Rule of law
Based on Wikipedia: Rule of law
In 1607, King James I of England stormed into a legal dispute demanding that he, as sovereign, had every right to decide cases personally. The Chief Justice, Sir Edward Coke, calmly informed the king that he could not. James exploded. To suggest that a king was "under the law," he declared, was treason.
Coke held firm. He quoted the medieval jurist Bracton: the king ought not to be under any man, but under God and the law.
This confrontation captures a battle that has raged for millennia across every civilization: Should power answer to anything greater than itself? The concept we now call "the rule of law" represents humanity's most persistent answer: yes. Power must be constrained. No person, no matter how elevated, stands above the rules that bind everyone else.
What the Rule of Law Actually Means
The phrase sounds simple enough. "No one is above the law." But lawyers and philosophers have spent centuries arguing about what this actually requires in practice.
At its core, the rule of law demands three things. First, the laws must be clear, stable, and publicly known. You cannot be punished for violating a secret rule or one written in incomprehensible language. Second, everyone—from the poorest citizen to the head of state—faces the same legal system. Third, independent courts must exist to apply these laws fairly.
But there's a crucial distinction that trips people up: the rule of law is not the same as rule by law.
Rule by law means the government uses legal mechanisms to control the population. The laws might be unjust, arbitrary, or designed to benefit those in power. But technically, everything proceeds through official legal channels. This is what authoritarian regimes do when they wrap oppression in legal formality.
Rule of law goes further. It means the law itself constrains those who wield power. The law becomes the master, not the servant, of government. As political scientist Li Shuguang explains it: "Under the rule of law, the law is preeminent and can serve as a check against the abuse of power. Under rule by law, the law is a mere tool for a government, that suppresses in a legalistic fashion."
Ancient Roots in Unexpected Places
Most Western textbooks trace the rule of law to ancient Athens or Rome. But the concept appears even earlier, in sources that might surprise you.
The Indian epics Ramayana and Mahabharata—with origins stretching back to the 8th or 9th century BC—grapple extensively with questions of law, duty, and the limits of royal power. The Mahabharata addresses what it calls "Rajdharma"—the duty of the king. One verse is remarkably direct: "The people should execute a king who does not protect them, but deprives them of their property and assets and who takes no advice or guidance from anyone. Such a king is not a king but misfortune."
Even more striking is this declaration from the Upanishads: "The law is the king of kings. No one is higher than the law. Not even the king."
This same insight emerged independently in Greece. Aristotle, writing in the 4th century BC, argued that the best government was one where "law should govern than any one of the citizens." Even when capable leaders hold power, he insisted, they should serve as "guardians and servants of the laws"—not masters of them.
His teacher Plato took a different view, at least initially. Plato dreamed of a philosopher king—a ruler so wise and benevolent that he transcended the need for legal constraints. But even Plato eventually conceded the danger. "Where the law is subject to some other authority and has none of its own," he wrote, "the collapse of the state is not far off."
The Roman Contribution
The Roman statesman Cicero crystallized the concept in a phrase that echoes through centuries: "We are all servants of the laws in order to be free."
This sounds like a paradox. How can subjection to law produce freedom? The answer is that when everyone—including the powerful—must follow the same rules, ordinary people gain protection from arbitrary oppression. The law becomes a shield rather than just a sword.
The Romans developed practical mechanisms to enforce this idea. During the Roman Republic, magistrates who abused their power could be put on trial once their terms ended. Even under the Empire, when the emperor himself became personally immune—the legal term was "legibus solutus," meaning freed from the laws—citizens with grievances could still sue the imperial treasury. The person of the emperor was untouchable, but the machinery of government remained accountable.
Medieval England: From Alfred to Magna Carta
In 9th-century England, King Alfred the Great undertook something remarkable. He assembled a comprehensive law code—known as the Doom Book—and grounded it on a revolutionary principle: the same law would apply to all persons, whether rich or poor, friends or enemies.
Alfred drew his inspiration from Leviticus 19:15: "You shall do no iniquity in judgment. You shall not favor the wretched and you shall not defer to the rich. In righteousness you are to judge your fellow."
Three centuries later came the document that would become the most famous symbol of limited government in the English-speaking world: Magna Carta.
In 1215, a group of rebellious barons forced King John to accept limits on royal power. The king could no longer imprison free men arbitrarily, seize property without legal process, or ignore the customary rights of his subjects. Magna Carta didn't create democracy—it was really about protecting the privileges of the aristocracy—but it established a crucial principle: even the king must act according to law.
The document's influence waxed and waned over the following centuries. By the time of Henry VI and the Wars of the Roses, its practical force had greatly diminished. But the idea it represented never disappeared entirely. When American colonists began demanding their rights centuries later, they reached back to Magna Carta as precedent.
The English Phrase Takes Shape
The actual phrase "rule of law" first appears in English around 1500. One of its earliest documented uses comes from a 1610 petition to King James I from the House of Commons:
Amongst many other points of happiness and freedom which your majesty's subjects of this kingdom have enjoyed under your royal progenitors... there is none which they have accounted more dear and precious than this, to be guided and governed by the certain rule of the law which giveth both to the head and members that which of right belongeth to them, and not by any uncertain or arbitrary form of government.
Note the emphasis on "certain rule of the law" versus "uncertain or arbitrary" government. This gets at something essential: the rule of law provides predictability. Citizens can know in advance what is permitted and forbidden, plan their lives accordingly, and trust that the rules won't change capriciously.
Lex, Rex: The Law is King
The most influential early theorist of the rule of law was a Scottish theologian named Samuel Rutherford. In 1644, he published a book with a deliberately provocative title: "Lex, Rex"—Latin for "the law is king."
This inverted the traditional formulation "rex lex"—the king is law. Under that older view, whatever the monarch commanded was law by definition. The king's will created legal reality. Rutherford argued the opposite: law stands above the king and constrains him.
Rutherford was attacking the doctrine of divine right, which held that kings received their authority directly from God and answered to no earthly power. This idea seems strange today, but it was the dominant political theory in early modern Europe. By arguing that law superseded royal will, Rutherford was making a radical claim with revolutionary implications.
A few decades later, John Locke built on these ideas in his Second Treatise of Government. Locke argued that legitimate government rests on consent. Citizens surrender some natural liberty in exchange for the protection of a stable legal order, but that order must apply equally to everyone. Freedom under government, Locke wrote, means having "a standing rule to live by, common to every one of that society... and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man."
The American Experiment
These ideas found their fullest expression in the founding of the United States.
Thomas Paine put it memorably in Common Sense: "In America, the law is king. For as in absolute governments the King is law, so in free countries the law ought to be king; and there ought to be no other."
John Adams, who would become the second president, enshrined the principle in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. Article VI of its Declaration of Rights stated that no person is entitled to special privileges "distinct from those of the community" merely by birth. The "idea of a man born a magistrate, lawgiver, or judge," Adams declared, "is absurd and unnatural."
This was a direct repudiation of hereditary monarchy and aristocracy. In the American conception, no one inherits the right to stand above the law. Every generation must earn its position. The law recognizes no permanent ruling class.
Dicey and the Modern Concept
The person most responsible for shaping our modern understanding of the rule of law was a 19th-century British jurist named Albert Venn Dicey. Writing in 1885, Dicey identified three core principles.
First, the absolute supremacy of regular law over arbitrary power. No one should be punished except for a distinct breach of law established through ordinary courts. Government officials cannot simply exercise "wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers of constraint."
Second, equality before the law. Every person—regardless of rank, wealth, or position—is subject to the same legal system and the same courts.
Third, that constitutional principles emerge from ordinary legal cases. In Britain, fundamental rights weren't handed down from on high through some grand constitutional document. They developed case by case, as courts decided particular disputes. The constitution, in Dicey's view, was the accumulated result of countless judicial decisions protecting individual rights.
Thin and Thick Conceptions
Legal scholars today distinguish between two ways of understanding the rule of law. These are sometimes called "thin" and "thick" conceptions, or "formalist" and "substantive" approaches.
The thin or formalist view focuses purely on procedure. It asks: Are the laws clear? Are they publicly known? Do they apply prospectively rather than retroactively? Are they applied consistently? Are they general rather than targeting specific individuals? Under this view, a legal system can satisfy the rule of law even if its laws are unjust—so long as they meet these procedural requirements.
Imagine a tyrannical regime that openly publishes discriminatory laws, applies them consistently, and enforces them through regular courts. Under the thin conception, this might technically qualify as rule of law. The laws are terrible, but they're clear and predictable.
The thick or substantive view rejects this. It insists that true rule of law requires more than procedural correctness. The laws themselves must respect certain fundamental rights—human dignity, equality, freedom from arbitrary detention. Under this view, a legal system that systematically violates human rights cannot claim to embody the rule of law, no matter how formally correct its procedures.
The debate between these camps remains unresolved. Formalists argue that their approach is more precise and less culturally biased—who decides which substantive values count? Substantivists counter that a purely procedural rule of law is hollow, providing no protection against legalized injustice.
The Rule of Law Versus Flexibility
Here's an uncomfortable truth: strict adherence to the rule of law can sometimes produce harsh results.
Consider someone who violates a statute for genuinely good reasons—perhaps breaking a law that was itself unjust, or acting out of necessity in an emergency. Natural law theory might say such a person should go unpunished. But the rule of law, strictly applied, demands that the written law be enforced regardless of such considerations.
This tension is inherent in the concept. The rule of law sacrifices some flexibility in exchange for predictability and equality. If judges could ignore the law whenever they deemed it just to do so, we'd be back to rule by individuals rather than rule by law. Yet sometimes strict application of rules creates manifest injustice in particular cases.
Different legal systems handle this tension differently. Some build more discretion into their processes. Others maintain strict rules but provide mechanisms for executive clemency or legislative correction. None has found a perfect solution.
Opposite Concepts: Rule of Man
The clearest way to understand the rule of law is to consider its opposite: what political philosophers call the "rule of man."
Under rule of man, power is personal. The sovereign's word is law. Decisions depend on the ruler's mood, interests, and relationships. What's legal today might be illegal tomorrow if the ruler changes his mind. Allies receive favorable treatment while enemies face persecution. There's no consistent standard to appeal to because the standard is simply the ruler's will.
James Harrington captured this distinction in 1656 when he contrasted "an Empire of Laws, and not of Men" with "an Empire of Men, and not of Laws." The first provides stability and fairness; the second leaves everyone at the mercy of whoever holds power.
This distinction matters intensely in practice. In a system governed by law, citizens can predict consequences. They can plan, invest, take risks, and organize their lives knowing the rules won't change arbitrarily. In a system governed by personal rule, everything becomes precarious. Today's legality might become tomorrow's crime. Connections to power matter more than rights. Society operates not on principle but on patronage and fear.
The Rule of Law Today
Despite its ancient roots and widespread endorsement, the rule of law remains fragile.
Every generation faces temptations to erode it. Emergencies—real or manufactured—create pressure to grant officials expanded discretionary power. Political leaders find legal constraints inconvenient when pursuing their goals. Citizens sometimes prefer swift action to procedural propriety, especially when they fear crime, terrorism, or social change.
The concept also faces genuine philosophical challenges. If law is created by powerful institutions, in what sense does it truly stand above them? Can the rule of law exist without democracy, or are they inseparable? How do we balance national legal systems against international law?
Legal scholars continue wrestling with these questions. But the core insight remains powerful: a society where power must justify itself before impersonal law differs fundamentally from one where might makes right. The rule of law doesn't guarantee justice—plenty of unjust laws have been duly enacted and enforced—but it provides a framework within which justice becomes possible.
Or as Cicero understood two thousand years ago: we become free by becoming servants of the laws, precisely because those same laws constrain the powerful who would otherwise be our masters.