Zhang Youxia

Based on Wikipedia: Zhang Youxia

In the highest echelons of Chinese military power sits a man who has actually seen combat—a rarity so unusual in modern China that it shapes everything about how he is perceived, trusted, and deployed. Zhang Youxia, now in his mid-seventies, commands the People's Liberation Army as its first-ranked vice chairman, second only to Xi Jinping himself. But what makes Zhang exceptional isn't his rank. It's that he earned it partly through battlefield experience that almost no other senior Chinese general possesses.

Most military leaders in China today climbed through bureaucratic ladders, political connections, and peacetime exercises. Zhang actually fought.

A Princeling Goes to War

Zhang was born in Beijing in July 1950, just months after the Communist Party completed its victory in the Chinese Civil War. His father, Zhang Zongxun, was a general who had fought alongside Mao Zedong during that conflict. This family lineage made the younger Zhang what Chinese politics calls a "princeling"—a child of revolutionary heroes who inherits both prestige and expectation.

But princeling status in China is a double-edged sword. It opens doors, certainly. It also creates suspicion that any success came from connections rather than competence. Zhang would eventually prove his mettle in a way few princelings ever have: through actual warfare.

He joined the army at eighteen in 1968, during the chaos of Mao's Cultural Revolution. For the next decade, he worked his way up through conventional peacetime service, stationed with the 14th Group Army in Yunnan province, the mountainous southwestern region that borders Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar.

Then, in 1979, China went to war.

The Sino-Vietnamese War

The conflict between China and Vietnam seems counterintuitive at first glance. Both were communist nations. Both had fought against Western powers. Vietnam had just defeated the United States in 1975, and China had supported that struggle for decades.

But geopolitics makes strange enemies. After reunification, Vietnam aligned itself closely with the Soviet Union, China's communist rival. Vietnam also invaded Cambodia in late 1978 to overthrow the Khmer Rouge—a genocidal regime that happened to be a Chinese ally. Deng Xiaoping, China's paramount leader, decided to "teach Vietnam a lesson."

In February 1979, China invaded with roughly 200,000 troops. The campaign was brutal and brief, lasting only about a month. China captured several Vietnamese border towns, declared victory, and withdrew. But the costs were staggering. Chinese casualties numbered somewhere between 26,000 and 63,000 killed and wounded, depending on which estimates you trust. The People's Liberation Army, which had not fought a major war since Korea in the early 1950s, discovered that its tactics, equipment, and coordination had atrophied badly.

Zhang Youxia served in this war as a young officer. The experience marked him permanently.

The Battle of Laoshan

The 1979 war officially ended, but fighting along the Sino-Vietnamese border continued sporadically for years. The most intense of these clashes came in 1984, around a place called Laoshan—a strategic mountain in Yunnan province that both sides considered vital.

This wasn't a brief skirmish. The Battle of Laoshan and the broader conflict in that region lasted years, with Chinese and Vietnamese forces exchanging artillery barrages and infantry assaults across fortified positions that resembled World War One trench warfare. Thousands died on both sides.

Zhang fought here too. By now he was a more senior officer, and the experience of sustained combat—the logistics, the casualties, the fog of war, the gap between plans and reality—shaped his understanding of what military force actually means. When he later rose to command China's military development, he carried this knowledge with him.

This matters enormously because almost no one else in Chinese military leadership has it.

The Peacetime Climb

After the border conflicts ended in the late 1980s, Zhang's career followed the conventional peacetime trajectory of a successful People's Liberation Army officer. He became a major general in 1997, then lieutenant general in 2007. That same year, he took command of the Shenyang Military Region—the forces responsible for northeastern China, bordering North Korea and Russia—and joined the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

In 2011, he received promotion to full general, the highest rank below the chairman himself.

The following year brought a more consequential change. The Communist Party held its 18th National Congress in 2012, and Xi Jinping assumed power as General Secretary. A wholesale reshuffle of military leadership accompanied this transition. Zhang was tapped to lead the General Armaments Department, the organization responsible for weapons procurement and development for the entire Chinese military.

This was not a ceremonial posting. The General Armaments Department controls what China's military can actually do—what weapons it possesses, what technologies it develops, what capabilities it can deploy. Zhang held this position during a period of aggressive military modernization, as China developed stealth fighters, aircraft carriers, advanced missiles, and the electronic warfare systems that define contemporary combat.

The Xi Jinping Connection

Zhang's rise accelerated under Xi Jinping, and their relationship extends beyond mere professional convenience. Both men trace their family roots to the Weinan region of Shaanxi Province in central China. Zhang's father and Xi's father, Xi Zhongxun, both came from this area and both served as Communist generals. In the intimate world of Chinese elite politics, where personal relationships and family networks matter enormously, this shared background creates bonds that outsiders rarely see but insiders never forget.

Whether Zhang and Xi knew each other as children is unclear from public records. But they certainly know each other as adults, and Xi has consistently elevated Zhang to positions of trust and authority.

In 2017, at the 19th Party Congress, Zhang joined the Politburo—the roughly 25-member body that collectively rules China—and became the second-ranked vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. This made him, effectively, the second-most powerful military figure in the country.

Then came 2022, and something unusual happened.

Breaking the Retirement Rule

The Chinese Communist Party operates by many informal rules that are never written down but almost always followed. One of the most important concerns age. Senior leaders are expected to retire at 68. This rule isn't absolute—Mao and Deng both governed until death—but in the post-Deng era, it has been remarkably consistent.

Zhang Youxia turned 72 in 2022. By all expectations, he should have retired.

He didn't. At the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, Zhang remained on the Politburo and was promoted to first-ranked vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. He was reconfirmed in this position in March 2023. Whatever Xi Jinping's plans require, they apparently require Zhang Youxia specifically.

Some observers speculate this reflects Xi's trust in Zhang's combat experience during a period of rising tensions over Taiwan. Others point to their personal relationship. Most likely, both factors combine with a simpler truth: Xi has systematically removed potential rivals and surrounded himself with loyalists, and Zhang is among the most loyal.

Taiwan and the Threat of Force

If you want to understand why Zhang Youxia matters to the outside world, Taiwan provides the answer.

China claims Taiwan as a breakaway province that must eventually reunify with the mainland. Taiwan operates as a self-governing democracy that has never been ruled by the Communist Party. The United States has committed, somewhat ambiguously, to helping Taiwan defend itself. This triangular tension has intensified dramatically in recent years.

In October 2023, Zhang addressed the Beijing Xiangshan Forum—China's main international security conference—and delivered a message of unusual bluntness. The People's Liberation Army, he said, would "show no mercy" against any moves toward Taiwanese independence.

This is not mere rhetoric. Zhang oversees the military preparations that would make such a threat credible. According to South China Morning Post reporting from 2021, he headed the anti-ship missile testing program that included a weapons-testing range with a mock-up of an American aircraft carrier. If China ever attempts to take Taiwan by force, and if that attempt involves sinking the ships of a U.S. naval response, Zhang will have helped develop the missiles designed to do it.

The Diplomatic Circuit

Zhang's role extends beyond war preparation to military diplomacy. In this capacity, he has met with an remarkable range of counterparts.

In November 2023, he visited Russia, meeting with Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and President Vladimir Putin. This came during Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine, when Chinese-Russian military cooperation had become a matter of intense Western concern. He returned to Russia in November 2025, meeting with the new Defense Minister Andrei Belousov.

He has met repeatedly with Pakistani military leaders—Chief of Army Staff Qamar Javed Bajwa in 2022 and his successor Asim Munir in 2024—reinforcing the deep military partnership between China and Pakistan that serves as a counterweight to India.

In August 2019, he met with a North Korean delegation led by Kim Su Gil, describing the visit as having "crucial significance in bilateral exchange." China remains North Korea's only significant ally, and military-to-military contacts like these help manage one of the world's most dangerous flashpoints.

Perhaps most significantly, in August 2024 Zhang met with Jake Sullivan, the United States National Security Advisor. This was notable because high-level military contacts between the U.S. and China had largely frozen. Zhang used the meeting to deliver Beijing's standard talking points—that America must "correct its strategic understanding of China" and "respect China's core interests"—but the fact that such a meeting occurred at all suggested both sides recognized the dangers of complete estrangement.

The Corruption Campaign

One of Zhang's less noticed but potentially more consequential roles involves Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign within the military.

In January 2022, during a meeting of the People's Liberation Army's disciplinary officials, Zhang called for "innovative measures to eliminate corruption problems." This might sound like standard bureaucratic language, but in context it matters enormously.

Xi Jinping has used anti-corruption investigations to remove rivals and consolidate power throughout his tenure. The military has not been exempt. Numerous senior officers have been purged, imprisoned, or worse. Some observers believe these purges have genuinely reduced corruption. Others see them primarily as political tools. Most likely both are true.

Zhang's involvement in this process places him at the intersection of military command and political loyalty. He is not merely running an army; he is helping Xi Jinping ensure that army remains personally devoted to its commander.

Vietnam Revisited

In October 2024, Zhang visited Vietnam—the country he had once fought against as a young soldier. The visit was remarkable for its normalcy. He met with Communist Party General Secretary Tô Lâm, President Lương Cường, Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính, and Defense Minister Phan Văn Giang. Both sides spoke of "making new progress" in defense relations.

This transformation illustrates something important about international politics. The enemies of one generation can become the partners of the next. China and Vietnam fought a brutal border war within living memory. Today they cooperate on various matters even while competing over territorial claims in the South China Sea.

Zhang embodies this complexity. He carries the experience of fighting Vietnamese soldiers. He now works to strengthen military ties with their successors. Whether he sees any irony in this—or whether he simply views it as the natural evolution of strategic interests—remains known only to him.

The South China Sea

At the 19th Western Pacific Naval Symposium in Qingdao in April 2024, Zhang called for abandoning "cold war mentality" while promising "firm countermeasures against unreasonable provocations" in the South China Sea.

This captures China's standard approach to the region: denouncing confrontation while insisting on Chinese dominance. The South China Sea contains vital shipping lanes through which trillions of dollars in trade passes annually. China claims most of it based on historical arguments that international tribunals have rejected. The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and other nations contest these claims, often with U.S. backing.

Naval incidents in these waters occur regularly. Chinese coast guard vessels ram Philippine boats. Military aircraft conduct dangerous intercepts. Each incident risks escalation. Zhang's role is to ensure that if escalation comes, China's navy is ready—and to signal that readiness clearly enough that adversaries might decide escalation isn't worth the cost.

What Zhang Represents

Zhang Youxia matters not because he makes policy—Xi Jinping does that—but because he represents something specific about Chinese military power at this historical moment.

He connects the revolutionary past to the present. His father fought with Mao. He himself fought in China's last real war. This gives him credibility that purely political generals lack.

He has overseen modernization. During his time leading weapons development, China's military capabilities expanded dramatically. The missiles, ships, and aircraft that worry Pentagon planners bear his institutional fingerprints.

He has Xi Jinping's trust. In a system where personal loyalty matters enormously, Zhang has proven himself reliable enough to survive past normal retirement and rise to the highest military rank below Xi himself.

And he has actual war experience. If China ever uses force against Taiwan, against rivals in the South China Sea, or against anyone else, Zhang Youxia will be among those directing it. Unlike most of his colleagues, he knows what that really means.

Whether this makes war more or less likely is impossible to say. Combat veterans sometimes become more cautious, having seen war's true costs. Sometimes they become more confident, believing they understand what others merely theorize about. Zhang has given no public indication of which category he falls into.

What is clear is that when Xi Jinping makes decisions about military force, Zhang Youxia will be in the room, and his voice will carry weight that comes from experience almost no one else in Chinese leadership possesses.