Major non-NATO ally

Based on Wikipedia: Major non-NATO ally

America's Other Allies: The Strange World of Major Non-NATO Partners

In November 2025, Donald Trump stood beside Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and announced something that would have seemed unthinkable just a few years earlier: Saudi Arabia was becoming a "major non-NATO ally" of the United States. The kingdom—long criticized for its human rights record and the 2018 killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi—was now joining an exclusive club that includes democracies like Japan and Australia alongside authoritarian states like Bahrain and Egypt.

What exactly had Saudi Arabia just joined? And why does it matter?

The designation "major non-NATO ally"—often shortened to MNNA—is one of those bureaucratic terms that sounds boring until you realize what it actually means. It's essentially a way for the United States to extend many of the military benefits of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to countries that, for various reasons, aren't part of that alliance.

Think of it as a VIP pass to America's weapons shop.

What NATO Is, and What This Isn't

To understand major non-NATO allies, you first need to understand what NATO actually is. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a military alliance formed in 1949, binding the United States, Canada, and most of Western Europe (now including much of Eastern Europe too) into a mutual defense pact. Article 5 of the NATO treaty says that an attack on one member is an attack on all—the famous principle of collective defense that has only been invoked once, after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States.

Major non-NATO ally status is emphatically not that.

Countries designated as MNNAs don't get an American security guarantee. The United States isn't obligated to defend them if they're attacked. What they do get is access to American military hardware, technology, and cooperation that would otherwise be restricted to NATO members or close allies.

The distinction matters enormously. NATO membership means American soldiers could die defending your country. MNNA status means you can buy American weapons on favorable terms and participate in joint military research. One is a blood oath; the other is a preferred customer card.

The Shopping List

So what exactly do major non-NATO allies get? The benefits are surprisingly concrete and specific:

• They can purchase depleted uranium anti-tank rounds—among the most effective armor-piercing ammunition available, normally restricted to close allies.
• They get priority access to American military surplus, which can range from meals ready to eat all the way up to decommissioned naval vessels.
• They can host American War Reserve Stocks—essentially pre-positioned military equipment stored in their country, ready for use in a crisis.
• Their defense contractors can bid on Pentagon contracts to repair and maintain American military equipment stationed overseas.
• They get expedited processing for purchases of space technology and advanced defense systems.
• They can participate in cooperative research and development projects with the Department of Defense, sharing costs and knowledge.

None of this is trivial. Access to American military technology is one of the most valuable commodities in international relations. Countries spend decades building relationships with Washington partly to unlock these doors.

How It All Started

The major non-NATO ally designation didn't exist until 1987. That year, Congress passed what became known as the Sam Nunn Amendment—named after the influential Georgia senator who championed defense policy for decades. The amendment allowed the Secretary of Defense, with the Secretary of State's agreement, to enter into cooperative research and development agreements with non-NATO countries.

The original five countries designated as MNNAs were Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, and South Korea. Look at that list and you can see the Cold War logic at work: key allies in the Pacific (Australia, Japan, South Korea), the Middle East (Israel, Egypt), all countries where the United States had major strategic interests but which, for geographical or political reasons, couldn't join NATO.

Australia and Japan were already covered by separate mutual defense treaties. South Korea hosted tens of thousands of American troops. Israel was America's closest partner in the Middle East. Egypt had signed the Camp David Accords with Israel in 1978, earning billions in American military aid. All five were already deeply intertwined with American security policy; the MNNA designation formalized and expanded those relationships.

The List Grows

In 1996, Congress enhanced the benefits available to major non-NATO allies and added New Zealand to the list. This was significant because American-New Zealand relations had been badly damaged in 1984 when New Zealand banned nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed ships from its ports—a policy that effectively ended the ANZUS defense treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.

For over a decade, New Zealand was in a kind of diplomatic purgatory with Washington. The MNNA designation in 1996 signaled that the relationship was healing, even if it would never fully return to its Cold War closeness.

Two years later, in 1998, Argentina became an MNNA. President Bill Clinton cited Argentina's participation in the Gulf War—making it the only South American country to join the coalition against Saddam Hussein's Iraq—and its contributions to United Nations peacekeeping missions. Argentina had been working hard to rebuild its relationship with the West after the Falklands War and the end of military rule, and this was a tangible reward for that effort.

The Strange Case of Taiwan

Taiwan presents a unique legal puzzle. The island is, for most practical purposes, treated as a major non-NATO ally—but it isn't formally designated as one.

Why the distinction? Because the United States officially recognizes the People's Republic of China as the legitimate government of all China, including Taiwan. Formally designating Taiwan as an MNNA would be a diplomatic provocation that could trigger a serious crisis with Beijing.

So Congress found a workaround. In 2002, it passed legislation requiring that Taiwan "be treated as though it were designated a major non-NATO ally." The Bush administration initially grumbled about Congress stepping on the President's foreign policy authority, but eventually submitted a letter to Congress acknowledging Taiwan's de facto status.

It's a distinction that sounds meaningless—Taiwan gets all the same benefits—but in the world of diplomacy, the difference between formal designation and being "treated as though" designated is the difference between a slap in Beijing's face and a gentle poke.

The Post-9/11 Expansion

The September 11 attacks and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq transformed American foreign policy, and the MNNA program expanded accordingly.

In 2003, Thailand and the Philippines accepted invitations to become major non-NATO allies. Both countries had longstanding military relationships with the United States—the Philippines had been an American colony until 1946, and Thailand had been a key ally during the Vietnam War. The MNNA designation reflected their cooperation in the new "war on terror."

Singapore was reportedly offered similar status but declined. The city-state, with its delicate balancing act between great powers, apparently worried that formal MNNA designation would alarm its neighbors. Instead, Singapore and the United States negotiated a secret Strategic Framework Agreement in 2005, achieving similar cooperation without the public label.

The most controversial post-9/11 designation was Pakistan, which President George W. Bush named as an MNNA in 2004. Pakistan was essential to American operations in Afghanistan—American supplies flowed through Pakistani territory, and Pakistani intelligence services were supposed to be cooperating against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

But the relationship was always troubled. Pakistan's intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence, was widely suspected of maintaining ties to the Taliban even while supposedly helping the United States fight them. And then, in 2011, American special forces killed Osama bin Laden in a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan—a military garrison town where the world's most wanted terrorist had apparently been hiding for years.

The discovery that bin Laden had been living under Pakistan's nose (or, as many suspected, under its protection) sparked outrage in Washington. Multiple bills have been introduced in Congress to revoke Pakistan's MNNA status, though none has passed. The controversy illustrates a tension at the heart of the program: MNNA status is supposed to reflect a close and trusting relationship, but geopolitics sometimes makes strange bedfellows.

Afghanistan: The Ally That Wasn't

Perhaps the most poignant case is Afghanistan. The Obama administration designated Afghanistan as a major non-NATO ally in 2012, a decade into the American-led war there. It was meant to signal long-term commitment—the United States wasn't just fighting a war in Afghanistan but building a lasting partnership.

Nine years later, the Taliban swept back to power as American forces withdrew. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the government the United States had spent two decades and over two trillion dollars supporting, collapsed in a matter of weeks.

In July 2022, the Biden administration formally notified Congress that it was revoking Afghanistan's MNNA status. The country that had been designated to receive America's most advanced military technology was now ruled by the same Taliban that American forces had originally invaded to overthrow.

The Gulf and Beyond

The list of major non-NATO allies has continued to grow. As of late 2025, there are twenty-one countries spanning four continents: twelve in Asia, four in Africa, three in South America, and two in Oceania.

Qatar was designated in 2022 by President Biden, who cited the country's crucial assistance during the chaotic American withdrawal from Afghanistan. Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar is the largest American military installation in the Middle East, making the country strategically vital regardless of its formal designation.

Colombia followed shortly after, reflecting decades of close cooperation on counternarcotics efforts and the country's role as one of America's most reliable partners in Latin America.

Kenya became an MNNA in 2024, recognized for its willingness to lead a multinational intervention in Haiti—taking on a difficult and dangerous mission that few other countries wanted.

And then came Saudi Arabia in November 2025, the designation that accompanied a trillion-dollar investment pledge and an agreement to sell the kingdom F-35 fighter jets, making it the first Middle Eastern country outside Israel to obtain the advanced stealth aircraft.

The Waiting Room

Several countries are reportedly being considered for MNNA status or have actively sought it.

Ukraine has requested the designation since 2014, when Russia's annexation of Crimea triggered the ongoing war. Bills have been introduced in Congress to grant MNNA status to Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova—all countries facing Russian aggression or occupation. As of 2023, none had passed, despite support from the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The hesitation reflects a fear of escalation. Designating Ukraine as a major non-NATO ally while it's actively at war with Russia could be seen as a provocation. Then again, the United States has already provided Ukraine with tens of billions of dollars in military aid, so the symbolism of MNNA status might matter less than the substance of what's already being done.

Armenia presents a fascinating case. The country is currently a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a Russian-led military alliance. But Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has grown increasingly frustrated with Russia's failure to protect Armenia from Azerbaijani attacks. In 2024, Armenia froze its participation in the CSTO, with Pashinyan declaring the alliance "a threat to the national security of Armenia."

Several Armenian political parties have called for seeking NATO membership or MNNA status, and some American politicians have endorsed the idea. Former Kansas Senator Sam Brownback has said, "Armenia is a natural long-term ally of the United States. Armenia must be given major non-NATO ally status."

Whether that happens may depend on how completely Armenia breaks with Russia—and whether Washington decides the strategic benefits outweigh the risks of further antagonizing Moscow.

Special Cases: India and Israel

Not everyone fits neatly into the MNNA framework.

India was designated a "major defense partner" in 2016—a new category created specifically for New Delhi. This allows India to purchase advanced American technology on par with the closest American allies, without the formal MNNA label. India's traditional policy of non-alignment and its complex relationships with Russia and the United States made a standard MNNA designation awkward, so a new category was invented.

Israel, meanwhile, is technically a major non-NATO ally but has long been treated as something more. In 2014, the House of Representatives passed a bill to create a new category—"major strategic partner"—that would place Israel one notch above MNNA status, with additional support for defense and energy infrastructure. The bill didn't become law, but it illustrated the degree to which Israel's relationship with the United States transcends normal diplomatic categories.

What It All Means

The major non-NATO ally program reveals something important about how American power actually works. The United States maintains a vast network of security relationships around the world, and those relationships exist on a spectrum. At one end is NATO, with its binding mutual defense commitment. At the other end are countries that receive no special treatment at all.

MNNA status sits somewhere in the middle—closer than ordinary, but not quite family. It's a recognition that in a complicated world, the United States needs partners who don't fit into neat Cold War alliance structures, and those partners need access to American military technology to be useful.

The program also reveals the tensions in American foreign policy. Some MNNAs, like Australia and Japan, are genuine liberal democracies with deep cultural and political ties to the United States. Others, like Bahrain and Egypt, are authoritarian states whose cooperation Washington values despite serious human rights concerns. The designation papers over these differences, grouping democracies and dictatorships together under the same bureaucratic label.

Perhaps most importantly, the MNNA program shows that American global influence depends not just on military bases and treaty alliances but on a web of commercial and technological relationships. Countries want access to American weapons and military technology. That desire gives Washington leverage—and the MNNA program is one way that leverage gets formalized and managed.

When Saudi Arabia became a major non-NATO ally in 2025, it wasn't just gaining access to depleted uranium rounds and surplus military equipment. It was being drawn deeper into an American-led security architecture that spans the globe, one preferred customer at a time.