Democratic backsliding

Based on Wikipedia: Democratic backsliding

Death by a Thousand Cuts

Here's the unsettling thing about how democracies die in the twenty-first century: they rarely go out with a bang. There are no tanks rolling through the capital, no dramatic seizure of the radio station, no dictator declaring martial law at midnight. Instead, democracies tend to decay slowly, almost imperceptibly, like a house with termites in its foundation. By the time anyone notices the structural damage, the walls are already sagging.

This gradual erosion has a name: democratic backsliding. And it's happening right now, in countries that most people would consider stable democracies.

What Backsliding Actually Looks Like

Democratic backsliding is, at its core, a process of making political power less accountable and more arbitrary. It doesn't require abolishing elections or banning opposition parties outright. Instead, it works through subtler mechanisms that hollow out democratic institutions while leaving their façades intact.

Think of it this way: a country might still hold elections, but the playing field has been tilted so dramatically that the outcome is essentially predetermined. The opposition might still exist, but they've been harassed, surveilled, or stripped of resources to the point where they can't effectively compete. The courts might still operate, but they've been packed with loyalists who rule however the executive wishes.

The political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, who wrote the influential book "How Democracies Die," emphasize just how difficult it is to identify the precise moment when a government crosses from democracy into something else. The transition happens "slowly, in barely visible steps," they write. Each individual action might seem defensible in isolation. It's only when you step back and see the pattern that the picture becomes alarming.

Legal scholar Ozan Varol coined the term "stealth authoritarianism" to describe this phenomenon. Aspiring autocrats have learned to use "seemingly legitimate legal mechanisms for anti-democratic ends," concealing their true purposes beneath the mask of law. They might manipulate libel laws to silence critical journalists, rewrite electoral rules to disadvantage their opponents, or abuse terrorism statutes to prosecute political enemies—all while maintaining the rhetoric of democracy.

The Four Warning Signs

How do you identify a leader who poses a threat to democracy before it's too late? Levitsky and Ziblatt, building on earlier work by the political scientist Juan Linz, developed what they call a "litmus test" with four key indicators of authoritarian behavior.

First, watch for leaders who reject or show weak commitment to democratic rules. They might suggest that elections are rigged (without evidence), refuse to accept electoral defeats, or flirt with circumventing constitutional limits on their power.

Second, look for denial of the legitimacy of political opponents. Democratic politics requires treating your opponents as legitimate competitors who have a right to seek power and govern if they win. Authoritarian-minded leaders instead cast their opponents as criminals, traitors, or existential threats to the nation.

Third, pay attention to tolerance or encouragement of violence. This includes praising supporters who attack opponents, refusing to condemn political violence, or maintaining ties to armed groups.

Fourth, and perhaps most insidiously, watch for a readiness to curtail the civil liberties of opponents, including media freedoms. This might manifest as threatening to sue newspapers, suggesting that critics should be investigated, or proposing restrictions on protest rights.

A leader who checks one or two of these boxes might simply be an aggressive politician operating within democratic norms. A leader who checks all four is a genuine danger.

The Great Historical Shift

Democratic backsliding isn't new, but the way it happens has changed dramatically over time.

During the Cold War, from roughly 1947 to 1991, democracies typically fell through military coups. Generals would seize power, suspend the constitution, and rule openly as a junta. The transition was sudden, violent, and unmistakable. Everyone knew exactly when democracy ended.

Since the Cold War's conclusion, a different pattern has emerged. Now, backsliding more commonly occurs when voters elect a personalist leader—someone who claims to embody the will of the people—who then systematically dismantles democratic institutions from within. The leader arrives through legitimate elections, then works to ensure that future elections no longer pose a threat to their continued rule.

When coups do still happen, they've adopted a new disguise. Political scientist Nancy Bermeo has documented the rise of what she calls "promissory coups," in which coup leaders justify their actions as defending democracy. They promise to hold elections soon and restore proper democratic governance. These coup-makers emphasize the temporary and necessary nature of their intervention. But Bermeo's research reveals the hollowness of these promises: "Few promissory coups were followed quickly by competitive elections, and fewer still paved the way for improved democracies."

The numbers tell a striking story. Before 1990, only 35 percent of successful coups fell into this promissory category. After 1990, that figure jumped to 85 percent. Even military interventions now feel compelled to speak the language of democracy.

Executive Aggrandizement: The New Playbook

The most common form of democratic backsliding today operates through what scholars call "executive aggrandizement." This is the gradual expansion of a leader's power beyond the checks and balances that legislatures and courts are supposed to provide.

The key feature of executive aggrandizement is that everything happens through legal channels. The leader doesn't suspend the constitution—instead, they rewrite it through referendums or constituent assemblies. They don't abolish the courts—they pack them with loyalists through technically valid appointment procedures. They don't ban opposition media—they use libel suits, tax investigations, and regulatory harassment to drive critical outlets out of business.

This approach has a crucial advantage for would-be autocrats: it provides a democratic veneer. Every action can be framed as having resulted from a democratic mandate. The leader can claim they're simply implementing the will of the people, expressed through votes and legal procedures.

There's another mechanism that has grown more prominent: legislative authoritarianism. This involves using elected legislatures themselves to consolidate power and undermine democratic accountability. Governments might rush through complex laws limiting opposition participation, erode oversight institutions, or reorganize legislative committees to favor ruling parties. Because this happens through formally democratic procedures—bills passed by elected representatives—it's particularly difficult to call out as anti-democratic.

Elections That Aren't Really Contests

Perhaps the most insidious form of backsliding involves the subversion of elections themselves. Not by canceling them—that would be too obvious—but by tilting the playing field so dramatically that the outcome is never really in doubt.

The tactics are numerous and often mundane-sounding. Opposition candidates might be disqualified on technical grounds. Voter registration might be made burdensome for populations likely to vote against the incumbent. Critical media might be denied access to cover opposition campaigns. Electoral commissions might be packed with partisan loyalists. Voting districts might be gerrymandered beyond recognition.

Each individual measure might seem minor. The cumulative effect is devastating.

Researchers studying party behavior have found strong statistical links between certain party characteristics and subsequent autocratization. Parties with very high populism, strong anti-pluralism, lack of commitment to democratic processes, and acceptance of political violence are far more likely to engage in democratic backsliding once they achieve power.

The Populist Question

One of the most contentious debates in political science concerns the relationship between populism and democratic backsliding. The connection is real, but it's more complicated than simple headlines suggest.

Populism, in its essence, is a governing style built on three pillars. First, populists emphasize that legitimate political authority comes from popular sovereignty and majority rule. Second, they challenge established political, cultural, and economic elites, portraying them as corrupt or self-serving. Third, they feature "maverick outsider" leaders who claim to speak for ordinary people against a rigged system.

None of this is inherently anti-democratic. In fact, populism can sometimes strengthen democracy by mobilizing previously excluded groups and challenging ossified power structures. Research by Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, two of the foremost scholars of populism, suggests that populism "tends to play a positive role in the promotion of electoral or minimal democracy."

The problem arises when populism encounters liberal democracy—the version of democracy that includes not just majority rule but also protections for minority rights, independent institutions, and constraints on executive power. Populists instinctively oppose limitations on majority rule. If the people have spoken, why should unelected judges or bureaucrats be able to override their will?

This tension becomes dangerous when populists achieve power. Mudde and Kaltwasser note that "populism is prone to diminish the quality of liberal democracies" and that "populism-in-power has led to processes of de-democratization." They point to Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela as examples, with Alberto Fujimori in Peru representing an extreme case where populism led to full democratic breakdown.

A 2018 analysis by political scientists Yascha Mounk and Jordan Kyle examined all populist governments elected since 1990. They found that of 13 right-wing populist governments, five brought about significant democratic backsliding. Of 15 left-wing populist governments, the exact same number—five—did the same. Democratic erosion, it turns out, is an equal-opportunity phenomenon that crosses ideological lines.

The Tony Blair Institute for Global Change put harder numbers on the risk: populist governments are four times more likely to cause harm to democratic institutions than non-populist governments. More than half of populist leaders have amended or rewritten their countries' constitutions, frequently in ways that erode checks on executive power.

The Twin Forces Threatening Democracy

Pippa Norris, a political scientist who holds positions at both Harvard and the University of Sydney, has identified what she calls the "twin forces" posing the largest threat to Western liberal democracies.

The first force is terrorism—specifically, "sporadic and random terrorist attacks on domestic soil, which damage feelings of security." These attacks create fear and anxiety that can be politically exploited.

The second force is "the rise of populist-authoritarian forces, which feed parasitically upon these fears." Not all populists are authoritarian, but authoritarian populists emphasize "the importance of protecting traditional lifestyles against perceived threats from 'outsiders,' even at the expense of civil liberties and minority rights."

The interaction between these forces creates a dangerous feedback loop. Terrorist attacks heighten insecurity. Populist-authoritarian leaders exploit that insecurity by promising strong protection against threats. In exchange, citizens accept erosions of civil liberties and constraints on democratic institutions. Each new attack provides justification for further concentration of power.

Why This Is Happening Now

Several factors appear to drive the current wave of democratic backsliding.

Economic inequality stands out as perhaps the strongest predictor. Research has found it strongly associated with democratic erosion in the twenty-first century, even in wealthy democracies. When citizens feel the economic system is rigged against them, they become more receptive to leaders who promise to tear down the established order.

Cultural backlash matters too. In many countries, rapid social changes—around immigration, gender roles, religious pluralism, and racial equality—have provoked conservative reactions. Some citizens feel their traditional way of life is under threat and are drawn to leaders who promise to restore an imagined past.

Crises of various kinds provide opportunities for democratic erosion. During emergencies, leaders often impose extraordinary measures. The problem arises when those measures are disproportionate to the actual threat, or when temporary powers become permanent fixtures. States of emergency that never quite end have become a common feature of backsliding democracies.

The timing matters as well. The late twentieth century saw what political scientist Samuel Huntington called the "third wave of democratization," as dozens of countries transitioned to democracy. Many of these new democracies were weakly institutionalized—they had the forms of democracy without deeply rooted democratic cultures or robust institutions. These regimes have proven most vulnerable to backsliding.

Since around 2010, following the Great Recession, we've been living through what scholars call the "third wave of autocratization." The number of liberal democracies peaked just before this period and has been declining since. The economic disruption of the financial crisis, combined with the cultural anxieties and technological disruptions of the following decade, created fertile ground for anti-democratic movements.

A Glimmer of Hope

Not all the research findings are grim. One particularly interesting discovery: more than half of all autocratization episodes over the past century and a quarter have what researchers call a "U-turn shape." The autocratization is closely followed by—and linked to—subsequent democratization.

In other words, democratic backsliding often provokes a backlash. Citizens who watched their democracy erode frequently mobilize to restore it. The story doesn't always end badly.

Recent psychological research points to another source of cautious optimism. Scholars have found that citizens sometimes vote against democratic norms because they believe their opponents will undermine democracy first—a kind of pre-emptive betrayal. In experimental studies, when partisans were shown evidence that their opponents were more committed to democratic norms than they assumed, the partisans themselves became more committed to upholding those norms.

This suggests that some of democracy's vulnerability stems from misperception rather than genuine anti-democratic sentiment. If citizens can be shown that their fellow citizens actually do value democratic rules, they may be less willing to abandon those rules themselves.

The Challenge Ahead

The political scientist Shawn Rosenberg has argued provocatively that "democracy is likely to devour itself"—that right-wing populism is exposing fundamental vulnerabilities in democratic structures. This may be too pessimistic, but it captures something important about our current moment.

Democracy has always required more than just institutions. It requires norms, habits, and shared expectations that citizens and leaders alike will play by certain rules even when it's not in their immediate interest to do so. When those norms erode—when political opponents become enemies, when lying carries no cost, when winning becomes everything—the institutions alone cannot hold.

The challenge of our era is that democratic backsliding has learned to work within democratic forms. It speaks the language of popular sovereignty while hollowing out the substance of self-government. It claims democratic mandates for anti-democratic actions.

Recognizing this pattern is the first step toward countering it. Democratic backsliding thrives on confusion about what's normal and acceptable. Clarity about the warning signs—rejection of democratic rules, denial of opponents' legitimacy, tolerance of violence, eagerness to curtail civil liberties—helps citizens identify threats before too much damage has been done.

The termites are real. But a house that knows it has a problem can call an exterminator.