Based on Wikipedia: Middle power

The Countries That Refuse to Be Ignored

In a world supposedly divided between superpowers and everyone else, there exists a fascinating category of nations that refuse to be ignored. They are not mighty enough to dictate the course of history through sheer force, yet they punch far above their weight on the global stage. These are the middle powers, and in the chaotic geopolitics of the twenty-first century, they may hold more cards than anyone expected.

The story of middle powers is not a recent invention. It stretches back to the ancient empires of China, India, Greece, and Rome, where kingdoms of moderate strength navigated between the dominant forces of their eras. In thirteenth and fourteenth century Italy, city-states that were neither dominant nor negligible carved out influential roles within the patchwork of the Holy Roman Empire. The concept crystallized in the late sixteenth century when Giovanni Botero, an Italian political philosopher, divided the world into three tiers: the grandissime, or great powers; the mezano, the middle powers; and the piccioli, the small powers.

Botero's definition of a middle power remains remarkably relevant today: a state with "sufficient strength and authority to stand on its own without the need of help from others." Not dependent, not dominant. Somewhere in between.

The Difficulty of Definition

If you ask ten international relations scholars to define a middle power, you will receive at least a dozen answers.

The most straightforward approach looks at raw numbers. Some researchers use Gross National Product statistics to draw their lists. If a country is neither economically massive nor economically tiny, it might qualify. But this method immediately runs into problems. Economic size alone cannot capture what makes a middle power distinct.

A second approach focuses on behavior rather than capabilities. This school of thought argues that middle powers can be identified not by what they have, but by what they do. They tend to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems. They embrace compromise positions in disputes. They champion what scholars call "good international citizenship." They build coalitions, serve as mediators, participate enthusiastically in United Nations peacekeeping missions, and invest heavily in international institutions.

There is something almost idealistic about this behavioral definition. Middle powers, according to this view, see themselves as moral actors on the world stage. They believe they have a responsibility to protect the international order from those who would threaten it, including, at times, the great powers themselves. This sense of purpose was particularly acute during the Cold War, when middle powers often found themselves navigating between the American and Soviet camps.

The trouble is that these definitions do not always align. Some countries have middle-power economies but do not behave like middle powers. Others act like middle powers despite questionable credentials in terms of size or wealth.

Traditional Middle Powers: The Old Guard

For decades, the archetypal middle powers were a specific set of wealthy, stable democracies. Countries like Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden became synonymous with middle power diplomacy.

Canada practically invented the modern concept. After World War II, Canadian Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent called his country "a power of the middle rank" and laid out what became the classical definition of Canadian middle power diplomacy. Canada was a junior partner in major alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, commonly known as NATO, and the North American Aerospace Defense Command, or NORAD, but it was not a satellite of either the United Kingdom or the United States. It made decisions objectively, in the light of its own obligations to its citizens and the international community.

Canadian leaders pointed to several factors that qualified their nation for middle power status. They were actively involved in resolving disputes outside their own region, most famously during the Suez Crisis of 1956 when Canadian diplomat Lester Pearson helped defuse a confrontation between Britain, France, Israel, and Egypt. Canada was not a former colonial power, which made it relatively neutral in anti-colonial struggles. It worked tirelessly within the United Nations to represent smaller nations and prevent superpower dominance. And it became synonymous with peacekeeping, contributing troops to missions around the world.

Australia followed a similar trajectory. In March 2008, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd explicitly defined his country's approach as "middle power diplomacy," pledging to influence international decision-makers on global economic, security, and environmental challenges.

These traditional middle powers share certain characteristics according to scholars. They are wealthy. They are stable. They have relatively egalitarian societies and social democratic political traditions. Interestingly, they tend not to be dominant within their own regions. They often construct national identities that are distinct from the more powerful states nearby.

The Rise of Emerging Middle Powers

Something has shifted in recent years.

American political analyst Cliff Kupchan argues that middle powers, particularly those in the Global South, have more agency and what he calls "geopolitical heft" in the 2020s than at any point since World War II. He identifies six nations as leading this new wave: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey.

These countries look quite different from the traditional middle powers. They are not necessarily wealthy by Western standards, though their economies are large and growing rapidly. They are not always stable democracies. They have significant regional influence, unlike the traditional middle powers who often seemed disconnected from their immediate neighborhoods. Many have only recently democratized, and some have democratic credentials that international observers view skeptically.

What unites them is their refusal to pick sides in the great power competition of our era.

Kupchan calls these nations "swing states." They are capable of creating new power dynamics precisely because they have not aligned themselves firmly with either the United States or China. Unlike during the Cold War, when nations were pressured to choose between Washington and Moscow, these emerging middle powers maintain relationships with all major powers simultaneously. They use this position to advance their own interests, playing rivals against each other when advantageous.

Why Middle Powers Matter More Now

Several historical developments explain why middle powers have gained influence in recent decades.

The first is the weakening of strict bipolarity. During the Cold War, the world was divided into two armed camps, and the pressure to choose a side was immense. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the United States enjoyed a period of uncontested hegemony. But that era has ended. The rivalry between America and China is real, but it is not as all-encompassing as the Cold War division. There is more room for maneuver.

The second factor is deglobalization. For decades, the world economy became increasingly integrated, with goods, capital, and people flowing across borders more freely than ever before. That trend has partially reversed. Supply chains are fragmenting. Regional economic blocs are gaining importance. In this more fragmented landscape, middle powers that dominate their regions have comparatively greater influence.

Consider Saudi Arabia. The international energy market was once relatively unified, with oil prices set globally. As that market fragments into regional components, a major energy exporter like Saudi Arabia gains leverage in its now-smaller regional market that it could not have exercised in a truly global one.

The third factor is the ability of middle powers to capitalize on great power rivalries. When the United States and China compete for influence, middle powers can extract concessions from both sides. They can threaten to tilt toward one rival if the other does not offer better terms. This is a game that requires diplomatic skill, but middle powers have often been defined by their diplomatic capabilities.

The Middle Powers Initiative and Nuclear Politics

One arena where middle powers have exercised particular influence is nuclear arms control.

The Middle Powers Initiative, a program of the Global Security Institute, brings together eight international non-governmental organizations to work with middle power governments on reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing nuclear disarmament. Their definition of middle power is quite specific: politically and economically significant, internationally respected countries that have renounced the nuclear arms race.

This last criterion is crucial. Under this definition, states that possess nuclear weapons, like India and Pakistan, cannot be middle powers. Neither can any state that participates in NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements, under which American nuclear weapons are stationed on the territory of certain European allies.

The logic is straightforward. Middle powers that have deliberately chosen not to pursue nuclear weapons have a unique moral authority when advocating for nonproliferation and disarmament. They have made the sacrifices they are asking others to make. This gives them credibility that nuclear-armed states simply cannot possess.

The Characteristics of Middle Power Diplomacy

Scholars have identified several consistent features of how middle powers conduct foreign policy.

The first is a deep commitment to multilateralism. Middle powers work through global institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and various regional bodies. They ally with other middle powers to amplify their voices. Acting alone, a middle power cannot match a great power. Acting in concert with a dozen others, they can shape the agenda.

The second characteristic is what scholars call "civil society penetration" in foreign policy. In middle powers, non-governmental organizations, academic experts, and ordinary citizens often have more influence on international affairs than in either great powers or small ones. The government does not monopolize the country's engagement with the world.

The third feature is the tendency to build national identity around distinctive foreign policy initiatives. Middle powers have championed peacekeeping operations, human security doctrines, the International Criminal Court, and climate agreements like the Kyoto Protocol. These are not peripheral concerns but central to how these nations see themselves.

There is an idealistic strain running through middle power diplomacy. These countries often describe themselves in moral terms, as defenders of international order and champions of the weak against the strong. Whether this idealism reflects genuine values or simply serves as a useful diplomatic tool is debated. Probably it is both.

The Blurred Lines at the Top

The distinction between middle powers and great powers is not as clear as it might seem.

Five nations are universally considered great powers: the United States, China, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom. These are the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, all recognized nuclear weapons states with enormous military, economic, and diplomatic capabilities.

Germany, India, and Japan are commonly cited as great powers by academics, though their claims rest on economic strength and global influence rather than military might or nuclear arsenals. Yet some scholars have classified these same nations as middle powers at various times.

The case becomes even murkier further down the list. Italy is considered a great power by some analysts, pointing to its membership in the Group of Seven advanced economies, commonly called the G7, and the NATO Quint, an informal grouping of the alliance's most influential members. Others firmly place Italy among the middle powers. Brazil's massive economy and regional influence have led some to call it a great power, while others see it as the quintessential emerging middle power.

Eight countries have been categorized as both great powers and middle powers by different experts at different times since the Cold War ended: Brazil, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom. This overlap reveals the fundamental ambiguity in these categories. They are not precise measurements but rough approximations, heavily dependent on which criteria you emphasize and when you are making the assessment.

The Long List of Middle Powers

Depending on which scholar you consult, the list of middle powers can include more than fifty countries.

This breadth reveals another problem with the concept. The category includes nations as large and influential as Australia, a member of the G20 with one of the world's largest economies, alongside tiny Norway with fewer than six million people. It encompasses regional powers like Turkey, which dominates its neighborhood, and states like the Czech Republic that some analysts would classify as small powers.

Argentina appears on many lists, despite economic turmoil that has periodically decimated its influence. South Korea qualifies on most counts, with its advanced economy, technological prowess, and cultural soft power through the Korean Wave of popular entertainment. The Netherlands punches above its weight through shrewd diplomacy and hosting major international institutions. Spain, Poland, and Mexico all appear on various compilations.

This diversity is not a weakness of the concept. It reflects a genuine reality about international politics. Between the handful of truly dominant states and the scores of countries with minimal global influence lies a broad middle ground. The nations in this middle ground share certain opportunities and constraints, even if they differ enormously in size, wealth, geography, and political systems.

Competition Among Middle Powers

Middle powers do not always cooperate with each other. They compete, sometimes fiercely.

The rivalry between Egypt and Israel for influence in Africa during the mid-twentieth century exemplifies this dynamic. Both nations sought to extend their reach across the continent, using soft power, including diplomatic initiatives, economic aid, and cultural connections, to win allies among newly independent African states. They were not fighting each other directly, but they were certainly not cooperating.

Scholar Annette Baker Fox has noted that relationships between middle powers and great powers reveal more intricate behaviors and bargaining schemes than often assumed. Middle powers are not simply passive recipients of great power decisions. They negotiate, they maneuver, they sometimes play great powers against each other. The same complex dynamics characterize relationships among middle powers themselves.

The Future of the Middle

The middle power concept emerged from European political thought, was refined during the Cold War, and is now being transformed by the rise of the Global South.

The traditional middle powers, the Canadas and Australias of the world, have not disappeared. They continue to champion multilateralism, invest in peacekeeping, and advocate for international norms. But they are being joined, and in some ways overshadowed, by emerging middle powers with very different characteristics.

Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey do not fit the old template. They are not necessarily egalitarian or social democratic. They have not renounced aspirations to regional dominance. Some possess or seek nuclear weapons. Yet they exercise the same kind of influence that defines middle power status: significant enough to matter, not dominant enough to dictate.

In a world where the old certainties of American hegemony are fading and a new Cold War between Washington and Beijing has not fully crystallized, these swing states hold surprising leverage. They can be courted by all sides. They can set conditions for their cooperation. They can advance their interests in ways that were impossible when the world was more rigidly divided.

The middle powers remind us that international politics is not simply a game played by the giants. Between the superpowers lies a world of nations that are too consequential to ignore, too numerous to suppress, and increasingly too skilled to be taken for granted. Their moment may have arrived.