Wikipedia Deep Dive

Xi Jinping Thought

10 min read

In 2017, something remarkable happened in Chinese politics—remarkable not because it was surprising, but because of what it revealed about power in the twenty-first century. The Chinese Communist Party, or CCP, unanimously voted to enshrine the personal ideology of its living leader into its constitution. With a show of hands, Xi Jinping became only the third leader in the Party's history to have his name attached to official doctrine, joining the ranks of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.

But what exactly is "Xi Jinping Thought"? And why does it matter?

The Full Name Nobody Uses

Let's start with the name itself, because it tells you something important. The official title is "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era." That's a mouthful. Outside China, most people just call it "Xi Jinping Thought" or sometimes "Xi-ism."

The Chinese government, interestingly, doesn't use the shortened version. When state media refers to the doctrine, they always use the full name—or they specify which aspect of Xi's thinking they're discussing, like "Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy" or "Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law."

This insistence on the complete phrase isn't just bureaucratic habit. Each word carries weight. "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" has been the Party's ideological brand since the Deng Xiaoping era, signaling that China's version of socialism differs from Soviet-style communism. "New Era" places Xi's leadership in a distinct historical period, one that began in 2012 when he took power.

The Haunting Question

To understand Xi Jinping Thought, you need to understand what keeps Xi Jinping awake at night.

It's the Soviet Union.

In a 2013 speech that later became foundational to his ideology, Xi asked a question that has defined his leadership:

Why did the Soviet Union disintegrate? Why did the Communist Party of the Soviet Union fall from power? An important reason was that the struggle in the field of ideology was extremely intense, completely negating the history of the Soviet Union, negating the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, negating Lenin, negating Stalin, creating historical nihilism and confused thinking.

Xi's diagnosis was damning: Soviet leaders had allowed ideological rot to set in. They'd permitted criticism of their history, questioned their founding figures, and lost control of the narrative. The result?

Party organs at all levels had lost their functions, the military was no longer under Party leadership. In the end, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a great party, was scattered, the Soviet Union, a great socialist country, disintegrated. This is a cautionary tale!

This fear of ideological collapse runs through everything Xi has built. Where his predecessors allowed some space for debate about China's direction, Xi has moved to eliminate ambiguity. There is one correct line, and it is his.

What Does It Actually Say?

Xi Jinping Thought is structured around several numbered frameworks that would feel at home in a corporate strategy document: ten affirmations, fourteen commitments, thirteen areas of achievement, and six "musts." Chinese political ideology loves numbered lists—they make complex ideas easier to memorize and harder to misquote.

The ten affirmations form the doctrinal core. Here's what they actually mean, stripped of jargon:

First and most important: The Chinese Communist Party leads everything. This isn't presented as a choice or preference—it's described as the "most essential feature" of Chinese socialism and its "greatest advantage." Party members must develop what's called "Four Consciousnesses," maintain "Four Confidences," and achieve "Two Upholds." These nested concepts all point in the same direction: absolute loyalty to the Party leadership, with Xi at its core.

Second: China aims to become a "great modern socialist country" by 2049—the centennial of the People's Republic. This isn't just economic development. The vision encompasses being "prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious and beautiful." Notice how "democratic" appears in that list; the Party insists that China practices democracy, just a different kind than Western nations.

Third: The main problem in Chinese society today is the gap between what people want and what the system delivers. This sounds almost like a market research insight. Xi frames it as "the contradiction between the people's ever-growing needs for a better life and unbalanced and inadequate development." The solution? "People-centered development"—a phrase that sounds warm but leaves the Party firmly in charge of defining what the people need.

The remaining affirmations cover economic policy (markets should allocate resources, but government guides the process), military modernization (build a "world-class" force that answers to the Party), foreign policy (China should reshape international relations while the rest of the world forms "a community with a shared future for mankind"), and anti-corruption campaigns (which have also proved useful for eliminating Xi's political rivals).

The Making of an Ideology

Xi Jinping Thought didn't arrive fully formed. It was constructed methodically over five years.

The process began almost immediately after Xi became General Secretary in November 2012. By January 2013, his speeches were being compiled as the "General Secretary Xi Jinping's Series of Important Speeches." Party officials were ordered to study them.

This wasn't unusual—Chinese leaders' speeches are always studied. What was unusual was the intensity.

By 2014, the Central Party School had run training programs for 2,300 provincial-level officials specifically on Xi's remarks. Universities and party schools were required to incorporate a new textbook into their curricula. Xi's multi-volume work "The Governance of China" was published for international audiences, translated into dozens of languages.

In 2016, the Party launched the "Two Studies and One Action" campaign. The name sounds anodyne, but the content was significant: every Party member must "study the Party Constitution and rules, and speeches of Xi Jinping, and become a qualified Party member." Note the grammar—studying Xi's speeches and being a qualified member aren't separate goals. They're connected.

By early 2017, Xi's close advisor Wang Huning—a political theorist who has shaped the ideological language of three Chinese leaders—declared that Xi's ideas had "already preliminarily become a complete theoretical system."

Then came October 2017 and the 19th Party Congress.

The Moment of Enshrinement

Xi gave the opening speech. He used a new phrase: "Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era." When the Politburo Standing Committee reviewed the speech, they added something: Xi Jinping's name.

This wasn't a small change.

In Chinese Communist Party tradition, having your name attached to official ideology is the ultimate marker of power. Mao Zedong Thought has been doctrine since 1945. Deng Xiaoping Theory was added in 1997, three years before Deng died. But Deng's two successors—Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao—never got their names attached to their contributions. Jiang gave the Party the "Theory of Three Represents" and Hu contributed the "Scientific Outlook on Development." Important-sounding, yes. But nameless.

Xi broke that pattern. His ideology carries his name. And it was enshrined while he was still in power, still capable of using that status to eliminate rivals and consolidate control.

The Congress voted unanimously to write Xi Jinping Thought into the Party constitution. The following March, it was added to the state constitution as well.

What Makes It Different

Every Chinese leader since Mao has contributed to what the Party calls "the theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics." It's presented as a continuous development, each leader building on the last. Officially, Xi Jinping Thought "builds on and further enriches" everything that came before.

But the emphasis has shifted dramatically.

Deng Xiaoping Theory was essentially pragmatic. Deng famously said it doesn't matter whether a cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice. He emphasized economic development, opening to the outside world, and tolerating experimentation. His successors continued this practical bent.

Xi Jinping Thought is more ideological. It stresses Party loyalty, ideological purity, and centralized control. Where Deng allowed space for debate about means, Xi defines the ends more rigidly. Where Deng's reforms sometimes weakened Party control over the economy and society, Xi has moved to reassert it.

Perhaps most tellingly, Xi has praised Karl Marx as "the greatest thinker of modern times" and called on Party members to adopt Marxist principles as "a way of life." This isn't just rhetoric. It represents a turn away from the more technocratic, less ideological style of Xi's predecessors.

The Two Establishes and Two Upholds

By 2021, the Party had developed new concepts to formalize Xi's position. The "Two Establishes" direct members to "establish the status of comrade Xi Jinping as the core of the Party Central and the whole party" and "establish the guiding status of Xi Jinping Thought."

The "Two Upholds" require "resolutely upholding" Xi's core status and "the Party Central's authority and centralized and unified leadership."

These formulations might seem redundant. They're not. Each phrase serves to close off a potential avenue of dissent. You might think you could support the Party while questioning Xi personally—but the Two Establishes bind them together. You might think you could accept Xi's leadership while questioning specific policies—but the Two Upholds demand you uphold the center's authority in full.

The Long Game

How long does Xi think this will take? He's given us a number.

The consolidation and development of the socialist system will require its own long period of history... it will require the tireless struggle of generations, up to ten generations.

Ten generations. At roughly 25 years per generation, that's 250 years of struggle before socialism is truly consolidated. This isn't modest—but it's not impatient either. Xi presents himself as a leader for history, not just for the moment.

On capitalism, Xi has been blunt: "Marx and Engels' analysis of the basic contradictions in capitalist society is not outdated, nor is the historical materialist view that capitalism is bound to die out and socialism is bound to win."

He's also been clear about what undermines Party members: "The fundamental reason why some of our comrades have weak ideals and faltering beliefs is that their views lack a firm grounding in historical materialism."

The diagnosis and the prescription are consistent: ideological weakness causes political failure. Ideological strength—specifically, strength grounded in Marxism as interpreted by Xi—prevents it.

Why It Matters

You might wonder why anyone outside China should care about the internal ideological documents of the Chinese Communist Party.

Consider this: Xi Jinping governs more than 1.4 billion people. China is the world's second-largest economy. Its military is expanding rapidly. Its technology companies compete globally. Its Belt and Road Initiative has reshaped infrastructure investment across Asia, Africa, and beyond.

Xi Jinping Thought is the framework through which all of this is understood and justified. When Chinese diplomats speak of a "community with a shared future for mankind," they're invoking Xi's ideology. When state media criticizes Western democracy, they're drawing on his framework. When policies shift, they're explained in terms consistent with his thought.

Understanding Xi Jinping Thought doesn't mean agreeing with it. But ignoring it means missing the logic that drives the world's most powerful one-party state.

The Living Doctrine

Unlike the ideologies of Mao and Deng, Xi Jinping Thought continues to evolve. The original "eight affirmations" from 2017 grew to ten by 2021. New formulations like the Two Establishes emerge to meet new political needs.

This fluidity is a feature, not a bug. It means Xi Jinping Thought can be adapted to justify whatever Xi decides. It's not a fixed constitution limiting power—it's a living ideology that power shapes.

The 2021 Party resolution called Xi Jinping Thought "a new breakthrough in the Sinicization of Marxism"—meaning the adaptation of Marxist theory to Chinese conditions. It also declared it "the Marxism of contemporary China and of the 21st century."

That's a remarkable claim. It positions Xi not just as one leader among many, but as the defining Marxist thinker of the current era. Not just for China. For the century.

Whether history will validate that claim remains to be seen. What's certain is that for now, in China, it is the only acceptable answer.