Southern Transitional Council

Based on Wikipedia: Southern Transitional Council

Yemen is splitting in two again. Not in some distant future or hypothetical scenario, but right now, in December 2025. Armed forces loyal to a group called the Southern Transitional Council have swept across the south of the country, capturing territory at a pace that's left observers stunned. Government ministers are defecting. The prime minister has fled to Saudi Arabia. And rallies in the streets of Aden are demanding something that hasn't existed since 1990: an independent South Yemen.

To understand what's happening, you need to know that Yemen wasn't always one country. For most of the twentieth century, it was two.

A Brief History of Two Yemens

Picture the Arabian Peninsula as a boot, with its toe pointing toward Africa. The southern coast of this boot, stretching from the Gulf of Aden to the border of Oman, was British territory for over a century. The port city of Aden—strategically crucial for ships traveling between Europe and India—became a British colony in 1937.

The British eventually cobbled together the various sultanates and emirates of the region into something called the Federation of South Arabia. It was, like many colonial administrative creations, somewhat artificial. But it existed. And when British forces withdrew in 1967 following an armed rebellion, this territory became an independent nation: the People's Republic of Southern Yemen, later renamed the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

This southern state was the only Marxist country in the Arab world. It was allied with the Soviet Union, deeply socialist in its economics, and culturally quite different from its northern neighbor, the Yemen Arab Republic, which was backed by Saudi Arabia and followed a more traditional tribal political structure.

When the Cold War ended, so did the rationale for keeping these two states separate. In May 1990, North and South Yemen merged into the Republic of Yemen. The marriage was troubled from the start. Southern leaders attempted to secede just four years later, in 1994. They proclaimed a "Democratic Republic of Yemen" and tried to break away. They failed. Northern forces crushed the rebellion in a brief but bloody civil war.

Many southerners never accepted the outcome. They felt colonized by the north—their resources extracted, their political influence marginalized, their identity suppressed. This resentment simmered for decades.

Enter the Southern Transitional Council

The group now reshaping Yemen's future emerged from this long-standing grievance. The Southern Transitional Council—usually called the STC—was founded on May 11, 2017, in the city of Aden. Its creation followed a very specific political drama.

A week earlier, Yemen's president, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, had fired the governor of Aden, a man named Aidarus al-Zoubaidi. Hadi's stated reason was that al-Zoubaidi had become too close to the United Arab Emirates, which Hadi accused of "acting like occupiers" in southern Yemen. This was ironic, given that both Hadi and the Emirates were nominally on the same side in Yemen's ongoing civil war against the Houthi rebels. But the alliance was fractious, and the Emirates had developed their own agenda in the south.

Al-Zoubaidi's dismissal triggered massive demonstrations in Aden. Tens of thousands gathered in what they called the "Aden Historic Declaration," demanding southern self-governance. Within days, al-Zoubaidi announced the formation of the Southern Transitional Council, with himself as chairman. The Emirates provided backing. President Hadi immediately declared the new council illegitimate.

The STC's goal was straightforward, if ambitious: to restore the independent state that had existed before 1990. They even chose a name that harked back to the British era—the "State of South Arabia," echoing the old Federation of South Arabia.

A War Within a War

Here's where things get complicated. Yemen has been consumed by a devastating civil war since 2014, when Houthi rebels—a Zaidi Shia movement from the north—swept into the capital, Sanaa, and overthrew Hadi's government. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates intervened militarily in 2015, launching an air campaign to restore Hadi and defeat the Houthis. The war has killed hundreds of thousands, caused a famine, and created one of the world's worst humanitarian disasters.

The STC was supposedly part of the coalition fighting the Houthis. But they had their own priorities. In January 2018, STC-aligned forces seized control of government headquarters in Aden in what was effectively a coup against Hadi—their supposed ally. Al-Zoubaidi declared a state of emergency and announced that the STC had "begun the process of overthrowing Hadi's rule over the South."

This created the bizarre spectacle of a war within a war. Saudi Arabia backed Hadi's government. The Emirates backed the STC. Both were theoretically fighting the Houthis together. In practice, they were often fighting each other.

The tensions exploded in August 2019. When government forces advanced toward Aden to reclaim it from STC control, the Emirates conducted airstrikes against their nominal allies, killing and wounding over 300 Yemeni government soldiers. This was the UAE—a member of the anti-Houthi coalition—bombing troops loyal to the internationally recognized Yemeni government that the coalition had been formed to defend.

Why did the Emirates turn against Hadi? Largely because of a political party called Islah. Islah is Yemen's branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the UAE views the Brotherhood as an existential threat. When Hadi aligned himself with Islah, he became, in Emirati eyes, part of the problem rather than the solution.

An Awkward Peace

Saudi Arabia, eager to keep the anti-Houthi coalition from completely collapsing, brokered a compromise in November 2019. The Riyadh Agreement, as it was called, brought the STC into the official government. It was a shotgun marriage. The STC would give up some military control in the south and withdraw from Aden. In exchange, they would be recognized as legitimate and given seats in a unity government.

The agreement held, loosely. In April 2022, President Hadi resigned and transferred power to a new body called the Presidential Leadership Council. This eight-member council was designed to represent Yemen's various factions. The STC's leader, al-Zoubaidi, became vice president. By May 2023, the STC had maneuvered to control three of the eight seats.

But the underlying tensions never went away. The STC's ultimate goal remained independence for the south. They were simply biding their time within the unity government while building their strength.

Operation Promising Future

On December 2, 2025, the waiting ended. The STC launched a military offensive they called "Operation Promising Future." Within six days, they had captured most of the territory comprising the six governorates of what had been South Yemen: Aden, Lahij, Dhale, Abyan, Shabwah, Hadhramaut, Al Mahrah, and the island of Socotra.

The offensive was swift and, by the standards of Yemen's brutal war, relatively bloodless. Government forces, weakened by years of conflict and internal divisions, offered limited resistance. The chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council and the prime minister both fled Aden for Riyadh.

What made this moment different from previous STC power grabs was what came next. In Aden and across the south, rallies and sit-ins erupted demanding the formal re-establishment of an independent southern state. Several government ministers—officials in the same unity government the STC was technically part of—issued public statements supporting southern independence.

Al-Zoubaidi declared that "the next stage will be the stage of building institutions of the future state of South Arabia." The head of the Presidential Leadership Council, Rashad al-Alimi, sitting in exile in Saudi Arabia, huffed that these ministers had "exceeded their functional responsibilities" and ordered legal action against them. But his orders carried little weight when STC forces controlled the ground.

The Geopolitical Puzzle

Understanding the STC requires understanding its backers. The United Arab Emirates has been the council's patron from the beginning, providing money, weapons, training, and political support. The Emirates' motivations are multiple.

First, there's commercial interest. The UAE wants control over key ports along the southern coast, particularly Aden and the deepwater facilities on Socotra. These ports are strategically valuable for trade routes connecting Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

Second, there's ideology. The Emirates see the STC as a bulwark against the Muslim Brotherhood's influence in Yemen. The STC's vice president, Hani bin Burayk, is a Salafi Islamist—a different, competing strain of political Islam that the UAE finds less threatening than the Brotherhood.

Third, there's the competition with Saudi Arabia. While publicly allied, the two Gulf monarchies are rivals for influence in the region. A southern Yemeni state closely aligned with Abu Dhabi would enhance Emirati power at Saudi expense.

The situation is further complicated by the Houthis in the north. In September 2025, just before the offensive, al-Zoubaidi publicly called for a "two-state solution" to Yemen's civil war. He argued there was "no prospect" of dislodging the Houthis from the north and that Yemen was already effectively divided into two states—so why not make it official?

This pragmatic framing was notable. Rather than promising to conquer the entire country, the STC was essentially proposing to accept Houthi control of the north in exchange for international recognition of their control of the south. It was a partition proposal, not a reunification plan.

Even more striking was a report from December 2023 that the STC had expressed willingness to cooperate with Israel against Houthi ship attacks in the Red Sea. The Houthis had been launching missiles and drones at commercial vessels, disrupting global shipping. Israel, the Emirates, and the STC all had reasons to oppose this. Strange alliances form in chaotic regions.

Who Are These People?

The STC's leadership is a mix of former government officials, tribal leaders, and military commanders. Al-Zoubaidi, the president, served as governor of Aden before his dismissal in 2017. He's a skilled political operator who has navigated between Emirati backing, Saudi mediation, and southern popular sentiment.

His vice president, Hani bin Burayk, represents a different current. He's a Salafi preacher and former government minister with close ties to militant Islamist networks. His presence in the STC leadership reassures the more religiously conservative elements of the southern movement while signaling to the Emirates that this isn't a secular leftist revival of the old socialist south.

The council includes 26 members, drawn from governors of southern governorates, government ministers, tribal leaders, and military figures. Below this leadership sits a 303-member National Assembly, established in December 2017, which provides a veneer of representative legitimacy.

The population the STC claims to represent is around 5.7 million people, roughly 19% of Yemen's total population. This is a minority of Yemenis, but they control significant territory and resources—including some of Yemen's oil fields and its most important ports.

The Human Cost

Independence movements often present themselves as struggles for freedom and self-determination. The reality on the ground is usually messier. Amnesty International has documented a range of human rights concerns in STC-controlled areas.

Since 2023, authorities in Aden have required civil society organizations to obtain permits from STC-run bodies before conducting public activities. According to Amnesty, these requirements come with extensive reporting obligations and have been used to deny approval to organizations seen as politically opposed to the STC. Events have been shut down mid-way through without explanation. Funding has been restricted. Self-censorship has increased.

More troubling are the detention cases. In November 2023, a lawyer named Sami Yassin Ka'id Marsh was arrested by STC security forces as he left work. He was held without charge at a military camp, subjected to what Amnesty describes as torture and prolonged solitary confinement. A leaked photograph showed him seriously ill in a hospital bed months later. His case is not isolated.

In May 2024, armed individuals affiliated with the STC took control of a Yemeni Women Union center in Aden—a shelter for survivors of gender-based violence. Staff and residents were expelled. These are not the actions of a movement solely concerned with liberating its people from northern domination.

What Happens Next?

As of late December 2025, the situation remains fluid. The STC has declared its intention to continue advancing toward Sanaa, the Houthi-held capital. Whether they have the military capacity to actually take the north is unclear. More likely, they're staking a maximalist negotiating position while consolidating control over the south.

Saudi Arabia finds itself in an awkward position. The kingdom has spent a decade and tens of billions of dollars trying to defeat the Houthis and maintain a unified Yemen under a friendly government. Now its Emirati partner has essentially carved off half the country. Riyadh is hosting the exiled remnants of the unity government but has limited options for reversing the STC's gains without triggering open conflict with the UAE.

The Houthis, for their part, denounced the STC's May 2023 congress and its demands for southern independence. But in practice, they might prefer dealing with a weakened rump Yemen than a unified country with the resources of both north and south. A partition could work to their advantage.

International recognition is the ultimate prize. The STC wants the same thing South Sudan achieved in 2011 and Eritrea achieved in 1993: acceptance as a sovereign state by the United Nations and the broader international community. The precedents exist. Colonial borders are not sacred. But the path from de facto control to de jure statehood is long and uncertain.

The Echoes of History

There's something almost cyclical about Yemen's trajectory. In 1967, southern Yemen became independent after the British withdrew. In 1990, it merged with the north. In 1994, it tried and failed to secede. In 2017, a new independence movement emerged. In 2025, that movement controls the territory and is building institutions of statehood.

The name they've chosen—the State of South Arabia—deliberately invokes the British-era federation. It's a claim to historical legitimacy, an argument that this territory has always been distinct from the north. The British drew these borders. The Cold War reinforced them. Unification was a mistake. Partition is correction.

Whether this narrative is accurate or self-serving, whether southern independence would bring prosperity or new conflicts, whether the STC represents popular will or Emirati interests wearing local dress—these are questions without clear answers. What's certain is that Yemen's agony continues, reshaped but not resolved, as old fractures reassert themselves and new alignments take form.

The people of Aden, the people of Hadhramaut, the people of Socotra—they have lived through decades of war, economic collapse, and political chaos. They have seen their country torn apart by foreign powers and domestic factions alike. Whether the STC offers them genuine self-determination or merely a change of masters remains to be seen. For now, the flags of the old South Yemen fly again over Aden's government buildings, and another chapter in the peninsula's long, troubled history has begun.