international pressure. Two years later, Joseph Stalin made India's position clear when he told Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, who would later become India's president: "Both you and Mr. Nehru are persons whom we do not consider our enemies. This will continue to be our policy and you can count on our help."

That help proved substantial.

In 1955, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru visited the Soviet Union. Later that year, Nikita Khrushchev—the Soviet leader who had denounced Stalin's cult of personality—made a return trip to India. During his visit, Khrushchev announced Soviet support for Indian sovereignty over both the disputed Kashmir region and Portuguese coastal enclaves like Goa.

This created a fascinating triangle of tensions. The Soviet Union's warm embrace of India directly contributed to the deterioration of Moscow's relationship with Beijing. When border disputes erupted between India and China in 1959, and again during the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the Soviets declared neutrality—which China found deeply offensive.

The numbers tell the story. By 1960, India had received more Soviet assistance than China had. In 1962, the Soviet Union agreed to transfer technology allowing India to produce the MiG-21 jet fighter—a sophisticated piece of military hardware that Moscow had earlier refused to share with China. These disparities became running sores in Sino-Soviet relations, contributing to the eventual split between the two communist giants.

The Bangladesh Crisis and American Confrontation

The year 1971 brought the relationship to a new level of intensity.

That year, the eastern wing of Pakistan—separated from West Pakistan by a thousand miles of Indian territory—began fighting for independence. India supported the secession. The United States, led by Richard Nixon and his national security advisor Henry Kissinger, tilted toward Pakistan and considered bringing China into the conflict to destabilize India.

But China, still smarting from its 1962 war with India, declined to participate in what it saw as American machinations to support atrocities in what would become Bangladesh.

India responded by deepening its Soviet ties. In August 1971, the two countries signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. When the crisis reached its climax in December, the Soviet Union deployed its navy to help India counter American naval movements in the region. The USS Enterprise, America's nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, had entered the Bay of Bengal in what India perceived as an act of intimidation.

The conflict ended with India's victory and the birth of Bangladesh. For many Indians, the lesson was clear: when confronting Western powers, the Soviet Union had their back.

Surviving Political Change

One remarkable aspect of this relationship is its resilience across dramatic political shifts in both countries.

In the late 1970s, India elected the right-wing Janata Party coalition government—a significant departure from the socialist-leaning Congress Party that had dominated since independence. The new government moved to establish better economic and military relations with Western countries. The Soviet response was pragmatic: they simply offered more weaponry and economic assistance to keep India close.

Even the 1984 assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi—considered the mainstay of cordial Indian-Soviet relations—by her Sikh separatist bodyguards didn't disrupt the partnership. Her son Rajiv Gandhi, who succeeded her, chose the Soviet Union for his first state visit abroad in May 1985. During that trip, he signed two long-term economic agreements and, according to scholars of Indian foreign policy, developed a personal rapport with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.

Gorbachev reciprocated. His first visit to a Third World nation as Soviet leader was to meet Rajiv Gandhi in New Delhi in late 1986. The two leaders discussed an Asian collective security system—a proposal that never materialized but illustrated the depth of strategic thinking both sides invested in the relationship.

The Post-Soviet Reinvention

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, many observers expected the India-Russia relationship to wither. After all, the ideological framework that had justified the partnership—non-aligned solidarity against Western imperialism—seemed obsolete in a unipolar world dominated by the United States.

They were wrong.

The first major political initiative came in 2000, when India and Russia signed a Strategic Partnership declaration. Vladimir Putin, writing in the Indian newspaper The Hindu, called it "a truly historic step." Former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh later described Putin as "a valued friend of India and the original architect of the India-Russia strategic partnership."

The relationship acquired new institutional architecture. The India-Russia Intergovernmental Commission became one of the largest and most comprehensive governmental mechanisms India maintains with any country. Almost every department of the Indian government participates in it. Russia became one of only two countries—Japan being the other—to have annual ministerial-level defense reviews with India.

The Defense Connection

If trade first connected these nations and ideology deepened their bond, it is military hardware that has made the relationship truly indispensable.

India is the second-largest market for Russia's defense industry. As of 2017, approximately sixty-eight percent of the Indian military's hardware imports came from Russia, making Moscow the chief supplier of equipment to one of the world's largest armed forces. This isn't just about rifles and ammunition. India operates Russian-designed aircraft, submarines, tanks, missiles, and aircraft carriers.

The diplomatic footprint reflects this priority. India maintains an embassy in Moscow and consulates-general in Saint Petersburg and Vladivostok—Russia's Pacific port city. Russia maintains an embassy in New Delhi and an extraordinary six consulates-general scattered across India: in Chennai, Goa, Hyderabad, Kolkata, Mumbai, and Trivandrum.

For comparison, Russia maintains far fewer diplomatic posts in most other large democracies.

Public Opinion and Mutual Affection

The warmth between these nations isn't confined to government ministries and military bases. It extends into popular sentiment.

A 2014 BBC World Service poll found that eighty-five percent of Russians view India positively, with only nine percent expressing negative views. A 2017 survey by the Moscow-based Levada Center—an independent, non-governmental research organization—found that Russians identified India as one of their top five "friends," alongside Belarus, China, Kazakhstan, and Syria.

The sentiment flows both ways. When pollsters asked Indians in 2022 whom they trusted most as a partner, forty-three percent named Russia. Only twenty-seven percent named the United States. In the same year, sixty percent of Indians supported their government's handling of the Russia-Ukraine conflict—which essentially meant maintaining neutrality and continuing to purchase Russian oil while the West imposed sanctions.

The Diplomatic Properties

The physical embassies themselves tell stories.

India's embassy in Moscow occupies a building constructed in 1821, remodeled in 1896, and transferred to the Indian government in 1952. The complex includes an aristocratic-style "Chancery Building," a rationalist-modern ambassador's residence, and a French-style structure nicknamed "Napoleon's Dacha." Before becoming Indian diplomatic territory, the Chancery building had belonged to an arts patron, a textile magnate, and the Soviet government.

Russia's embassy in New Delhi has its own history. The Russian consulate in India first opened in Mumbai in 1900, then moved to Kolkata in 1910. Initially housed in Travancore House on Curzon Street—now Kasturba Gandhi Marg—the mission eventually moved to Chanakyapuri, Delhi's diplomatic enclave. In February 1956, India allocated the Soviet Union two plots totaling twenty-two acres, and a lease agreement was concluded.

These properties have seen their share of intrigue. A declassified 1985 CIA report claims that the Press Section of the Soviet Embassy during that era "specialized in fast-breaking disinformation campaigns, principally targeted against the United States." According to the report, Soviet operatives worked to implicate the United States in the 1984 assassination of Indira Gandhi and to spread claims that American diplomat Jeane Kirkpatrick was plotting to "Balkanize" India—to break it into smaller, weaker states.

The Modern Strategic Calculus

Today, India and Russia cooperate in multiple international forums: the United Nations, BRICS (the grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), the G20, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (commonly abbreviated SCO). Russia has stated its support for India receiving a permanent seat on the UN Security Council—a major diplomatic prize that India has sought for decades.

Russia has also backed India's membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)—a body that controls the export of materials that could contribute to nuclear weapons—and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. In return, Russia has expressed interest in joining the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), where India is a founding member, as an observer.

The relationship helps India navigate its complicated position in Asia. In May 2022, Russian political scientist Sergey Karaganov—considered close to both Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov—stated that strong India-Russia ties help stabilize New Delhi's relationship with Beijing while bringing balance to Moscow's own partnership with China.

This is a delicate dance. India and China have their own border disputes and strategic rivalries. Russia and China have drawn closer since Western sanctions began over Ukraine. Yet somehow, the India-Russia partnership provides a counterbalancing force that all parties find useful.

The Ukraine Complication

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 tested this partnership as never before.

Western nations expected India to join their sanctions regime and condemn Russian aggression. Instead, India abstained from United Nations votes criticizing Russia. More significantly, India increased its purchases of Russian oil—taking advantage of discounted prices as European buyers withdrew.

Indian officials have defended this position using carefully calibrated language. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar praised Russia as "exceptionally steady" and a "time-tested" partner in November 2022. In January 2023, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova publicly backed India in its dispute with the British Broadcasting Corporation over a documentary critical of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

The mutual support continues even as global pressure mounts.

Words from the Leaders

The rhetoric on both sides reveals how seriously these nations take their partnership.

Vladimir Putin has stated: "Relations with India have always been and I am sure will be one of the most important foreign policy priorities of our country. Our mutual ties of friendship are filled with sympathy, and trust, and openness. They were never overshadowed by disagreements or conflict. This understanding is indeed the common heritage of our peoples."

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has reciprocated: "We are confident that India lives in the hearts of every Russian. In the same way, I can assure you that Russia also lives in our souls as a homeland, as people who share our emotions, our feelings of mutual respect and constant friendship."

Former Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai identified five pillars of the strategic partnership: politics, defense, civil nuclear energy, anti-terrorism cooperation, and space exploration. These aren't abstract categories. They represent concrete programs involving billions of dollars, thousands of personnel, and technologies that shape both nations' futures.

The Long View

What makes the India-Russia relationship so durable?

Part of the answer lies in institutional memory. Unlike India's relationship with the United States—which has oscillated between hostility (during the Cold War) and partnership (since the nuclear deal of 2008)—the India-Russia connection has remained consistent across seven decades. Russian diplomats can point to Moscow's support during the 1971 Bangladesh crisis. Indian officials remember that Russia never armed Pakistan against them.

Part of the answer is strategic autonomy. India has long prized its independence in foreign policy. Maintaining strong ties with Russia allows India to avoid becoming too dependent on any single partner—whether the United States, China, or anyone else. In a multipolar world, having options matters.

Both governments explicitly support the concept of a "multipolar world order" in which Russia and India serve as independent "poles" of power. This vision stands in contrast to American preferences for a rules-based international order led by democracies.

And part of the answer is simply practical. Replacing Russian military equipment would take India decades and cost hundreds of billions of dollars. The relationships between defense establishments run deep. Officers who trained together, engineers who collaborated on projects, suppliers who know each other's systems—these human networks don't disappear because geopolitics shifts.

Looking Forward

The partnership between India and Russia isn't easily categorized.

It isn't an alliance in the formal sense—neither country is obligated to come to the other's defense. It isn't based on shared values in the way Western policymakers typically understand that phrase—India is a democracy, Russia increasingly is not. It isn't primarily economic—trade between the two countries remains modest compared to India's commerce with the United States, China, or the European Union.

Yet it persists, year after year, government after government, crisis after crisis.

Understanding this relationship is essential for anyone trying to make sense of global politics in the twenty-first century. When Western sanctions target Russia, India provides a crucial outlet. When India needs a counterweight to Chinese pressure, Russia offers diplomatic support. When international forums divide into competing camps, both nations benefit from having a trusted partner on the other side.

From the Cossack merchants of Astrakhan to the MiG fighters over the Himalayas, from Stalin's assurances to Nehru to Putin's letters in The Hindu, this is a relationship built on centuries of contact and decades of strategic alignment. It may frustrate Western policymakers. It certainly complicates simple narratives about democracies versus autocracies.

But it isn't going anywhere soon.